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Preface
International Multilateral Negotiation is a response to a growing awareness of
a great hole in the expanding field of negotiation analysis. Currently, no con-
ceptual work addresses the vast area of multilateral negotiation. Although a few
studies of negotiation concepts include a section on multilateral processes and
many insightful empirical studies have been made of multilateral cases, an ex-
plicit conceptual treatment of the subject is lacking. Implicitly or explicitly, all
negotiation theory addresses bilateral negotiation, but the complexity of multi-
lateral negotiations remains untreated.
This situation poses a major challenge. It means that practitioners ride-
often very skillfully-on the seat of their pants. It means that analysts explain-
often very insightfully-by induction and context. Operating on intuition and
reflexes learned through on-the-job training is what diplomats do, and their
actions are what analysts study. However, unless the process generated by those
actions and interactions, when performed well, is studied for regularities, gener-
alizations, and conceptualizations, it can never escape the prison of uniqueness
and can never be evaluated, improved on, taught, or learned from.
Yet at the same time, there are a number of theoretical approaches that are
potentially useful for providing generalizations and explanatory concepts. It is
impossible to test all of them, so some preliminary selection must be made.
Political science, economics, social psychology, sociology, and mathematics all
analyze aspects of multilateral negotiation. The problem with a disciplinary
approach is that these fields also address many other related phenomena, and
many of them address the same concepts, sometimes differently but often quite
similarly. Thus, all the disciplines mentioned discuss coalition, many discuss
power, several discuss decision, others discuss leadership, and so on.
In this book, we use conceptual approaches as the basis for the analysis
of multilateral negotiation, gaining richness through interdisciplinary means
whenever possible. In addition, to add spice to richness, proponents of these
approaches were asked to compete in an academic contest to provide the best
explanatory conceptualization for the multilateral process. The result is the first
broad attempt to provide tools of analysis designed specifically for the character-
istics of multilateral negotiation; this attempt is useful both to those involved in
multilateral negotiation and to those who analyze the subject.
In the process, behind this competitive diversity and overarching its ana-
lytical pluralism, a paradigmatic unity has appeared. The competition brought
xi
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out the fact that no approach was trumps because each was an attempt to provide
a segmentary answer to a single question that lies at the heart of the multilateral
negotiation process: how to manage the inherent complexity of multilateral
agreement. Using the management of complexity as an organizing paradigm
allows a general understanding of the nature of the problem and permits an
examination of its many forms. The complexity inherent when many parties in
many roles need to reach agreement on many issues has to be managed for anal-
ysis and decision, and each analytical approach presents a different way of man-
aging that complexity.
Thus, this work provides both a general understanding of and specific
analytical approaches to the problem of multilateral negotiation. Although it is
an analytical work, its findings and insights should be useful to practitioners as
well as to analysts. Both face a similar task in seeking to manage complexity: the
one to explain results and the other to produce results. By making the individual
efforts of practitioners generalizable and transmittable, analysis repays its debt to
practice for work well done. Thus, the authors present this work as a contribution
both to the analysis of the multilateral problem and to the training of good
negotiators and the improvement of multilateral negotiations.
About the Project
This study is the fifth to be produced by the Project on the Processes of Inter-
national Negotiation (PIN) at the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (nASA) in Laxenburg, Austria. The PIN Project came into being in
1986 through the recommendation of a steering committee of nASA's Council in
1981 and a decision by the council in 1984. It owes much to nASA's first director,
Howard Raiffa of Harvard University, whose career centered in many ways on
the field of negotiation analysis (and practice) and to whom this work is dedi-
cated. Its first product was Processes of International Negotiations (Mautner-
Markho£' 1989). The Project was initiated by Frances Mautner-Markhof in 1986
and fully constituted in 1988 by Robert Pry, then nASA director, and Bertram
I. Spector was engaged as its leader.
The work of the project has been organized by an international steering
committee of six scholars working with Spector: Guy-Olivier Faure, a French
anthropologist from the University of Sorbonne; Victor A. Kremenyuk, a Russian
political scientist from the Russian Academy of Sciences; Winfried Lang, an
Austrian diplomat and jurist from the University of Vienna; Jeffrey Z. Rubin, an
American social psychologist from Tufts University; Gunnar Sjostedt, a Swedish
political economist from the Swedish Foreign Policy Institute; and I. William
Zartman, an American political scientist from the Johns Hopkins University.
Three times a year for up to a week each time, this international committee has
met to work on the study of international negotiations in its many forms; the
gatherings were in themselves an exciting, collegial exercise in international
negotiation.
The keystone work of the project was International Negotiation: Analysis,
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Approaches, Issues (Kremenyuk, 1991). It was followed by International Environ-
mental Negotiations (Sjostedt, 1993) and by Culture and International
Negotiation (Faure and Rubin, 1993). Other works are in progress, including
Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from UNCED (Spector,
1994), Power and Asymmetry in Negotiation (Rubin and Zartman, forthcoming),
and International Economic Negotiations (Kremenyuk and Sjostedt, forthcom-
ing). Each of these works has been the product of collaboration among a large
group of international scholars and is the result of a workshop supported by
nASA for authors and others to discuss the draft contributions.
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Introduction
Two's Company and
More's a Crowd
The Complexities of Multilateral Negotiation
I. William Zartman (USA)
As the incisive common wisdom on social interaction reveals, the chemistry
changes when more than two are working out a relationship. The dyad has its
own dynamic, but the complexity introduced by a larger number of parties defies
straightforward analysis. Negotiation theory, such as it is, has focused exclusively
on bilateral bargaining, based on assumptions strictly dependent on the existence
of two parties. Therefore, its answers to the basic analytical question-How are
negotiated outcomes achieved/explained?-are at least suspect because of inap-
plicable assumptions and may be entirely invalid for multilateral interactions. A
new and specific answer has to be sought for the same question in a multilateral
setting.
Negotiators in a multilateral encounter enter with such questions as, What
is going on here? How can we find our way through this scene? How can we give
some direction to these proceedings? How can we make something happen? Ne-
gotiators need to orient themselves both to the other parties and to the issues, and
at the same time to an array of roles, particularly of competing leaders and
contributing followers. This is a very different array of roles from that found in
bilateral negotiations, where the two parties are immediately cast as adversaries
and where analysis seeks to capture the inherent adversarial dynamics-as players
in a two-party game of strategic choice, as convergers through concessions, as
Indian wrestlers, or as inventors of an overarching collaborative formula to over-
come their differences. In multilateral negotiation, the initial perception is not
adversarial because participants do not know who is the adversary and because
structuring the dynamics on the basis of confrontation would turn all parties into
1
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a coalition of opponents. In bilateral negotiation, the situation is already struc-
tured by definition; in a multilateral situation, it must be structured, according
to the parties and issues, through a use of roles.
The one discipline that has provided answers to its own form of the basic
analytic question comes up with a tantalizing result. Instead of seeing bilateral
decision making as a straightforward problem and multilateral decision making
as a complex problem, economics presents a reversed picture. "The theory of
bilateral monopoly is indeterminate with a vengeance," write two economics
authorities. "When either pure competition or pure monopoly prevails, there are
clearcut solutions to the firm's price and output decision problems" (Scherer and
Ross, 1990, p. 519). Why go any further? Why not hand over the multilateral
bargaining problem to the economists and declare victory? Unfortunately, mul-
tilateral negotiation is not pure competition but rather oligopoly, a very different
problem. "Oligopoly pricing is interesting and important ... because it poses
such difficult problems for the economic theorist" (Scherer and Ross, 1990,
p. 199). In multilateral negotiation, numbers are large but not infinite, generally
between 10 and 150. Size matters, and parties are not equal (as they generally are
assumed to be in bilateral negotiation). Interests differ, and so roles differ as well.
As a result, economists can provide insights, but the basic problem cannot be left
in their hands for a solution.
Similarly, political scientists studying regimes have also focused on a form
of multilateral negotiation, but they explain the outcome of the process in terms
of its preconditions. As Touval and Rubin (1987, p. 1; compare Touval, 1989)
point out, explaining how "is not the same as asking why agreements are con-
cluded." To show "that cooperation and agreement take place because the parties
give priority to common interests over conflicting ones" not only assumes away
the problem by focusing on the common interests already achieved but avoids the
problem by explaining the outcome through preconditions rather than process.
Nor do the preconditions explain the process. They only open the way to an
analysis of negotiation, which cooperation studies generally do not pursue. Anal-
ysis is left at the doorstep of the basic issue, an explanation of the way in which
many parties with mixed motives achieve an agreement.
The regimes branch of political science draws its roots originally from
game theory, where there is also a well-developed analytical approach to multi-
lateral decision making. Starting with parties' shares, which are imputed var-
iously from security points, or from innovative or integrative strategies (Ikle,
1964; Walton and McKersie, 1965), the theory determines outcomes that can be
obtained by players acting according to both collective rationality and individual
rationality using formulas based on impartial, equitable, or stable justice (Davis,
1970; Rapoport, 1970a, 1970b). It also shows the conditions under which a partial
coalition will be preferable for some or all parties to a great coalition-that is,
a unanimous joint decision. But its emphasis is on explaining nonagreement
more than on explaining agreement, and its cases of agreement are coincidences
of the initial imputations. It does not tell how to move to larger positive-sum
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outcomes or how to obtain a consensual agreement when smaller coalitions are
preferred by some players.
As a result, the challenge is open. The stage can be set for meeting it by
setting out the characteristics of multilateral negotiation that define it and distin-
guish it from bilateral negotiation and then turning to the several theoretical
approaches proposed to provide explanations from the phenomenon as identified.
Distinctions
The overarching characteristic of multilateral negotiation is its complexity along
all conceivable dimensions. Although most studies of the subject say little about
multilaterality as its essential characteristic, those that do tend to agree with this
emphasis on complexity, beginning with two seminal works in 1977. Midgaard
and Underdal (1977, pp. 334, 339-341) emphasize that in negotiations the more
the messier, to the point where negotiation itself is inversely successful in relation
to size; they focus on ways of organizing that complexity by reducing the size to
make it manageable for negotiation-through mediation, coalition, and even
increased roles for chance. Winham (1977a) also points to the characteristic com-
plexity of multilateral negotiations, with oversimplified cognitive structures, fad-
ing appreciation of concessions, and increased end-game pressures as its major
effects. His in-depth case study a decade later (Winham, 1986) brings out both the
messiness and the concessional inconclusiveness of multilateral negotiations in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Raiffa (1982, pp. 252-254)
devotes an entire section to negotiations of "many parties, many issues," insisting
that they are conceptually different but not specifying the nature of those differ-
ences; he does, however, mention complexity and concentrates on two ways of
handling its issue and actor components-the single negotiating text and the
coalition.
The silence of most studies on the difference between multilateral and
bilateral negotiations, however, might be taken as evidence that the difference is
only one of degree, not of essence. Both Winham (1982; 1986, Chap. 9) and Raiffa
(1982, p. 251) reject this view, but there is still little discussion in the literature
of why bilateral analysis cannot be merely extended to multilateral negotiation.
Instead, some authors (Lipson, 1985, p. 220; Snidal, 1985, p. 53) contend the
reverse, that multilateral negotiations need to be reduced to their bilateral dimen-
sion to be susceptible to analysis. The argument can be made that this is what
happens in reality because ostensibly multiple sides often congregate into two
camps, either institutionally (as in the Cold War) or issue by issue. Yet, also in
reality, practitioners and analysts alike have often decried the constraining aspect
of bilateralism, with the nonaligned nations coming into being to break down
the bilateralism of the Cold War and crosscutting coalitions being proposed to
overcome the North-South stalemate (Mortimer, 1984; Zartman, 1987, Chap. 10).
Winham (1986) make the important theoretical point that conflicts tend
to bilateralize, but he modifies its practical import by emphasizing the lower level
of conflict in nonmilitary encounters. Thus, even if there is enough conflict over
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a negotiated issue to polarize the sides, there is usually at least a third side that
sees its interests best served by neutrality and mediation. Furthermore, if polari-
zation is the principal effect of one issue, the multi-issued nature of multilateral
negotiations means that there will at worst be many crosscutting, two- or three-
sided face-offs, none of which is overriding enough to line up parties into a
bipolar conflict or a bilateral negotiation. This idea has been carried to the point
of characterizing multilateral negotiations as merely the negotiations of many
dyads (Preeg, 1970, pp. 89-90,133-134, 184-194), but this characterization has not
been used to analyze results. If analysis were to be based on dyads, either the
picture would be incomplete or the result would be chaos. The very purpose of
multilateral negotiation is to give difficult but necessary coherence to the com-
plexity created by a congeries of dyads (Sebenius, 1984, pp. 99, 108; Rummel,
1982). Analysis must meet the same test.
Characteristics
To understand the phenomenon under consideration, it is important to identify
the minimal and basic characteristics that define multilateral negotiation and
distinguish it from bilateral agreement. Within the standard definition of nego-
tiation as the process by which conflicting positions are combined to form a
common decision (Zartman and Berman, 1982, p. 1), six characteristics with their
relevant implications define the multilateral version of the process. l
First, and most obviously, multilateral means multiparty negotiations.
Although any party may agree with any other party, and eventually all parties
presumably reach agreement, the multiparty assumption implies autonomous
entities each with interests and interest groups of its own to underpin its separate
position. Many sides do not just constitute a numbers game but rather a challenge
to the reconciliation of multifaceted interests.
A second characteristic is the multi-issue nature of multilateral negotia-
tions. This attribute is based in reality but is not inherent; negotiations with
many sides could be on only one issue, but in fact the large forums under con-
sideration always do involve many issues, not all of them even related to the broad
topic. Conversely, bilateral negotiations may also deal with multiple issues; the
difference between the two types of negotiations on this dimension is one of
degree rather than of nature. Multiple issues provide the means as well as the
subject of agreement because they allow for trade-offs that provide the network
for a single outcome. They also create texture in the negotiations because not all
of the many parties have the same intensity of interest on any issue, any more
than they have the same substantive interest. This texture allows Homans's
maxim-"The more items at stake can be divided into goods valued more by one
party [or parties] than they cost to the other[s] and goods valued more to the other
party [or parties] than they cost to the first, the greater the chances of successful
outcome" (Homans, 1961, p. 62)-to be played out to the fullest, and Homans's
maxim is the key to any negotiation. How it works in multilateral negotiations
is the subject of analysis in Chapters Three and Four.
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The third defining characteristic is the multirole nature of the negotia-
tions. Just as texture is present on the issue dimension, combining intensity and
interest, so is it present on the party dimension, adding role differential to
numbers and interest groups. But role presents its own dimension beyond the
simple matter of intensity. In the process of being more or less active in multi-
lateral negotiations, parties select from a limited list of roles that differ in nature.
They can drive, conduct, defend, brake, or cruise (Sj&tedt, 1993; Yuki, 1989).
Drivers are leaders who try to organize the participants to produce an agreement
that is consonant with the leaders' interests. Conductors, also called managers,
also seek to produce an agreement but from a neutral position, with no interest
ax of their own to grind. Defenders are single-issue participants, concerned more
with promoting their issue than with the overall success of the negotiations.
Brakers seek to block an agreement and protect their freedom of action, often with
reference to a limited number of issues. Cruisers are filler, with no strong interests
of their own, and so are available to act as followers. Without such role diversity,
the issue and party complexities could not be combined into an agreeable out-
come. Although the list may appear ad hoc, it actually encompasses the main
roles available to parties. Additional research could usefully check cases for other
roles. It could also pursue detailed role analysis, including such questions as the
relation between role and power or the effects of different role interactions. Some
of these questions are addressed in Chapter Seven.
Bilateral negotiations are characterized by variable values, as opposed to
fixed choices that must be voted for or against. Negotiated decisions are possible
because the parties can reformulate the proposed outcomes and because one party
can influence the value that the other party attaches to those outcomes (Zartman,
1978, p. 70). However, the number of parties is fixed, by definition, in bilateral
negotiations, and so the roles the parties play are fixed or are at least highly
limited. Multilateral negotiations, in contrast, are composed of variable values,
parties, and roles-that is, participants can, and therefore must, play at all three
levels of interaction, working to shape not only the values attached to various
outcomes and the outcomes themselves but also the parties and their roles in order
to come to an agreement. They must do so because if they choose to ignore these
possibilities, others will make use of them, forcing the other parties to play at
the three levels in response. Again, the immense complexity of having to deal
with many parties, issues, and roles makes doing so the price of winning an
agreement, thus further increasing the characteristic complexity.
The fifth and sixth characteristics of multilateral negotiations concern the
outcomes. Agreement has been used thus far to characterize the outcome, but in
fact-again because of the complexity-induced difficulty of reaching unanimous
agreement-a looser term is needed for multilateral negotiations. Multilateral
agreement is frequently by consensus, a decision rule in which, essentially, ab-
stention is an affirmative rather than a negative vote. Multilateral agreements are
arrived at by consensus when a significant but unspecified number of parties are
in favor and the rest do not oppose. Even where voting is provided for in the rules,
multilateral decision making tends to save it for exceptional cases-cases of vital
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national interest, in the terminology of the European Communities-and focuses
instead on the mechanisms of building consensus.
The implications of this condition are significant. In bilateral negotia-
tions, each party has a veto, and therefore there is a basic element of equality. Veto
is a looser notion in multilateral negotiations if it exists at all. Parties not agree-
ing can abstain without blocking the outcome, and parties opposing can be left
out as long as their number does not become significant. Strategies of incremental
participation and agreement then become possible (Zartman, 1987, Chap. 10). At
the same time, the significant-number requirement means that lowest-common-
denominator agreements without teeth are a residual possibility but also that
such agreements can form the basis of an incremental process that creates inter-
national sociopolitical pressures rather than legal obligations to conform (Zart-
man, 1993). Thus the implications of consensus rather than agreement are
significant and invite further research, as indicated in Chapters Four and Six.
Fifth, the outcomes of multilateral negotiations are mainly matters of rule
making rather than the redistribution of tangible goods. Neither of the basic
characteristics of division and exchange is often present in multilateral negoti-
ations; instead, the main goal is to harmonize national legislation or to establish
rules that can be applied by and to states (Winham and Kizer, 1993). Having this
goal does not mean that tangible goods are not thereby affected, but it does mean
that the effect is uncertain, long-range, and universal, rather than simply being
contingent on the other party's actions. It does mean that the importance of the
formula is even greater in multilateral negotiations than in bilateral negotiations
because the adoption of a rule depends more on a convincing justification or a
notion of justice than on exchanged concessions in detail. Trade-offs between
rules, however, are often a major part of the structure of multilateral agreements,
although the framework for the analysis of such trade-offs needs further research;
this framework is addressed in Chapter Five.
Finally, and obviously, multilateral negotiations are characterized by coa-
lition (Rapoport, 1970b; Lax and Sebenius, 1991). Through the formation of
coalitions, "the [multilateral] negotiatory situation becomes less complicated"
(Stenelo, 1972, p. 58). Although coalition has been proposed as a major approach
to analyzing multilateral negotiations, particularly through game theory, it
should be considered one-even if a salient one-of many ways in which parties
in many-partied negotiations handle their own large number by bringing that
number down to a manageable size. But coalition is a mechanism not only avail-
able to the many parties but also applicable to the many issues. Because the goal
of negotiations is to arrive at decisions on issues, it is necessary to reduce their
complexity and make them, as well as the number of parties, manageable. Pack-
aging, linkages, and trade-offs-the basic devices of the negotiation process-are
all ways of making coalitions among issues, interests, and positions. Although
there is much disparate work on coalition formation, further research is needed
both on its operation and on the framework for analysis, as discussed in Chapter
Seven.
The defining elements of the multilateral negotiation process form the
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framework for an appropriate analytical approach to the subject. Roles are used
to produce party and issue coalitions so that the complexity of the multilateral
situation becomes sufficiently manageable for a consensus decision to emerge.
Analysis focusing on the use of different roles to produce consensus among par-
ties on issues responds to the needs of both observers and practitioners to under-
stand and deal with the management of complexity.
Approaches
This basic approach may be pursued from a number of different angles provided
by different disciplines or schools of analysis. No single approach can claim a
monopoly on explanation, for any natural or social phenomenon can be ex-
plained by a variety of insights and from a variety of angles. But some angles can
provide a better view of the phenomenon by using parameters and techniques
that explain more than other approaches do. Both the innate appropriateness of
the approach and the skill with which it is used are involved. In each case, the
use of an approach for analyzing multilateral negotiations has to rise above some
inherent limitations associated with its use for bilateral analysis. Although other
approaches could be added to the following group, these are prominent vantage
points in social disciplines for the study of multilateral decision making.
l. Decision analysis is based on seriatim consideration of each player's
outcome values, followed by comparison among them. In order to deal with the
many parties in multilateral negotiations, they are grouped into a small number
of coalitions based on similar preferences (Barclay and Peterson, 1976). The many
issues are handled one at a time, with attention focused on salient concerns. By
moving back and forth between major coalitions and major issues, analysts and
practitioners can come up with some notion of trade-offs. Decision analysis does
not purport to be predictive or explanatory but merely serves as a simplified guide
to decision making-a simple, straightforward, practical way of managing com-
plexity. It can, however, portray a distribution of positions on an issue in such
a way that results and the need for change become apparent; it can then multiply
these "snapshots" to produce a moving record of evolving positions and allow
inductive generalizations to be made about the patterns of movement (Friedheim,
1987, 1993). This analysis can then be played back in a "what if" mode to explain
why the parties acted as they did, assuming best-interest rationality.
2. Strategic analysis using game theory is also based on the structure of
values the parties assign to different outcomes. It pluralizes decision analysis
because it considers outcomes to be the product of social interaction. The mul-
tilateral form of strategic analysis, n-person game theory, is based on coalitions,
not as an insight or an outcome as in other approaches but as the characteristic
starting point. Beginning with the parties' security points or with innovative or
integrative outcomes from which the parties' shares can be imputed (Davis, 1970;
Rapoport, 1970a), the theory determines outcomes that can be achieved by players
acting rationally, either collectively or individually, according to formulas for
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agreement that embody various notions of justice (Rapoport, 1970b). It also de-
termines the level and conditions under which a great coalition (or joint decision
with unanimous agreement) can be formed or will be rejected by some parties as
inferior to partial coalitions.
Because strategic analysis is based on coalitions, however, it is limited to
three or four collective players; "n-player games are usually too complex for
classical game theory to provide clear answers" (Fraser and Hipel, 1984, p. 324;
Davis, 1970). Like two-person game theory, it tells where rational outcomes lie,
but it does not tell much about shaping them. Using fixed values, it does not tell
how to move to large positive-sum outcomes or how to devise consensual out-
comes to overcome preferred partial coalitions. It is not surprising, therefore, that
this approach has shown more usefulness in the analysis of voting, which is a
different process than negotiation (Riker, 1962; Midgaard and Underdal, 1977,
p. 341; Zartman, 1978, pp. 69-71). Yet it does provide powerful insights into the
comparative chances of choices, which is the promise of its approach.
3. Organizational analysis is based on the institutional setting of multi-
lateral negotiation; it explains outcomes through parties' behavior as deduced
from their position within an organization or from their need to find their way
through the constraints of the organization-that is, as they operate with or
against the organizational imperatives. These imperatives can be either the spe-
cific rules of a given organization or the broader constraints of collective insti-
tutionalized behavior inherent in all organizations. Use of the specific rules,
typical of public administration approaches, is captive to the idiosyncratic details
of the case, and use of the broader constraints is captive to the assumption that
all multilateral negotiation is dominated by its institutional context. But both
approaches provide a powerful insight into limiting and channeling factors that
can work to produce outcomes, and the more generalized notions of organization
theory add a dimension of external logic that is not apparent in a simple study
of actors' choices.
Thus, multilateral negotiation can be analyzed using the theorem that the
organization moves its members to an agreed outcome, whenever possible,
through its rules, culture, and institutions. "Whenever possible" is determined
by the characteristics of the organization and its members, which may constitute
barriers to the type of agreement being sought. The result is an interesting type
of cybernetic interaction whereby members, specifically defined, set up their own
rules, which then guide their subsequent actions, which then impinge on and
inform further modifications of the rules, which then guide subsequent actions,
and so on in a forward-moving series of communication loops. Rules, character-
istics, and behaviors are all inputs and outputs of the recycling system.
4. Small group analysis is also a contextual approach, explaining out-
comes of a peculiar interaction that occurs in a restricted pluralist setting. An
innovative use of small group analysis, which is usually applied as an explana-
tion of conformity pressures, can reveal the dynamics of agreement in multilateral
bargaining. Like other approaches, small group analysis handles complexity by
assuming a reduced number of players and focusing on both within-group and
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among-group interactions, both seen as small group behavior. Decision making
is analyzed as an aggregative process in which the group moves through the large
uncoalesced mass of many parties to form one or several core groups and then
moves to a single consensus. Small group analysis comes from social psychology
and thus focuses on the interpersonal and intergroup pressures rather than
simply on the organizational structures that operate on the actors. The actors'
behavior then becomes a function of the nexus created by their own interaction.
5. Power-coalition analysis could be seen as "all of the above," but it also
has a specific angle of its own to explain multilaterally negotiated outcomes.
Whereas other approaches to coalition see it as either the starting point or the
by-product of analysis, coalition analysis can be employed as a specific focus to
explain outcomes. It does so by analyzing the use of power to create coalitions;
the purposive actions of the parties are its parameter. Whereas game theory tells
which coalitions will be optimal under conditions of full information and ra-
tionality, power-coalition analysis concentrates on the way in which parties form
coalitions by manipulating information and overcoming conflicts of rationality.
Both outcomes and side payments are used as inducements and dissuasions to
move parties into coalition on given issues.
Coalitions can be identified as various types, depending on their size,
stability, "hardness," and cohesion, and then correlated with the tactics of power
appropriate for each type. Strategies in the decision-making process, such as
Sj6stedt's (1993) driving, braking, and modifying, also vary with different types
of coalitions. Thus, the particular constellation of parties and interests deter-
mines the type of coalition, which in turn determines the available and appro-
priate power needed to further the parties' interests.
6. Leadership analysis focuses even more sharply than coalition analysis
on the negotiating agent, analyzing tactics and strategies used to reduce the com-
plexity of both parties and issues to the point where a consensual decision
emerges. It identifies a major role and treats other roles in relation to it, thus
handling the three components of multilateral complexity. Leadership itself has
its own modes. In a historical-descriptive or personality mode, it has frequently
been used as the basis for the "great man" school of history, giving examples of
unilateral actions toward other parties. Another mode, "coercive" leadership, is
related to coalition analysis as already presented. And, in a mode analyzed in this
book, instrumental or entrepreneurial leaders contribute to the design of "good"
solutions or procedures through cooperative arrangements and tie together the
tactics of orchestrating complexity with the creation of positive-sum outcomes.
Spokespeople for these six schools of analysis were invited to present their
approach and to focus its explanatory power on a few selected multilateral ne-
gotiation cases; in the process they were asked also to refine the approach beyond
its current state of development into new levels for multilateral analysis. The
invitation was for a competition, in which the submissions vie to provide the best
explanation of outcomes, using the cases as illustrations. Earlier a similar com-
petition was held for the definition and analysis of the basic bilateral process
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(Zartman, 1978). The result brought out the comparative strengths of different
disciplinary approaches as well as the basic unity of views on the subject of
negotiation itself. In that instance, the different approaches were then illustrated
by case studies that employed the modes of analysis to explain various bilateral
encounters. Some years later, a different competition was set up using a single
case-the Henry Kissinger disengagement negotiations in the Middle East in
1974-1975-as the subject of competing analyses and evaluations (Rubin, 1981).
There the purpose was not merely to analyze and explain outcomes but also to
make judgments about the conduct of diplomacy and the appropriateness of the
methods employed.
In this study, two cases have been chosen for analysis by the competing
schools. Although many cases could have been studied, space limitations imposed
a choice of two; they were selected because of their innate importance, their
numerical and institutional variation, their complex process, and the fact that
they are in general typical of multilateral negotiations. One is the negotiated
decision of the twelve members of the European Communities in 1985 to adopt
goals and procedures to consolidate their integration by 1993; the result is known
as the Single European Act. The other is the negotiated indecision of the 108
signatories of GATT facing their eighth round of tariff reductions between 1986
and 1993, a process fraught with multiple breakdowns. The cases are presented
as significant events in themselves, worthy of analysis, but also as examples of
two types of many-party negotiations separated by an order of magnitude-one
with about ten parties, termed plurilateral, operating within an institutionalized
context; and the other with over a hundred parties, termed multilateral, operating
within a much looser institutional framework. Thus, the secondary purpose of
the analysis to see whether this span in size makes any difference to the process,
outcome, or analysis. Prima facie evidence would suggest that larger numbers
make agreement more difficult, but finer analysis is needed. It is to the presen-
tation of cases and the subsequent analyses that this study now turns.
Note
1. This list is necessarily similar to but importantly different from that of
Young (1989c, pp. 359-366). His "multiple actors" category is of course the same.
"Consensus" replaces "unanimity" as being more accurate; "coalition" and
"variable values, parties and roles" replace "transnational alliances" and "shift-
ing involvements" as being more specific. Young's "integrative bargaining"
seems to mistake an optimal search for a basic characteristic. Both "uncertainty"
and "[selective] problems and approaches" are interesting features but do not
appear to be defining characteristics.
PART ONE
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Chapter 1
Negotiating the
Single European Act
in the European Community
Juliet Lodge (UK)
The Single European Act (SEA) is a document that covers amendments to the
1957 treaties establishing the European Communities (EC). It does not have the
status of a new treaty, although it was subject to the unanimous approval of
the twelve EC member governments-France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux
countries (the original six) plus the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Portu-
gal, Spain, and Greece-and ratification by their usual constitutional processes.
In practice, this procedure gave a final role to national parliaments (normally
irrelevant to EC decision-making processes). In the event, only one parliament-
Ireland-challenged the SEA's legality, on the grounds that its Title IlIon po-
litical cooperation compromised Ireland's neutrality. This chapter on the
plurilateral negotiations over the SEA is divided into six parts, as outlined in the
earlier study by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Processes
of International Negotiation Project (Kremenyuk, 1991): background and aims,
actors, structure, strategy, process, and outcomes.
Background
The SEA Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) negotiations were the product of
earlier demarches by key actors, and their experience of success and failure con-
ditioned the whole process. Stagflation; ossified decision-making procedures; a
declining capacity to act decisively, responsively, and accountably; persistent
rows over the budget and the United Kingdom's contributions to it; the prospect
of further enlargement of the EC to the poorer Mediterranean periphery; and
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slippage in the EC's position in the international political economy in the late
1970s and early 1980s led the Commission of the European Communities and the
European Parliament (EP) to consider a strategy for injecting a new dynamism
into the EC and into the process of European integration. For several years, the
Commission's annual reports on the progress of the internal market had iden-
tified problems and the additional, avoidable costs incurred because of physical,
technical, and fiscal barriers to freedom of movement of goods, services, capital,
and persons within the EC.
Not until 1985, however, was the Commission's white paper on the com-
pletion of the internal market (subsequently known as the Single Market) pub-
lished. It catalyzed wide public debate and governmental response. By then, it had
become part of conventional wisdom among Euro-official and business elites,
some of whom had played a role in provoking discussion and in lobbying the
Commission and EP for appropriate initiatives. Business elites wanted official
Commission intervention to remove internal borders to help them attain their
corporate goals and increase their profit margins. In the early 1980s, the EP's
Albert-Ball report on the causes of and remedies for economic decline in the EC
was published. It coincided with political initiatives being taken within the EP
to advance the idea of a European Union.
In short the political-economic costs of "non-Europe" and the imperatives
for cutting them were given priority and placed on the EC's agenda for urgent
action, with a specific deadline and strong pressure to meet it. It was unusual for
the EC to build in deadlines for the attainment of policy goals. That it did in
this case underlined the sense of urgency and the consensus-based commitment
to the general goal of completing the Single Market. The peaks and troughs of
such pressure can be charted, with peaks coinciding with the most visible, high-
level political negotiations at the European Council meetings (notably in Milan
and Luxembourg in June and December 1985). In addition, further pressure came
from the principal EC actors (the Commission and the EP) with their proposals
to reform the EC's traditional system of decision making to ensure fast action.
Such reform was a sine qua non for meeting the January 1993 target but was one
of the most controversial and sensitive issues.
The SEA was neither unexpected nor completely novel. It was part of a
long process of constitutional adjustment within the EC that had its origins in
the mid-1970s, within the overall context of advancing European union (a neb-
ulous, ill-defined term). Its roots can be traced to the Tindemans Report on
European Union in 1975 and the 1980 Genscher-Colombo initiative for a Draft
European Act (which eventually surfaced in attenuated form in the Solemn Dec-
laration of European Union in 1983) and more importantly to the EP's 1984 draft
treaty establishing the European Union, which had a decisive influence on the
SEA's content.
These predecessors to the SEA were important, as they encapsulated both
the minimalist (no or minor change) and maximalist (fundamental constitu-
tional change, new treaty) positions of the various governments, national and
supranational political parties, and EC institutions. Regarding the key issue of
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constitutional reform of EC decision-making practices, the actors were broadly
aware of the main parameters and the arguments for and against reform because
these had already been rehearsed in the immediate past. Even though govern-
ments in some of the member states changed in the interim, a broad inference
could be drawn as to what reforms each was likely to entertain realistically.
Thus, opening positions bore some resemblance to past known positions.
It also meant that governments could playa high-profile pro- or anti-European
Union role with impunity as part of their opening negotiating gambit, as EC
rules (both written and unwritten) prescribe concession making to achieve con-
sensus, usually around the midpoint positions of all players. Compromise is the
name of the game. This is known from the outset and is reflected in bargaining
tactics. Governments can switch from tough to soft to moderate positions accord-
ing to the issue under discussion to achieve an overall package that corresponds
neither to their lowest acceptable deal nor to their optimal goal on every issue.
Cooperative behavior is the norm in the EG But on individual issues,
usually for tactical reasons, a state may adopt an initially antagonistic position
in the expectation that others will engage in behavior that is more accommodat-
ing to its own interests than it might expect through usual negotiations. Al-
though such extreme behavior is relatively rare, it may be the product of the
personality of a particular leader (Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom is
the example in this case study). It may also occur on issue-specific occasions (for
example, the U.K. budget dispute) when compromise seems undesirable or when
vital national interests seem endangered. It might even occur, although even more
rarely, when the majority lines up against one state that is blocking progress
wanted by the others (this too happened in the SEA case). But, normally, the
expectation is that initially antagonistic behavior will turn sufficiently cooper-
ative to permit bargains to be struck. The two may coexist simultaneously across
different issue areas, giving the EC a propensity to go for package deals as part
of an overall bargain, as typified by the SEA negotiations.
So why was a new type of initiative needed in the shape of the SEA? The
answer lies in the perceived urgency of the problems confronting the EC and the
apparent incapacity of existing mechanisms to handle them adequately and
speedily. Small amendments to the founding treaties of the Communities had
been undertaken on a piecemeal basis in the past in selected areas, but this time
a more radical approach was wanted by both key EC institutional actors and most
governments. The original goal of some governments was to secure the adoption
of a new treaty to supersede the Rome Treaty. This proved impossible. That the
treaty revisions could be grouped together in a single document was something
of a triumph. But the SEA was initially neither understood as nor intended to
be a major constitutional document in the way that the European Union Treaty
(EUT) was.
Some governments, notably the Italian, held the high European ground,
and not simply for strategic or tactical reasons. Some, such as Germany, could
play the rhetorical European role in the expectation that the antagonistic posi-
tion of another (notably the United Kingdom) would lead to compromise that
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approximated their real interests (less enthusiastically pro-European Union than
Italy or their own rhetoric). All could rely on the fact that the EC works by
problem solving: the Commission and the various government working parties
are intent on preparing options that will be acceptable to all parties. In the
normal course of events, the Commission does not even formally table proposals
that it knows, through preliminary soundings, will antagonize most of the
member states. And major political initiatives can be underpinned by high-level
political intervention through the European Council. But, in the SEA process,
the Commission did not perform its initiating role because the decision-making
process was not supranational but intergovernmental. This process gave govern-
ments the key role.
The Milan European Council had in fact approved four different institu-
tional initiatives: the revision of the treaties in accordance with the Article 236
procedure for an intergovernmental conference (ICC); the drafting of a treaty on
political cooperation; a request to the Council of Ministers to "study the insti-
tutional conditions in which the completion of the internal market could be
achieved within the desired time limits"; and the launching of the Eureka scien-
tific cooperation project outside the EC framework. It also agreed that the first
and second initiatives might be taken together or separately.
Slightly earlier, political demarches had been initiated within the new,
directly elected EP for wholesale constitutional reform and the EC's transforma-
tion into a genuine European Union. The EUT was devised as the constitutional
basis for the Union. It has many of the hallmarks of a written constitution and
also corresponded to the maximalist position for the SEA process. It stood as a
concrete alternative to the SEA but did not have a realistic chance of being
adopted because it was too federal in its prescriptions. Thus it provided a modest
threat position because governments' slow moves toward further integration
could be compared with the EUT and shown as failing to provide the institu-
tional reforms necessary to ensure the completion of the Single Market. This
threat was a potent factor in motivating governments to agree to institutional
reform and was also necessary after years of prevarication. Furthermore, it was
implicit that given the EUT's unacceptability, almost any agreement from the
SEA process would be better than none at all. Those sympathetic to the EUT,
however, had an interest in ensuring that the outcome of the negotiations approx-
imated as far as possible the EUT recommendations. Thus, the EUT was an
essential reference point for the SEA negotiators both in its actual content and
in the strategy and tactics used for its development and adoption by the EP.
Inspired by Euro-federalist Altiero Spinelli, the all-party deliberations of
the parliamentarians' unionist "crocodile club" and later the EP's special ad hoc
Institutional Affairs Committee (lAC) created broad-based, cross-party, cross-
national support for the EUT in the EP and in member countries. The strategy
adopted was based on past experience of failure. Transformation had always been
thwarted by national governments anxious lest treaty reform clip their autonomy
and erode national sovereignty, goals that had priority over effective, efficient,
responsive, and democratic decision making. The lAC sought to overcome this
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anxiety by creating wide support for the EUT inside the EP and outside it,
including within national parliaments that it lobbied. Both the strategy and the
content of the EUT were designed to inform governments and influence the
content of the SEA. Without the EUT, it is doubtful that the SEA would have
seen the light of day. The EUT remains, moreover, the benchmark for subsequent
constitutional deliberations in the EP (such as the Martin and Colombo reports
of 1990) and indirectly, therefore, for the intergovernmental conference (ICC) on
political union in 1990-1991.
The SEA's aims were to realize the internal market (later the Single
Market); to introduce measures that would enable the attainment of that goal,
such as institutional reform and amendment of key articles of the Rome Treaty;
to limit the formal requirement for unanimity; to encourage majority voting in
the Council; to expand the jurisdiction of the EC; and to advance the European
Union.
Actors
The EC is a unique supranational organization. It has many of the features of
a federal state but is not a state. Its decision-making system is geared to the
emission of binding legislation. This is a distinguishing feature of the EC which
makes it unlike other international organizations. It is not in the business of
making agreements with which compliance is voluntary. Legislation taking the
form of regulations and directives is binding on the member states, directly ap-
plicable and superior to national, domestic legislation that may conflict with it.
Member states cannot opt out. They can be arraigned before the EC Court of
Justice for inadequate compliance with EC law that they have approved as a
group. Under majority voting (more common since the SEA), states in a minority
are obliged to comply with legislation.
The methods involved in this legislative process both include and go
beyond those of intergovernmental cooperation and bargaining. Thus, the EC
Commission, which alone initiates legislation, does so only when it has taken
informal soundings in the member states. Once it tables a piece of draft legisla-
tion, the aim is to see it adopted (in amended form if necessary) by the Council
of Ministers. Under the old single-reading decision-making procedure, the adop-
tion process could be exceptionally protracted, in the more notorious instances-
for example, the architects' directive-taking over a decade, but it normally runs
from two to five years. Under this system, the Council could reject legislation
only unanimously but could adopt by unanimity (where prescribed by the treaty),
by effective unanimity (whereby discussions and concession making continue
until there is a majority consensus in favor of the legislative proposal), or by a
qualified majority (when prescribed by the treaty and where votes are weighted
according to the size of the member state and to ensure the support of a mixture
of large and small states). The unanimity requirement so that member govern-
ments could not easily throw out draft legislation underscores commitment to
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problem solving on a joint basis. Consequently, building majority consensus on
issues is the norm.
At the political level, such consensus may be built through formal chan-
nels or through a series of bilateral tete-a-tetes between the Council president and
his or her counterparts in key member states before critical meetings of the Coun-
cil. It may occur within the Council of Ministers, in the "fireside" chats of foreign
ministers, or in meetings in the corridors. At the level of officials, similar meet-
ings take place. When actual legislative proposals are on the table, however, the
Commission assumes its critical role as honest broker and arbitrator. In such
instances, it alone is formally able to draft amendments to the original proposals.
Although the treaty prescribes weighted majority voting in some instances,
the practice has been for states to continue bargaining-with the help of the
intermediary of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and
the Commission-until a consensus is discerned. Relatively rarely have issues
been formally put to a vote. States may veto draft legislation only if a vital
national interest is at stake; the veto is applied only rarely and tactically. Indeed,
one of the issues during the IGC process was whether rules should be introduced
to compel the Council president to call a vote or whether several states could
themselves demand a vote. Since the SEA, voting has increased because of the
increased number of instances in which majority voting is prescribed and because
the EC has been preoccupied with Single Market legislation, which falls mainly
under the majority voting rules (for details, see Lodge, 1989).
Controversial and exceptional as the IGC process was, all the participants
expected it to lead to some outcome in the short term-either to a new treaty
(maximalist position) or to an amendment to the existing treaties (midpoint
position) rather than simply to confirmation of the status quo (minimalist po-
sition). The convening of an IGC was itself a mark of commitment. It also
indicated how high the stakes were, not least since the decision to convene fol-
lowed an extremely acrimonious Council meeting at which the Council president
had acted extraordinarily in calling for a decision based on a majority vote. Time
pressure meant that prevarication pending consensus was not an option; the
majority was not prepared to cede the initiative to minimalist states wanting to
preserve the status quo. There was a further commitment because the process had
been initiated by the heads of state government at the Milan European Council.
The public profile of the European Council meetings as part of the IGC process
was higher than usual, as were the political stakes of key players.
In the normal course of events, the dominant actors are the Commission,
which alone is responsible for initiating and amending draft legislation; the
Council of Ministers, which is responsible for adopting it as the EC's "legisla-
ture"; and, to a lesser extent at the time of the SEA, the EP, whose formal opinion
on draft legislation has been required in many cases. Individuals and personal-
ities matter. Member states' interests are represented in EC institutions through
the Council of Ministers, which comprises the member states' functional minis-
ters; the European Council, which groups together the member states' heads of
Negotiating the Single European Act 19
state or government but which does not have a legislative role, was not part of
the institutional system set up by the treaties, and until the SEA was not menti-
oned in the Rome Treaty; and COREPER, consisting of member governments'
official representatives (often drawn from their foreign offices) acting as gatekeep-
ers between the member states and the Commission. COREPER is charged with
preparing compromises and consensus on draft legislation initiated by the inde-
pendent Commission and submitted to the Council, but it cannot amend legis-
lation. Only the Commission can do that at any stage of the legislative process.
All along the line, the stakes are relatively high, but all know that ultimately
inaction will merely delay a decision, not abrogate it.
The member states are not the only or even the most important actors in
the EC. Of central importance is the uniquely independent Commission, which
is a hybrid of an international secretariat and an independent political executive.
As a result, its internal organization; learning processes; policy-making styles;
processes of brokerage, mediation, and decision making; and bureaucratic pol-
itics reflect identifiable "bureaucratic" features. However, because it has been
given the task of initiating legislation, mediating among divergent interests (no-
tably through a process known as engrenage via links with national bureaucra-
cies-a process that itself induces learning and European socialization of national
administrators), devising package deals, ensuring that legislation is implemented
and that member states honor their commitments, and developing policy over the
short, medium, and long term for the agreement of the member states, it plays
a distinctive executive and political role.
Negotiations take place across departmental and national boundaries. Bu-
reaucratic interpenetration, mediated and fostered by COREPER, encourages ne-
gotiation by civil servants on Commission proposals. The aim is to ensure that
their content is acceptable to all member states. The name of the game is con-
sensus. Consensus-seeking behavior normally typifies Council meetings and did
even before the SEA came into effect irrespective of whether the treaty prescribed
unanimity for the adoption of a proposal. Avoidance of divisive behavior led to
Council presidents' avoiding putting proposals to the vote. The effect was non-
decision and procrastination. Insofar as this behavior was seen as an obstacle to
realizing the Single Market, voting practices in the Council needed to be re-
formed, which was very controversial per se. It also meant that the Council could
not be entrusted with evolving reforms for the ICC given its past failures to
reform decision making and its continuing interest in the status quo.
The composition of the Council and voting practices vary according to the
subject matter of the draft legislation on the table. To a greater or lesser extent
in the early and mid-1980s the emphasis was still on securing compromises that
had unanimous support. Because the process might take years, member states'
ministers and even the ideological leaning of a government might change be-
tween the first submission of a proposal and its eventual adoption, requiring a
different type of compromise. One of the aims of the SEA negotiations, therefore,
was to overcome what was seen as a major flaw in the EC's legislative process.
II
IIji
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This was another reason why a permanent body to prepare the IGC had to be
convened (Keatinge and Murphy, 1990).
The EP is a supranational parliament; before the SEA, it had only limited
authority and few legislative powers. It is directly elected every five years. Its
members (MEPs) are autonomous and have an individual mandate. They sit in
transnational party groups. National contingents within them often vote across
ideological lines and often against the known position of th~ir governments and
home parties. The EP devises its own agenda (a potent political tool) and its own
rules of procedure and interprets them tactically and strategically (Jacobs and
Corbett, 1991). Its opinion is necessary under the founding treaty for some but
not all areas of legislation, and the Council must await the opinion before adopt-
ing its decision. Before the SEA, the EP did not have a right to amend draft
legislation or to be consulted on either Commission amendments or the eventual
draft voted by the Council.
Getting a genuine legislative role was an important EP objective because
the EP's role in the legislative process was marginal and incompatible with
notions of democratic legitimacy and practice. The emphasis on promoting ef-
ficient, effective, responsive, and accountable decision making was closely tied to
increasing the EP's legislative power (Cardozo and Corbett, 1986). It is all the
more striking, therefore, that the SEA process arose out of an initiative of the EP.
It is wholly misleading to suppose that plurilateral diplomacy alone applied,
during this time, to coalition-building behavior among the member states. With-
out the EP's initiative for the EUT, the SEA process would not have been
launched or been run in the way that it was.
The member states' views on a formal reform of the EC were by no means
uniform at the start of the process. Their likely position on the sensitive issues
raised by the idea of convening an IGC to reform the EC could be inferred fairly
accurately from their MEPs' votes on the EUT, adopted on February 14, 1984.
Those member states traditionally anxious about preserving national sover-
eignty-the United Kingdom, Greece, and Denmark-exhibited the usual reti-
cence and inhibitions when faced with a treaty having federal overtones. Spain
and Portugal were associated with the process even though they had yet to accede
to the EC. Their position throughout tended to be positive.
The advancing European Union needed a national champion, preferably
one of the big four. The French, not known for supranational enthusiasm, were
nevertheless well placed to assume the role. Had France opposed further integra-
tion, it is unlikely that the IGC would have materialized. The succession of
member states to the Council presidency was crucial at this stage. France held the
presidency at a critical juncture and could be sure that a major initiative on the
European Union would not fade the moment it passed on the leadership position
to the next state. In Ireland the member states had a pro-EC honest broker. Italy
was a state with Euro-ambitions but one that would not steal Ireland's and
France's thunder. France could continue to assume the mantle of the realist
champion while Italy played the idealist.
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The EUT was a major catalyst for action on the institutional front. In May 1984,
President Fran~ois Mitterrand in his speech to the EP called for preparatory
consultations about a new treaty arrangement based on the EUT and the Solemn
Declaration of 1983. In June 1984, the Fontainebleau meeting of the European
Council decided to set up two committees on the European Union. One, in-
structed to advance proposals for a "people's union," was known by its chair-
man's name: the Adonnino Committee. The other was known by several names:
the Ad Hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs, the Spaak II Committee (after
the 1955-1956 committee that prepared the original Treaty of Rome), or the
Dooge Committee (after its Irish chair). The three names revealed the multiplicity
of tasks facing the committee and highlighted the concurrent pursuit of different
types of diplomacy throughout this period. These ranged from the normal bilat-
eral encounters, as between the presidency and individual member states or
among key states themselves (for instance, Anglo-German, Franco-German, and
Benelux talks); to plurilateralism, notably in the Spaak II guise, where a sense
of mission (promoting the European Union) prevailed, and in interactions be-
tween the twelve nations and the Commission; to a mixture of both, "Dooge."
The Dooge Committee's affinity with the original Spaak I Committee,
source of the 1957 Rome Treaty that created the EC, arose from the fact that it
too had been composed of personal representatives rather than government dele-
gates. The distinction is subtle but important. Spaak II consisted of personal
representatives from the European Council's members. Because they were directly
accountable to the European Council, it was assumed that the new committee
would operate outside the usual administrative frameworks (Keatinge and
Murphy, 1990). But the idea of a new enterprise like that which launched the
Spaak committee at Messina was belied by the fact that the European Council's
conclusions refer, a good deal, to "cooperation" but never to "union."
During the first phase of the Dooge Committee (up to the Dublin Euro-
pean Council of December 1984), enlargement dominated the agenda. The Coun-
cil took note of the Dooge Committee's interim report and requested a final report
for its Brussels meeting in March 1985 (phase two). The issue was to be given full
consideration, however, only at the Milan meeting of the European Council in
June 1985 (phase three).
The first phase reflected the anxiety and ambiguities over the nature of the
committee just set up. Ireland claimed the chair because it held the presidency
and put forward as its "personal representative" the Council president, James
Dooge. This move immediately undermined any pretensions to the committee's
being a Spaak II Committee because the chair was not independent and Dooge
did not see himself as a Spaak-type motor. His role became, instead, that of
manager, the more traditional honest-broker role of a small state holding the
Council presidency. He was not proactive in advancing change but rather sought
compromise to facilitate the process. Belgium felt it had a claim to the chair
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(recalling Tindemans and the Spaak tradition) as did Germany (which wanted
former President Carsten in that role). However, once the pattern was set, inertia
crept in, and no change in the nature of the chair resulted from a change in the
states holding the presidency. The other members of the Dooge Committee had
different degrees of domestic political shrewdness and influence (Lodge, 1986d).
In phase two, the Dooge Committee's task was to explore the ground for
agreement. Because the member governments had not been overly enthusiastic
about the EUT, the Dooge Committee could not base its recommendations en-
tirely on it. The Italian representative, Mauro Ferri, could however be seen as an
EUT advocate in view of his close association with it and the EP's lAC chair,
Spinelli. French representative Edgar Faure likewise enjoyed a good deal of au-
tonomy and good personal relations with his patron and kept France to the fore.
The Committee met eleven times and worked on topic-specific briefing papers.
It did not try to secure unanimity. France presented the general overview report.
Close informal working links were kept with the lAC. Spinelli attended three
meetings, and the EP president, Pierre pflimlin of France, met with the Dooge
Committee twice. Spain and Portugal were kept informed toward the end.
As Dooge proceeded on the basis of majority views in phase three, the final
report was littered with footnotes that reflected national reservations, but a broad
consensus over the body of the report had been attained. The task of securing
governmental approval then fell to the Italian presidency, which was keen to use
the report as the basis for action at Milan. To this end, Italy engaged in a good
deal of bilateral diplomacy, and foreign ministers met in Stresa in June before
the European Council. Italy's commitment to the European Union was critical
at this stage because by now the other big states were jockeying for position. The
United Kingdom alone seemed out to wreck the endeavor, presenting counter-
proposals at Stresa that were later upstaged by the Franco-German plan on the
eve of the Milan summit. From the skirmishing in and around the Dooge Com-
mittee, it is clear that Italy, France, and, to a lesser extent, Germany were deter-
mined to preserve the idea of a goal that was a qualitative leap forward in
European union. A number of smaller states, notably Belgium, supported them
in this. Denmark and Greece expressed reservations.
The Dooge report was divided into three main sections: priority objectives
(substantive policies); the means (decision making); the method (procedure to
implement the report). On substantive matters, economic convergence and sol-
idarity proved highly contentious, with Greece taking a strong line backed by
Ireland. Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands called instead for convergence
of economic policies. External identity issues and particularly the extension of
the European Political Community (EPC) to security issues elicited predictable
Danish and Greek reservations, supported by Ireland on the security side. The
United Kingdom, however, broadly concurred with the original six.
On the means, the EUT had advocated a transformation of EC decision
making along clear federal principles and had proposed a full-blown bicameral
legislature based on the EP and the Council. Denmark, Greece, and the United
Kingdom objected even to Dooge's much diluted proposals. Germany sided with
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the United Kingdom in objecting to proposals regarding the Commission; the
United Kingdom objected to the Commission president-designate being given a
chance to influence the choice of other Commissioners; and the Germans objected
to a proposed cut in the Commission's size. Consolidating the role of the Court
of Justice evoked consensus. Changing Council voting practice elicited sharp
disagreement and a good deal of trading between the interim and final reports.
The interim report was peppered with footnotes containing formal reservations
from all but France, Italy, and Ireland. Ireland left the Franco-Italian maximalist
camp at the end of phase two. The majority agreed on omitting references to the
"vital national interest" wanted by the status quo minimalists: Denmark, Greece,
and the United Kingdom. Ireland and Luxembourg indicated ambiguous posi-
tions among the majority.
On the method, an intergovernmental conference was to negotiate a draft
treaty based on the acquis communautaire of the Solemn Declaration and the
Dooge report and guided by the spirit and method of the EUT. Calling an
intergovernmental conference would be the initial act of the European Union.
Britain, Greece, and Denmark opposed this suggestion, which was extremely
controversial. The United Kingdom consistently disputed the need for one. When
the Italian Council presidency, nevertheless, decided to set aside the usual
consensus-seeking practice at the European Council in favor of an unprecedented
vote on convening the conference, there was an uproar in the U.K. camp. Al-
though the president could be certain of winning the vote, it is interesting that
several governments, particularly the French, subsequently stressed that a prece-
dent had not been set and that usual practices would continue (Lodge, 1986d).
The Italian presidency's tactic had been inspired by the EUT formula
(which foresaw progress if a majority of two-thirds of the Union's population
concurred) and by the fact that unanimity was not prescribed for European Coun-
cil decisions. The EUT provision, as well as the attendant strategy, has subse-
quently become a key feature of plurilateral bargaining within the EC. It
provided the rationale and the legitimacy for arguing that the majority of
member states should not be prevented from advancing integration by the least
communitarian state or states. The EUT formula was adapted for SEA provisions
on the cooperation procedure. At this point, however, it served to remind the
British that although they might not condone further integration, the majority
of states was prepared to go ahead without British involvement. Thus, a carefully
managed strategy evolved of allowing states to isolate themselves from the wishes
of the majority only at their peril.
Equally important, given the consensus prevailing among the procom-
munitarian original six members of the EC, the minority was in a weak position
numerically and politically. Internal splits within the minority left the six room
for maneuvering. However, uniformity did not prevail among them either, leav-
ing the door open for sabotage or bargaining. Moreover, the Milan mandate did
not call for a single draft treaty on the European Union a la Dooge but instead
implied piecemeal amendment of the existing treaties under Article 236, which
could undermine the coherence of the endeavor. The U.K. and Franco-German
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drafts on political cooperation were even more limited in scope. The task of
pulling all this together fell to the smallest state, Luxembourg.
Luxembourg immediately submitted a proposal to amend the treaty. Be-
fore the IGC could be convened, the Commission, Council, and EP had to give
their opinions as required by Article 236. Favorable opinions were all put before
the Council of Ministers by July 22, 1985. The Council then called the initial
meeting for September 9 and set the scheduled December 1985 meeting of the
European Council as the deadline for decisions to be made.
Strategy
It was known at this stage both generally and through the specific opinions of
the Commission and EP that these two bodies were in favor of the IGC and that
the member states were divided. Several member states still objected to the calling
of the IGC and expressed reservations over the Council's opinion, which was,
nevertheless, passed unanimously. Their objections can be explained by the fact
that the Milan European Council's highly controversial and unprecedented ma-
jority vote decision to proceed with an IGC reflected known divisions and that
the field for dispute, and ultimately for cooperative behavior and compromise,
had been delineated before Milan. The fact that the Milan vote was taken by
majority reflected the high degree of political commitment to advancing the
European Union in principle, irrespective of disagreement over its details.
It is axiomatic that no major initiative can proceed in the EC without the
consent of France and Germany, even though qualified-majority voting in the
Council does allow for other coalitions. The "rule" does not give the same power
to Italy or the United Kingdom. Moreover, the "rule" does not always have to
be translated into a strategy that rests on joint Franco-German initiatives. Indeed,
in the case of the SEA, all that was necessary was that the Germans not try to
thwart or compete with France's lead. Had both lost interest in the European
Union, however (as their faint-hearted political cooperation proposals seemed to
suggest), the whole venture might have been eclipsed. That it did not owes some-
thing to the countervailing multinational, cross-party, and elite pressures, expec-
tations, and awareness generated by the EP.
In many respects, the SEA process was atypical of normal plurilateral
bargaining in the EC in that it was indirectly driven by one of the EC's juridically
weakest institutions, the EP. As in the EUT process, the EP relied on the work
of its IAC.l The lAC consulted as appropriate with other EP committees, notably
those on political and legal affairs. The lAC divided responsibility for subject
areas covered by the IGC among eight of its members. Their comments and a
synthesis by Vice Chair Herman Croux provided the basis for a set of conclusions
adopted by the whole lAC for the use of pflimlin in his talks with IGC players.
The EP's delegation to the IGC comprised pflimlin and Spinelli plus, on one
occasion, Chair Roberto Formigoni of the Political Affairs Committee (Louis,
1985).
The EP's initial strategy was to get in on the act. It hoped to ensure that,
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in the absence of a direct role in the negotiations, it would have a role that was
one stage removed. It wanted the adoption of reforms to be conditional upon its
assent, preferably on an item basis or, failing that, collectively. When it was
denied anything but a loose consultative role, it modified its strategy accordingly.
Based on its EUT strategy, it concentrated on identifying and lobbying appro-
priate governments, parliaments, and political, intellectual, trade, labor, and
business elites as well as opinion leaders. The EP used the support it had gen-
erated among national parliaments for the EUT in a tactical way to bolster its
demands for changes in institutional provisions. The Italian and Belgian parli-
aments, in particular, adopted positions that reinforced the EP's claims to be
consulted about the outcome of the SEA negotiations and about the actual reform
of its powers.
Although the critical action took place among supranational-level actors,
influence was exerted at the national level by bodies that were normally irrelevant
to the content and outcome of the EC's legislative process but that, by dint of
national constitutional provisions regarding the ratification of treaties, were in
a position either to prevent the SEA's adoption or to prevent or protract the SEA's
implementation. Used tactically and sparingly, this power gave national parlia-
ments, if they wished, the opportunity for shaping expectations in certain direc-
tions. None definitively influenced the SEA's content. Negotiators, however,
needed to ensure that the SEA would be broadly acceptable to a majority of the
members of national parliaments, many of whom remained ill-informed about
both the EC and the SEA.
Moreover, throughout the process rumor played a part in creating the
facilitative conditions that made the players receptive to dialogue. It is often said
that the EC thrives and works on rumor (Budd, 1987; Butler, 1987), and although
the impact of informal communication cannot be quantified, there can be little
doubt that it does lead states to explore more alternative options than they might
otherwise do. It must be remembered that whenever a majority has to be main-
tained for a given position, there are opportunities for all kinds of deals, side
payments, and cross-bargaining. Similarly, the EP was in a position to influence
an important Euro-event, the second elections to the EP in summer 1984 (Lodge,
1986a). The EUT and the general issues of the Single Market and European
Union surfaced to a greater or lesser degree in the campaigns in the member states.
This gave Europe a high public profile, and the EP worked to maintain it.
From the outset, the EP's strategy was one of cooperation. Indeed, only by
adopting such a strategy did it stand any chance of gaining a clear insight into
the process and of having some opportunity for influencing the IGC delibera-
tions. Commission President Jacques Delors reported to the lAC the day after his
return from Milan. Before breaking for its summer recess the EP passed a reso-
lution representing the EP's formal opinion as required under Article 236. 2 It
endorsed the convening of the IGC, called for the EP to be treated as an equal
partner in the IGC, and reaffirmed the EP's view that the European Union should
be allowed to proceed if a majority of states favored it. EP President Pflimlin
then, by letter, stated that this resolution could be considered a favorable opin-
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ion. ~ This endorsement was important because the Luxembourg presidency had
formally proposed the revision of the treaties and anything less than the EP's
endorsement would have meant that the ICC would be delayed; it met on July
22, 1985. Creece, Denmark, and the United Kingdom said they would participate
in the procedure but reserved their position on the outcome.
Nonetheless, the EP sharply distrusted intergovernmental conferences be-
cause most of their work was influenced by officials who, MEPs felt, lacked a
sense of overarching Euro-political vision and who consequently tailored their
proposals to the lowest common denominator and bureaucratic inertia (Corbett
and Lodge, 1986). For this reason, during the EUT process, the EP had involved
itself directly with political forces and national parliaments throughout the EG
Its majoritarian Spinelli formula for avoiding national vetoes also highlighted
its belief that although an intergovernmental conference was necessary, its con-
duct according to Article 236 was not. Having repeatedly called for an intergov-
ernmental conference, the EP argued that a Euro-input to balance national
bureaucratic stances was imperative, and it advocated making the conclusions of
such a conference subject to the combined approval of the EP and the ICG It
recommended repeatedly and unsuccessfully a conciliation procedure in the event
of differences between the two. Formal combined approval would have given the
EP a veto, which it justified on the grounds that a major constitutional issue was
at stake. Subsequently, the EP was given the right to approve major international
treaties in the reforms of Articles 237 and 238 introduced by the SEA. To some
extent, the EP's requests for a role, and specifically the kind of procedural inno-
vations and amendments that it sought, were akin to those that it wanted to see
introduced as part of the ICC's reform of the EC's decision-making process.
Covernments were divided over the nature of the EP's association with the
ICG As a result, Pflimlin sent a letter setting forth equal participation as the EP's
first goal. This goal was rebuffed when it was referred to during the initial
ministerial meeting on September 9 but with assurances that the ICC would tak~
into account the EUT and any further proposals the EP wished to submit. The
ministers proposed to meet with MEPs during the course of the ICC deliberations
and agreed "to submit" the results of their work to the ICG This proposal
implied more than an intention to inform the EP about the ICC deliberations
but also a good deal less than EP participation as an equal partner. The term
submit led to wrangling between the EP and the ICC until, in the end, it was
specified that submit meant that the EP would be informed and given the chance
to express an opinion, a lesser arrangement than a second reading or a right of
amendment, veto, or conciliation.
The EP's strategy then turned to strengthening its rights of submission,
capitalizing on the Article 236 procedure of getting one member state to indicate
that it would thwart the attainment of unanimity as required. It persuaded Italy
to declare that it would ratify a new treaty only with the EP's approval. Only
when the EP had debated the ICC outcome and referred its view to the ICC would
the EC-level process (assuming EP approval) be concluded. Thus, the strategy
was refined to make a blocking coalition between an EC-level institution (respon-
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sible for the initial political momentum behind treaty reform but formally ex-
cluded from the ICC process) and at least one of the governments central to the
ICC process, the one that had already broken with tradition by holding the
majority vote on the issue in the first place. As part of the system of associating
past, present, and future presidents in a leadership troika, Italy still played an
important executive role as immediate past president. This move proved vital in
ensuring that the ICC negotiators were kept in a dialogue with the EP.
The EP also hoped, as its second goal, that the EDT would serve as a basis
for the ICC's work because it defined how institutional relationships might be
refined in the EC's transformation into a European union. Its representations to
this effect failed. Commission President Delors assured the EP that the Commis-
sion's proposals were based on the EDT and that relevant extracts were included
in the briefs on sections of the treaties likely to be amended. 1 However, it would
not have been expedient politically for the ICC to say that the starting point was
a neo-federal treaty drafted by an institution that lacked genuine legislative pow-
ers and whose authority remained contested both among the EC institutions and
member governments and among the EC's electorate. Still, the failure was only
partial, for there can be little doubt that Dooge and ICC deliberations were
informed by the EDT.
The EP's third goal was close scrutiny of the ICC. The EP received tabled
documents either officially or via the back door. It had a three-pronged tactic
based on close monitoring of the ICC proceedings and papers, on reaffirmation
of the EP's position at all stages both through formal resolutions and by con-
stantly shadowing the ICC and lobbying recalcitrant parliaments and potential
government alliance partners, and on delegation of tasks to the lAC to act on its
behalf.
Dissatisfied with the apparent reluctance of the Commission and the gov-
ernments to table proposals in line with the Dooge Committee and Adonnino
Committee reports, the EP adopted an emergency (Herman) resolution on Oc-
tober 10, 1985. 5 MEPs used their right to question the Commission and Council
president at the October 25 session. The EP delegation had several meetings with
the ICC. The results from initial talks were unsatisfactory from the EP's view-
point and were dominated by the Luxembourg presidency of the Council. The
EP had greater success a little later when it managed to expose divisions among
the member states, notably over reforms of the EP's powers. The EP's plurilateral
diplomacy and alliance with Italy yielded important results at this stage, not least
because further plurilateral interaction had led Belgium, the Netherlands, and
France to appreciate the Italian position.
The continuity of the alliance was vital to the December Luxembourg
Council. The EP adopted a resolution condemning several areas of the ICC
package (especially those relating to EP powers) as "unsatisfactory." On the eve
of the summit, the EP's enlarged bureau issued a statement contesting the content
of the ICC's preparatory work submitted to the European Council. 6 It was par-
ticularly anxious lest reform be sacrificed in favor of quick agreement. In the
event, Italy entered a formal reserve against the reform package agreed on by the
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European Council pending the position of the EP and Italian parliament. There
were signs that Belgium might back this line. Denmark entered a general reserva-
tion against the whole package lest it be too radical for the Danish parliament.
The Danish reservation weakened Italian resolve and meant that an Italian veto
on behalf of the EP was likely to be sacrificed for compromises that had been left
to the foreign ministers to complete. This development did not deter the EP from
keeping up the pressure, notably on the explosive issue of institutional reform,
over which the member states were seriously divided.
As a result of this pressure, a strategy was needed to ensure that the Eu-
ropean Union proceeded according to the wishes of the member states rather than
as a response to a treaty drafted by an institution often vilified as talking shop.
This criticism came from opponents of further European integration and from
governments anxious lest further EC reforms denude them individually and col-
lectively (in the Council of Ministers) of authority. The way for the members to
keep overall control of the situation was to insist on reforms and an ICC based
on the Article 236 procedure. However, this insistence was coupled with constant
reference to the need for the majority will to prevail a la Spinelli.
The strategy had to be implemented in such a way as to combine commit-
ment to the European Union with governments' interest in retaining as much
autonomy as possible for themselves. Although governments could be relatively
open to steps to advance the Single Market (such as the replacement of unanimity
by majority voting in the Council on selected policy sectors), they had to be more
careful about reforms that would alter the interinstitutional balance. It was im-
perative to maintain a balance between distancing themselves from the EP and
appearing to listen to EP suggestions. For this reason the ten agreed that account
would be taken of the EUT and other EP proposals, that the ICC would meet
an EP delegation, and that the EP would have a chance to express its views before
the ICC text was signed. Commission President Delors was instrumental in get-
ting this concession and was backed by foreign ministers Dietrich Censcher,
Ciuglio Andreotti, and Leo Tindemans.
Rather than playing merely a secretarial or bureaucratic role, the Commis-
sion acted politically, tactically, and strategical at critical moments (Freil, 1991).
Trade-offs were made as normal EC bargaining processes would lead one to
expect. But the dominant coalition was not always uniform across all the issues
raised by the SEA. The Franco-Italian axis was critical in sustaining the general
public political momentum for the European Union, but the Commission was
the driving force throughout. Even before the ICC opened, it proposed that
agreement should be encapsulated in one document. This was a highly political
and sensitive issue because political cooperation, strictly speaking, fell outside the
domain of supranational decision making. Contentious as this proposal was,
support for it grew during the negotiating process. It was probably realized from
the start that this issue was one over which, ultimately, a majority could appear
to make a major compromise to appease those who contested the desirability of
the ICC in the first place. However, the proposal was not just a tactical move
by the Commission, a "bargaining chip" for purposes of trade-offs. It was one
Negotiating the Single European Act 29
of the Commission's many initiatives on policy issues that helped to maintain
momentum and spur member states into action.
Domestic politics affected the momentum behind the process. Mitterrand,
in particular, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl maintained the pace as chief protag-
onists. Domestic elections in both cases quelled Euro-enthusiasm. In Germany's
case, their first-ever use of the veto (on cereal prices), two weeks before the Milan
European Council, seriously undermined their Euro-credibility. Domestic poli-
tics in Italy had a positive effect in reinforcing Italy's assumption of the leader-
ship role. At the political level, personalities came into the equation: Spinelli,
as a father of European integration, was bolstered by Delors and flanked by
Mitterrand and Kohl. Thatcher epitomized an inward-looking and sometimes
arrogant British isolationism, and her personality tended to jar her colleagues.
The timing of the enterprise was itself tactical. The task of conducting the
IGC fell to Luxembourg as it assumed the rotating Council presidency. This
development was more than fortuitous: Luxembourg was considered pro-
European. It had few major vested national interests in critical issue areas. By
itself, and even with the support of small states, it could not block or advance
anything unless it had the support of at least one big state. Moreover, there is an
expectation in the EC that the smaller states will make the most of any oppor-
tunity they have to playa major statesmanlike diplomatic role when occupying
the EC presidency: a high-profile, political role on the European, and even the
international, stage at times. In short, they have a role to play and try to play it
better than the big states. This gave Luxembourg an incentive for acting accord-
ingly and also for encouraging its partners to focus on the broad issues addressed
by the European Union rather than on the minutiae. This too is a typical Euro-
tactic when major decisions have to be taken: details are left for future discussion
when the broad parameters have been agreed on. This tactic is certainly conducive
to action and compromise. Thus, Luxembourg set out its version of the agenda
in a document known as a treaty framework (charpente d'un traite), and the IGC
deliberations proceeded on the understanding that delegations should make their
submissions in the form of treaty texts by October IS, 1985.
The member states adapted many of their usual tactics to the IGC process
and the higher public and political profile surrounding the European Union.
These included posturing, coalition formation-involving trade-offs and the Spi-
nelli formula (in effect a threat) to remind recalcitrant states of the consequences
to them of isolation-and, ultimately, agenda adjustment (dropping and hiding
irreconcilable issues).
The big four engaged in posturing to a greater or lesser degree. Germany
played its traditional "rhetorical European" role (publicly proclaiming itself in
favor of greater union while concealing its reservations under Britain's uncom-
munitarian cloak). France assumed the mantle of leader. Italy took up the most
progressive-that is, most federal-position. Denmark and Greece fell to the
other extreme. The United Kingdom unsuccessfully touted the vision of an al-
ternative Europe based on intergovernmental cooperation. Indeed, the United
Kingdom's position became an easy public target for Benelux, French, German,
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and even Spanish rhetoric. The reality of governments' positions was sometimes
not that far removed from the rhetoric. However, apart from Italy, none could
match the pro-Union high ground occupied by the EP.
Coalition formation worked in the positive sense of building and main-
taining commitment to advancing the European Union and the Single Market.
Although a negative coalition of Denmark, Greece, and the United Kingdom was
theoretically possible, it did not evolve into a solid, blocking minority. Internal
divisions meant that the Spinelli formula could be deployed on an issue-by-issue
basis if trade-offs failed. Moreover, for tactical reasons, states could adopt unchar-
acteristic positions either to regain ground at the EC level by showing a commu-
nitarian face or to divide domestic opposition parties. For example, Denmark
tabled proposals on energy and local voting rights that were more advanced than
even the most procommunitarian states were able to accept, in the expectation
that they would fail. In the event, they were dropped.
Agenda adjustment and time pressure constituted another tactic. The
Commission set the agenda, producing and submitting formal treaty texts on the
internal market, the environment, and research and technological development,
and later on cohesion, monetary policy, and cultural policy. The imperative of
realizing the Single Market by January 1, 1993, meant that the IGC had to come
to a reasonable conclusion by the end of 1985. The time scale for reform was
dictated by this deadline and by the attendant need to allow time for the signing
and ratification of any agreement. The agenda had to be adjusted (cut) accord-
ingly. Moreover, impending elections in member states (notably France, Ger-
many, and Greece) favored an expedient rather than optimal outcome.
Particular member states were associated with particular issues. The Ger-
mans, for example, advocated major reforms of the EP's powers, but these would
have fallen on deaf ears but for Italy's insistence on the EUT line and persistent
EP lobbying. Equally important, although there was little general enthusiasm for
increasing the EP's legislative powers, it was recognized that some institutional
change would have to be accepted if the Single Market were to become a reality.
The report on the institutional costs of non-Europe had hit home. Given the
constant refrain in favor of democratizing EC decision making, as well as render-
ing it more efficient, a small concession to the EP needed to be made. The result
was a process introduced to speed up decision making on vital internal market
issues, termed the cooperation procedure-another example of compromise and
fine-tuning of the agenda.
The Dooge Committee's tactic of keeping up the momentum for the Eu-
ropean Union by advancing issues having majority support carried over into the
subsequent IGC deliberations. Issues without wide support were dropped from
the agenda. These included Dutch, Italian, and Commission proposals on cul-
tural Europe (an issue also relevant to the Adonnino Committee), Dutch and
Danish proposals on a common development aid policy, French proposals on
differentiation, and Danish proposals on a common development aid policy,
French proposals on differentiation, and Danish proposals on energy and voting
rights in local elections. The willingness of states to see certain areas removed
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from the immediate agenda can be interpreted in tactical terms as either a will-
ingness to trade off one interest against another or an outflanking damage limita-
tion ploy to redress anticommunitarian images. In shoTt, states were not
necessarily equally committed to initial positions across the Dooge/IGC agenda.
Agenda adjustment of this nature was essential to ensuring that the
member states did not lose sight of the need to have in place the requisite treaty
changes relating to decision-making practices. Without them, the 1992 deadline
would not be met. All states recognized the need to afford priority to increasing
the EC's decision-making capacity. Agenda adjustment also avoided member
states' becoming involved in protracted negotiations (implying various levels of
disagreement) likely to obscure the overall objective and encourage procrastina-
tion as governments faced domestic elections and coped with the implications of
other major changes in the international environment, including the reactivation
of the Western Europe Union (WEU). The agenda adjustment was subtle in that
items were not so much dropped as either slipped into the SEA's preamble, as
in the case of human rights, or put aside to a future date. It is, for example,
significant that the Commission's opinion of October 1990 on proposals for the
political-union intergovernmental commission specifically allude to provisions
strengthening the objectives and the instruments of cooperation and development
aid to make it effective. 7
Process
Throughout the deliberations a steady campaign was kept up, often via the
media, to advance the European Union and to warn the United Kingdom that
it could not stop the others from moving forward. On November 19, 1985, Be-
nelux prime, foreign, and European ministers issued a declaration listing five
priority goals: completion of the internal market by the end of 1992, generalized
Council majority voting, more powers for the EP, more power for the European
Monetary Union (EMU), and more EC technological development. 8 The French
European minister had already indicated commitment to majority voting and to
giving the EP the powers that an elected parliament should have (which was not
the same thing as endorsing the EP's quest for greater legislative authority), and
the German president argued that the EC could not be less democratic than its
member states.
The United Kingdom's view was that the EC already was a European
union, as it was in the process of deepening and broadening the scope of its
European activities, and that change should be minimal and pragmatic. The
United Kingdom called only for agreement on an EPC treaty. Italy warned that
it would not accept anything lacking teeth. Denmark's starting position was
ambiguous and geared toward domestic public opinion, but it hinted that it
might accept limited amendments. Reactions to the United Kingdom were col-
ored by annoyance over the ongoing budget dispute, and the United Kingdom
was less than diplomatic in the handling of the two issues at high political levels.
Italy assumed the role of honest broker and coalition cementer when it was clear
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in November 1985 that splits among the Eleven threatened the whole venture.
The United Kingdom was effectively seen as irrelevant because there was general
acceptance that if the United Kingdom chose not to go along, the other members
would proceed anyway. This was considered enough of a threat to encourage the
United Kingdom to put aside its rhetoric and recognize the importance of being
part of the new venture.
Italy and France were keen to maintain the wide pro-Union coalition. The
consensus was reinforced by the favorable positions taken on the European
Union by many national parliaments (including the Italian, Belgian, German,
Dutch, Irish, and French), some of which mirrored their favorable treatment of
the EUT proposals. Consensus emerged over increasing the EP's powers and
majority voting in the Council. The Italian parliament took the lead in arguing
for the EUT to remain center stage and for a significant increase in EP powers.
Shortly before the December IGC, it condemned the proposals as unacceptable
in terms akin to those of the EP.
Political parties, notably the transnational federations-the European
People's Party (EPP), the Confederation of Socialist Parties (CSP), and the Fed-
eration of European Liberals and Democrats (ELD)-adopted positions designed
to influence the outcome of the deliberations. These views mirrored known gov-
ernmental and national positions to a fairly high degree. The CSP's Madrid
congress adopted a policy document on the European Union that (unusually) did
not bind all parties, thereby permitting the Danes and British to maintain their
opposition and reservations. All three basically approved measures advocated by
the EUT. The U.K. members of the European Democratic Group gave a press
conference on November 26 indicating wide disagreement with their government
and accord with the majority of MEPs.
Although priorities on the issues diverged, there was broad agreement on
extending the scope of EC activity. Denmark, Greece, and the United Kingdom
generally opposed intensifying the level of integration. Others could accept
deeper integration only with specific qualifications, especially in regard to inter-
institutional relations. For that reason this issue, above all, required sustained
pressure from the EP and its allies. Because the institutional question was divi-
sive, it made political and tactical sense to focus on internal market matters. This
focus rendered the IGC process less threatening to the more wary and skeptical
participants and infinitely more pragmatic (and hence less repugnant) to U.K.
Prime Minister Thatcher. Moreover, institutional reforms could be slipped into
substantive policy-sector amendments: majority voting in the Council and in-
creased power for the EP and for the Commission were introduced by small
changes to existing provisions.
The Commission's initial proposal of September 18 broadly defined the
internal market as an area "without frontiers in which persons, goods, services
and capital shall move freely under conditions identical to those obtaining within
a member state." These are the "four freedoms," and they are to be attained by
removing physical, technical, and fiscal boundaries. The Commission also sug-
gested the following: replacing unanimous voting with qualified majority voting
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in the Council for all but freedom of movement of persons; adoption of imple-
menting measures by the Commission save where the Council unanimously
reserved that right to itself; and automatic mutual recognition by the member
states of each other's rules if provisions had not been adopted by the end of 1992.
Italy and the Benelux countries broadly endorsed the Commission's proposal.
The member states split over various issues: the definition of the internal
market (too broad for the United Kingdom, France, and Germany); majority
voting and delegation of powers to the Commission (opposed by Denmark and
Greece); fiscal and taxation matters (qualified objections from the United King-
dom, Ireland, Germany, and the Netherlands); banking and insurance (Ireland);
and social security for migrants and the organization of professions (Germany).
The poorer states (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) were worried about the effect
of the internal market on their economies and the potential for an increased rich/
poor, center/periphery divide (encapsulated by the phrase economic and social
cohesion); they made their agreement contingent on the outcome of the negoti-
ations on cohesion. The richer states, notably those with higher standards in key
areas (Denmark and Germany), feared that harmonization provisions could lead
to social dumping and lower EC standards. Germany suggested a quasi-veto
formula to ensure that decisions in this field were made only if the higher-
standard states were part of the majority (Corbett, 1986).
Political momentum was injected into the negotiations by France and the
Commission, which tabled revised proposals for a political declaration on the
harmonization of indirect taxes by 1990 and the internal market by 1993, and on
altering the Rome Treaty to provide for majority voting in the Council when the
EP had approved a Commission proposal. These moves subsequently proved
critical. The Luxembourg presidency advanced revised proposals that were based
on diluted versions of those of the Commission.
After long and sometimes acrimonious negotiations over Irish and U.K.
health regulations, a lengthy set of articles and declarations was agreed on. The
Commission's definition of the internal market as an "area" was eventually en-
dorsed by France, Germany, and finally the United Kingdom, but its scope was
cut and the reference to identical conditions deleted. Several articles were
amended to permit majority voting in specified areas or to meet specific reserva-
tions. A new Article 100a providing for majority voting was inserted in place of
Article 100 except for fiscal policy, free movement of persons, and employee
rights. This change eliminated the need for recourse to the unanimity required
by Article 235 (which in the past was fraught with difficulties). The momentum
was maintained by obliging the Council to act before 1992 and to consult the EP,
and by requiring progress reports from the Commission in 1988 and 1990. By
using the tactic of agenda adjustment, final decisions were postponed until after
the December IGC. Similarly, declarations in the Acts of the Conference spelled
out other divisive issues such as crime, terrorism, and others where member states
nevertheless agreed to cooperate. Greece, Portugal, and Ireland entered unilateral
declarations on economic issues, and Denmark on safeguard measures under
Article 100a.
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Although the budget was largely neglected by the IGC (and while it
remained an explosive Eleven-versus-the-United Kingdom issue), monetary ca-
pacity and the EMU were covered. There was one additional player in this field:
the Council of Finance Ministers, the only sectoral council to be involved. An
informal meeting on September 21 indicated their concern that they might be
denied an input. Delors promised to discuss draft amendments with them prior
to sending them to the IGC. The Commission's proposals centered on amend-
ments to Article 107i designed to codify existing procedures and open the door
for further development. These amendments were discussed by the finance min-
isters on October 28 and November 18. The United Kingdom, Germany, and the
Netherlands objected in principle to monetary policy being part of the general
treaty revision. The British dismissed EMU as pointless, whereas the Dutch and
Germans had specific reservations not least concerning the role and autonomy
of central banks. Italy, France, Belgium, and Ireland dismissed the Commission
proposal as too weak. The Commission's revised proposal had to accommodate
diametrically opposed views and fared no better.
The big four states were split down the middle. To avoid impasse, one had
to be persuaded to change sides. Kohl obliged. He isolated Thatcher shortly after
a bilateral meeting with her on November 27, which Thatcher mistakenly
thought had drawn him into her camp. To secure Kohl's "defection," Italy and
France took on board German reservations and announced measures to liberalize
their exchange controls. This left the United Kingdom in splendid isolation
again on a major issue as late as the first night of the European Council.
Monetary capacity and, in the longer term, EMU were seen as vital to the
effective operation of the Single Market, an issue too important to be dropped
from the agenda. Consequently, further compromise proposals were considered
at the summit from the Commission, the Dutch, and the Germans. Although it
was agreed to add a new chapter hedged about with restrictive Article 236-type
qualifications, the real battle was postponed. The intractable problem of EMU
led to the adoption of a tactic used for controversial items that were dropped:
namely, amendments to the preamble indicating commitment to the overall
goal-in this case, EMU. A further tactic was used to confirm that the EC's
monetary capacity could be further developed (except where institutional matters
were concerned) without recourse to the Article 236 procedure. This tactic was
revealed using the device of a declaration by the presidency and the Commission
added to the Acts of the Conference. In short, the commitment to monetary
matters seriously divided the states. To avoid adding yet another empty statement
on EMU to the list that had grown since 1972, the issue was slipped in wherever
possible. 9
Ireland, Italy, Greece, and France (to a lesser extent perhaps) feared that
EC enlargement would divert structural funds from traditional beneficiaries to
Spain and Portugal. This fear was shared by the United Kingdom though it did
not make much of it given its wider concern to halt the European Union and its
opposition to an increase in the EC budget. The Commission proposal of Sep-
tember 27 on reducing economic divergence between the regions and related
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structural-fund matters divided the member states along the lines of the likely
beneficiaries and fund contributors. Germany opposed some measures (notably
the idea of new EC loans), while the Dutch quite blatantly said that periphery
states' support for the Single Market would have to come as part of a quid pro
quo on cohesion. France objected to any reform smacking of merger of the struc-
tural funds and tabled amendments to Commission proposals designed to main-
tain their integrity. Greece's proposal called for additional resources, as did
Ireland's on the Regional Fund. Ireland also opposed a revision of the Social
Fund (Articles 123-127, advocated by the Commission) and submitted amend-
ments to the Commission's revised proposal of October 15.
The Commission elaborated a compromise that focused on the key issue
dividing the states-center/periphery economic discrepancies. German, French,
and Irish objections were accommodated. The new EC loan was dropped along
with the Commission's original plans to improve working and social conditions,
and the Regional Fund was specially mentioned. Given the United Kingdom's
concern over EC resources and unwillingness to set figures down, no limits were
specified. Reference was made instead to the Brussels 1984 European Council
agreement to increase structural funds' resources significantly. In this area, the
Commission played a crucial honest-broker role.
The potential for dispute was particularly large on the environmental
front. This potential owed as much to the usual disagreement over whether the
Council should go over to majority voting in such matters as to the fact that EC
intervention in this field remained contested. Once again, however, the overarch-
ing demands of the Single Market's realization impelled action. The question of
expanding the EC's scope to environmental matters provoked little comment.
The Commission took the lead in proposing four new articles laying down
aims, principles, and specific measures, with majority voting for implementing
measures but unanimity for defining aims and principles. Denmark had a specific
interest in environmental action and was keen to ensure that it should not be forced
to lower its standards to accommodate any new EC norm. It put forward a six-
article proposal akin to that of the Commission. Against Denmark were the "dirty"
states: the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Greece; these states considered stringent
legislation costly. Ireland (backed by Greece) put forward an amendment on the
need to balance environmental and economic considerations. Greece and the Ne-
therlands objected to the extensiveness of the specific measures. Greece and Den-
mark objected, for different reasons, to majority voting. Only Germany suggested
expanding the proposal's ambit (a la EUT) to include animal protection.
Bilateral trade-offs and diplomacy were clearly important in this sector. It
was relatively easy and cheap for the "greener" states to put forward proposals
unlikely to win the support of the less-clean states. They could appear advanced
and communitarian in the expectation that not much would happen. The Com-
mission's proposal was diluted to accommodate the requests from the "dirty
states" that it take into account scientific evidence, costs to industry, regional
differences, and the need for economic development. The subsidiarity principle
was confirmed. The agenda adjustment tactic was used to postpone the decision-
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making battle. The side-stepping tactic was used to include reference to the con-
troversial matter of the European Court of Justice's competence and to
subordinate EC environmental action to national energy policies. In brief, the
idea of an environmental attachment to all EC policies as a matter of course was
neatly qualified to assuage certain states' objections.
The research-and-development (R&D) issue ran parallel to the Eureka in-
itiative. Fearful that France's lead on Eureka would denude the EC of an effective
R&D role, the Commission (supported by several states) quickly submitted a
proposal on September 16 for seven new treaty articles. The timing of the sub-
mission indicates the degree of concern the issue raised in principle. The Com-
mission's revisions took into account member states' suggestions. Belgium
formally sought an amendment, while Denmark tabled an alternative but in some
ways complementary proposal. The Luxembourg presidency assumed the role of
honest broker and submitted a redraft of the Commission's proposal to the
member states, which accepted the various forms of EC action envisaged. How-
ever, Germany, suspecting that it would be asked for additional resources to fund
the actions, sought a veto over the budgetary issues by insisting on unanimity.
In the event, a complex compromise was agreed on that partly met German
objections and limited the EP's budgetary powers in the R&D sector.
Denmark and the Commission made proposals in the social-policy sector.
The Danish proposal was fairly detailed and was designed to overcome domestic
opposition to the idea of revising the treaties. The Commission proposed intro-
ducing a "social space" to the EC's social goals and a two-part revision of Article
118 on social areas of collaboration. Article 118b was accepted, and a compromise
based mainly on the Danish proposal was agreed on for a new Article 118a. The
United Kingdom was fairly isolated in its objections both to the content of the
proposals and to the decision-making procedures, which, it suspected, would lead
to its being outvoted and to an expansion in EC competence. Accordingly, it
pushed for the retention of unanimity until the last moment, when it was per-
suaded to accept the agenda adjustment and side-stepping tactics: its reservations
were accommodated in an extra paragraph and declaration appended to the Acts
of the Conference; they recognized that small businesses should be protected from
"unjustified burdens." This amendment did not obscure the fact that the United
Kingdom objected in principle to expanding the EC's competence into industrial
relations areas (as its refusal to sign the Social Charter the following year con-
firmed) and to majority voting in this sector. Contentious as further EC action
in this sector proved, the Commission believed it imperative that the IGC bring
the issue into the general treaty revision, not least because action on this front
was seen as necessary to shield the EC from the charge of creating a Single Market
for the benefit of business only.
The question of political cooperation exposed Britain's reservations for
what they were: deep-seated opposition to European integration. Paradoxically,
however, this was the arena in which the United Kingdom could happily engage
in Euro-rhetoric. It was the one area in which it submitted proposals and in
which it hoped to remain a le'lder. The term cooperation particularly appealed
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to Britain because it avoided supranational connotations and implied intergov-
ernmentalism, which suited Britain perfectly. Therefore, the United Kingdom
advocated increased cooperation in a host of matters, including security, even
though Euro-wisdom had it that security cooperation and integration were where
autonomous nation-states ended and a federal European union began.
In some respects, it was odd that political cooperation should be part of
an agenda otherwise dominated by Single Market issues. However, the Genscher-
Colombo initiative of 1980 for a Draft European Act to formalize EPC had been
diluted into the 1983 Solemn Declaration on European Union, and the EUT had
clearly expected "political cooperation" (that is, foreign policy cooperation) and
the European Council to be integrated into the Community's structure and com-
petencies. Political cooperation was separated from the rest of the IGC proposals
in terms of expectations and process. There was no consensus that any agreement
on entrenching EPC would form part of a treaty revision under the IGC. Nor
were EPC proposals tabled in parallel to those on the Single Market issues.
Rather; initial EPC proposals had been tabled before the Milan summit by Bri-
tain, France, and Germany.
The British proposal was tactical inasmuch as Britain hoped it would
recoup some of its Euro-credentials amidst its hostility toward the convening of
the IGC at all. It was also very much in line with the United Kingdom's pro-
Atlantic foreign policy and advocated increased cooperation among the EC, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the WEU. The Franco-
German proposal emasculated the British tactic and robbed it of its impact. It also
closely approximated the British proposal in several respects, but differences in
nuance highlighted subtle differences in substance. The British and the Dutch
proposals, for example, advocated increased cooperation within the WEU for EC
states so inclined and hinted at the possibilities of enlarging the WEU. The
Italians proposed increased cooperation between EPC and WEU presidencies and
combined EP and WEU assembly meetings. Italy specified the very security issues
that were omitted from the SEA but that were slipped onto the agenda of the 1990
IGC on political union: peace, arms control, external threats, and Euro-security.
The Dutch proposal purported to be a compromise between the first two. Like
the Italian proposal, it owed a good deal to the U.K. proposal and supported the
British suggestion (contained in the annex to rather than the body of the text)
that EPC be supported by a small secretariat with backup provided by the Coun-
cil secretariat. Italian and Dutch fears that anything grander would eclipse the
Commission, would evolve into an intergovernmental secretariat along the lines
of the Fouchet model of the 1960s, and would be dominated by France and
Germany were shared by many small member states.
In the case of political cooperation, big-state/small-state anxieties and
divisions resulted in tacit alliances across pro- and anti-integration lines. The
Netherlands appeared interested in maintaining amicable links with the United
Kingdom. Belgium also supported the idea of links with the WEU, which sug-
gested a more flexible approach than its traditional role of wanting to keep
discussions within the framework of the Rome Treaty. Luxembourg was gener-
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ally pro-Union apart from its reserve on majority voting (which might be ex-
plained in terms of a lack of precise instructions). Ireland's sensitivity over the
security issue and neutrality prompted it to enter a reserve, but on the whole it
maintained a positive approach. Denmark's position on political cooperation
was in line with its general position of sticking to the letter of the treaties. Greece
adopted a generally negative line and stressed the need for action on center/
periphery disparities at every opportunity.
Institutional and decision-making capacity was the biggest arena for di-
vision among the member states and also the most important one to the whole
European Union debate. Argument centered on the respective powers of the EP
and the Council of Ministers. States divided roughly into those ready to concede
that the EP should be given some additional legislative powers and those that
wanted to maintain the status quo. The EPC arguments over whether the EP
should be "informed" (status quo, United Kingdom) about EPC matters or be
"associated" (Franco-German proposal) or be given an "essential role" vis-a-vis
EPC (Italy) were in line with the general positions taken up on institutional
reform.
The draft mandate for the IGC drawn up by the Italian presidency in May
1985 recognized that the aims of creating a homogeneous internal economic area
(that is, by completing the internal market, strengthening the European econo-
my's competitiveness, promoting economic convergence, creating a technological
community, strengthening the European Monetary System (EMS), and mobiliz-
ing the resources needed to set out the objectives defined in the mandate) could
not be achieved unless the institutions were "renewed and strengthened." Specif-
ically, it noted the need to extend majority voting in the Council; to restore the
Commission's initiating, managing, and implementing roles (the Dutch propo-
salon the role of the Council in Article 145 was not fully accepted, although key
points remain in Article 10 of the SEA); to provide the EP with effective, joint
decision-making powers in specifically defined legislative areas; and to redefine
its powers on budgetary matters and grant it the right to vote on the investiture
of the Commission. All these items were subject to agenda adjustment. Majority
voting was limited in line with expanded powers for the EP; the Commission's
implementing and managing powers proved so controversial that finalizing de-
tails on them was postponed until after the IGC. Acrimonious "commitology"
proceedings ensued with the EP seeking the advice of the Court of Justice.
Proposals were made on EP powers by the pro-EP camp, embracing Italy,
France, and Germany, and the anti-EP camp of the United Kingdom, Denmark,
and Greece. Well in advance of the October 15 deadline for proposals, the German
government leaked draft amendments and additions to the treaties, based on the
German submission of June 27 to the Milan summit extending "consultation,"
"collaboration," and "joint legislative action" with the Council. A subtle change
in the wording of Article 137, to replace "peoples" with "citizens" (implying
federal loyalty divisions), was also included. The German draft drew on EUT
proposals and approximated the EUT's suggestions on a first reading and con-
ciliation procedure. However, it deviated in providing for a sole right of decision
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for the Council if conciliation failed. This version was to appear in the finally
adopted text.
The Commission criticized the German proposal where it suspected that
an implicit weakening of its own powers had been foreseen. The Commission put
forward alternative proposals based on the "basket approach." Basket 3 referred
to the "cooperation procedure" subsequently incorporated into the SEA. Ireland,
the Netherlands, and Belgium broadly accepted the cooperation procedure. The
other nations were divided. Italy took the high ground and for tactical reasons
put forward a proposal based on the EUT and Dooge, advocating full co-decision
for most legislation even though it knew that it would not be acceptable. Italy
also backed the Commission's fourth basket and generally supported the Com-
mission's proposals. Belgium noted some support as a result. Delors and German
representatives had expected that their compromises would appeal to the majority
but found negotiations difficult. All but Denmark accepted the idea of EP co-
decision on constitutional matters. Co-decision was particularly problematic, and
virtually every state had an objection to its application in certain fields-France
and Greece on Article 138 on the composition of the EP; France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom on Article 201 on financial contributions; France and Ire-
land on Article 236 on intergovernmental conferences; and Greece on Article 237
on new members.
French proposals sought to combine suggestions from the Commission
and Germany. France favored increased EP participation (though not necessarily
a colegislative role) on regional development, environment, living conditions,
culture, and education. It foresaw increased majority voting and abstention to
avert the adoption of decisions when unanimity was required by the treaty. 10 The
Dutch proposal sought a consultative role for the EP in the nomination of the
Commission president. Little headway was made however. Even a meeting with
the EP delegation on October 21 was fruitless. Ministers failed to agree on a new
mandate for the preparatory group. The Luxembourg president then took the
initiative to instruct the preparatory group to continue and to develop proposals
that keep the system as simple as possible (earlier proposals had envisaged up to
six readings of draft legislation, to which all the states were opposed). It drafted
a compromise derived from Commission proposals on the cooperation procedure
and limiting it to nine articles, increasing the Commission's room for discretion
at the second reading, and limiting assent to Articles 237 and 238 on new members
and associations, respectively. The idea of the conciliation procedure was
dropped. (The agenda was adjusted, but the idea surfaced within months of the
SEA's coming into effect and received higher profiles during the early 1990s,
before the next intergovernmental conferences.)
At this point plurilateralism came into its own. The Benelux countries,
Germany, and France said the compromises represented a bare minimum. Den-
mark still opposed them as too radical. Italy, and to a lesser degree France and
Belgium, sided with the EP in suggesting that they were inadequate. The United
Kingdom, when the deadlock was taken up by the European Council, indicated
that the EP's powers should not be extended. Rather, the EP should be disbanded.
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In the event, they produced a compromise for which, through agenda adjustment
tactics, they were able to gain broad acceptance. Difficult associated matters on
the operationalization of the cooperation procedure were referred to the foreign
ministers' meeting for resolution. Denmark and Italy entered reservations against
the text for opposite reasons. The EP's resolution on the results of the European
Council sought further changes from the foreign ministers. The EP was success-
ful in some respects, and parts of the Commission's original proposal were rein-
serted. Other problematic points were partially resolved through presidency
declarations in the Acts of the Conference and, more weakly, through the Dutch
presidency's assurance to the EP in January 1986 that the Council of Ministers'
rules of procedure would be amended. The IGC eventually agreed to the EP's
being formally called the "European Parliament" instead of the "Assembly" in
line with German proposals.
Apart from the EP itself, only Italy and the Commission took a consis-
tently bold line on EP powers. Both did so publicly, thereby indirectly mobilizing
elites in a position to pressure national actors. Delors had told the Milan Euro-
pean Council that the EP should be given "genuine and equal power of decision"
in limited fields. Spinelli too had intervened in the public debate by publishing
an article in twelve European newspapers that condemned the "immobilists"
(United Kingdom, Greece, and Denmark) and called for boldness regarding the
Union. ll
A new treaty on the European Union was expected to have a significant
psychological impact on the member governments as well as the supranational
institutions. The results of Dooge and the IGC fell far short of EUT expectations.
They did not have the stature of a new treaty based on the acquis communautaire.
Rather they amounted to a revision of the existing treaties. EC competence was
extended, and the ambiguous position of European political cooperation was
rendered slightly clearer by being included in the one document (even though the
language of Title III refers not to member states but to high contracting parties).
It was far from obvious from the outset that the result would be a single
document that could be seen as a step toward the European Union. Commission
President Delors called for a revision treaty comprising a preamble and three
sections (joint provisions, revision of the European Economic Community, po-
litical cooperation), as reflected in the French proposal of November for a single
act. The SEA contained four titles, the first three proposed by Delors and a fourth
on final and general dispositions that, by stipulating that the European Court's
competence cover only Title II, undermined the import of the rest and of the
preamble, where many compromises on contentious issues, like human rights,
had been hidden.
Although the European Council meeting on December 2 and 3, 1985, was
to lead to agreement among the member states on the internal market, monetary
capacity, cohesion, environment and social policy, research and technological
development, and institutional reform and political cooperation, several member
states expressed important reservations. Thus, the approval of Italy was condi-
tional on support by its national parliament (which espoused the positions of the
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EUT and the EP); Denmark and Ireland had deep domestic divisions to over-
come; Italy and the United Kingdom entered further reservations about the provi-
sions on the improvement of working conditions at the ministerial meeting in
mid-December. In effect, for political and presentational reasons as much accord
as was possible to secure had been knocked together for the European Council.
Several serious difficulties had been referred back to the working group, but the
quintessential idea of unicite was ultimately retained by the treaty amendments'
being presented in a single document, though one that fell short of a treaty on
political union.
Ratification of the SEA fell to the successor to the Luxembourg presidency,
the Netherlands. It, too, had to play an honest-broker, managerial-type role and
was helped heavily by the Commission's legal services at this stage. At the end
of the IGC, the United Kingdom insisted that the veto remain intact and that not
much be changed. Denmark supported the "no loss of sovereignty implied" ar-
gument. Mitterrand signaled that the SEA was but the beginning of a longer
process. Belgium noted satisfaction that something, no matter how weak, had
been achieved, and Jan Martens criticized the government for not lining up
boldly with Italy. Portugal spoke out for more power to the EP. Italy's earlier
stand implied that if the EP opposed the package, Italy would prevent its rati-
fication with the result that collapse would be inevitable.
For tactical reasons the Italian position was not quite as watertight as
might seem at a first glance. The EUT formula could after all be invoked leaving
the most procommunitarian state in paradoxical isolation. MEPs wanting to
stick to this line were in a minority. Even so, a good deal of lobbying went on
by the Commission, the Council president, and some member governments to
persuade MEPs to agree to the package. The Dutch Council president made
special representations to the lAC. Eventually, the EP accepted the package but
stressed its inadequacy and recalled that overall, as its resolution of December had
said, it could not be accepted in its present form and, as Mitterrand indicated, the
SEA was but a start. Careful wording of its opposition at this stage meant that
the EP did not imperil ratification. Italy then proceeded with ratification but only
after the issue had been debated by its parliament. Danish ratification was even
more problematic given intense internal divisions. The Danish parliament re-
jected the package by five votes. Danish Premier Poul Schluter, however, called
a referendum and won a 56 percent majority for the package.
Before the referendum, intense bilateral and plurilateral diplomacy had
occurred. Schluter made swift visits to other governments that, to back him up,
insisted that talks to reform the package could not be reopened. Just over a week
before the referendum, the Dutch called for the package to be signed on February
17 so that general pressure could be put on Denmark. All but Greece and Italy
obliged. The Commission and EP sent their vice presidents to the signing cer-
emony to show their dissatisfaction with its minimalist results. Denmark, Greece,
and Italy added their signatures on February 28. Italy added a lengthy declaration
calling for the SEA's review and expansion (notably in respect to the EP) by 1988.
Court action on the constitutionality of the SEA (lest it infringe Ireland's neu-
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trality) delayed but ultimately did not endanger the SEA's implementation from
July I, 1987. Implementation was delayed by the Irish supreme court, which
caused a referendum to be held before Ireland could ratify the SEA.
Outcomes
The mixed diplomatic techniques applied during the SEA process showed the
advantages of coalition building among the EC states and between blocs within
them and EC institutions broadly sympathetic to their views. These coalitions
persisted more or less intact throughout the process. Bargaining within them was
common and productive. The tactic of isolating the least communitarian member
was successful, and the United Kingdom's tactic of trying to divide the big three
failed. The EP alliance with Italy maintained maximalist pressure throughout.
Others sided with the EP and Italy both for genuine reasons and to take up
rhetorically ultracommunitarian positions or to engage in damage limitation
exercises when they had been in the minority on other issues. States could afford
this tactic particularly when they were certain that this type of minority coalition
was unlikely to win the day but was nevertheless an indicator of pro-Union
sentiment. The Commission, on whose shoulders the real exercise of drafting
proposals fell, adopted procommunitarian, even pro-EP, positions but had to
balance suggestions both to suit its own views and especially to facilitate com-
promise among the states to secure winning coalitions. As necessary, significant
inputs were made in the public domain by leading personalities from the EP, the
Commission, and member states, such as Spinelli, Delors, Mitterrand, Kohl,
Schluter, and Andreotti. The Council presidencies (notably under Luxembourg
and the Netherlands) acted as managers and occasionally as front-line mediators.
The knowledge that all the actors had of how each lined up inevitably
assisted ultimate compromise and facilitated judicious agenda adjustment. No
issue raised during the IGC process disappeared from the EC's agenda. All have
been taken up since then and resurfaced in the 1990-91 IGC deliberations; issues
dropped from the agenda at the 1991 IGC will resurface at the next IGC. These
conferences are unusual and reflect a need to institutionalize major changes in
the way the EC operates, in agenda and priority setting, in expanding the EC's
policy competencies and institutional capacities, and in creating the necessary
legal base for action in new, often highly contentious areas that impinge directly
on state sovereignty. Many issues have been highlighted through the IGC process,
and, even when only passing reference is made to them on one occasion, new
demarches are actually on the short- to medium-term agenda. In short, the pattern
of plurilateral diplomacy initiated before the 1985 IGC by the EP has stood the
test of time.
Notes
I. Before Spain and Portugal acceded to the EC, forty-five out of sixty-
three votes were needed to secure the adoption of a proposal by weighted majority
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Chapter 2
Negotiating the
Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade
Gunnar Sjostedt (Sweden)
This is a study of the Uruguay Round, the great and problematic trade nego-
tiation of the 1980s. The objective is to give an account of its developments and
main characteristics: how the Uruguay Round was initiated, how the negotiation
was organized, and what patterns of conflict and cooperation materialized. An
important part of the analysis will be to elucidate how the structural properties
of the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) influenced
the negotiation process in all its stages. A comprehensive outcome assessment,
which would have completed the picture, was unattainable as the Uruguay
Round was still in progress as of this writing (July 1993) and was only concluded
six months later (December 15, 1993).1
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section deals with the pre-
negotiations, which were underway long before the Uruguay Round was for-
mally opened. The second part concerns the formal negotiations, which were
initiated at the ministerial meeting in Punta del Este in September 1986. Devel-
opments are traced until the ministerial meeting in Brussels in December 1990.
In the third section a summary description is given of the continuation of the
Uruguay Round after the unsuccessful meeting in Brussels. The main theme of
this account is the management of failure. The final section contains a few brief
observations related to the outcome of the Uruguay Round.
Prenegotiations
The formal point of departure for the Uruguay Round is easily discernible. It was
the successful conclusion of the ministerial meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay,
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on September 20, 1986, when almost 100 participating nations agreed to begin
a new round of GATT negotiations. This collective decision followed a week of
hard bargaining with the outcome remaining uncertain until the eleventh hour
(Winham, 1989; Baldridge, 1986). The Punta del Este conference had an impor-
tant ceremonial function. However, it also represented a genuine decision process
in its own right because it determined in considerable detail the agenda of the
upcoming Uruguay Round. Although of decisive significance, the Punta del Este
meeting was in reality but an episode in a long train of events eventually leading
to the start of a new GATT round. The ministerial meeting in Punta del Este
not only was the formal starting point of the Uruguay Round but also repre-
sented the closure of another process, that of prenegotiations.
Diffuse Origin
It may be disputed exactly when the Uruguay Round began. One reason is that
the Uruguay Round did not start on a single occasion. In certain respects it
originated in earlier multilateral trade negotiations in GAIT, particularly the
Tokyo Round, which ended in late 1979. Part of the agenda of the Uruguay
Round consisted of leftovers from the Tokyo Round: trade problems that impor-
tant actors in the GATT process considered to be improperly solved in earlier
rounds of negotiation. From a political point of view the most important case
is trade in agricultural goods-a matter of particular concern in Washington.
Agriculture had been on the agenda in the Tokyo Round but had not been the
object of any real liberalization efforts to improve access to closed markets (United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1982). With the results of the
Tokyo Round in the pocket, Washington found it increasingly urgent to bring
agricultural trade under GATT disciplines.
In fact, several trade issues had been only partly settled in the Tokyo
Round. For example, the deadlocked negotiations on safeguards (Article XIX in
GATT) had been a complete failure. The several celebrated codes on various
nontariff trade barriers represented a certain success but had been signed by only
a relatively small number of countries, almost all of which were members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Most gov-
ernments in Third World countries felt that textiles and clothing should be
brought under the GATT regime as soon as possible. Numerous governments in
the North, as well as in the South, were worried about the increasing use of
voluntary export restraints and orderly market arrangements, particularly by the
great economic powers in sensitive industrial sectors (Aggarwal, Keohane, and
Yoffie, 1987). Thus, in the early 1980s the opinion was widespread that although
the Tokyo Round had made impressive headway to free manufactured goods in
particular, it had not addressed a number of trade matters that required attention.
These needs represented a potential moving force in the initial stage of the pro-
cess of cross-country consultations that was destined to evolve into the Uruguay
Round. Still, the prenegotiations developed into a protracted process full of stum-
bling blocks.
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The political forces, notably the United States, which began to pave the
way for new multilateral trade negotiations even before the completion of the
Tokyo Round, seem to have been particularly concerned with what became
known as the "new" trade issues because they had hitherto neither been covered
by the GATT regime nor been on the agenda of the multilateral trade negotia-
tions: trade in services, trade-related intellectual property rights, and trade-related
investments. Actually, these issues had not been considered to be trade at all. The
new trade issues were, from the very beginning, promoted by the United States
and gradually received increasing support from other industrialized countries.
The opposition consisted of an initially large group of developing countries, of
which Brazil and India stood out as the most influential and assertive. The aim
of the opposition was straightforward: to keep the new trade issues outside the
agenda of the GATT negotiations (Bradley, 1987; The Uruguay Round, 1988).
Thus, the tug-of-war over the new trade issues, so typical of the Uruguay
Round, did not first appear at the ministerial meeting in Punta del Este. The
patterns of conflict and cooperation in these areas had been crystallized in pro-
tracted prenegotiations, which had been going on for several years. Prenegotia-
tions had, in turn, been considerably influenced-indeed conditioned-by earlier
GATT rounds. In order to fully understand this continuity from the past it is
necessary to consider the great significance that the GATT context has always
had for agenda setting in multilateral trade negotiations.
The Uruguay Round was the latest in the series of multilateral trade ne-
gotiations that started in Geneva in 1947, when GATT was established. To be-
come a contracting party to GATT a nation had to make certain tariff
concessions. In Annecy (1949), Torquay (1951), and Geneva (1955) the GATT
membership was widened and the GATT regime consolidated by further tariff
reductions agreed on in product-by-product negotiations. Then followed the
powerful wave of trade liberalization of the 1960s and 1970s: the relatively un-
successful Dillon Round (1960-1961), followed by the more impressive Kennedy
(1964-1967) and Tokyo Rounds (1973-1979). Together these rounds of negotia-
tion resulted in average tariff reductions on the order of some 70 percent. In the
Tokyo Round the agenda was substantially expanded into the area of nontariH
barriers to trade-dumping/antidumping, subsidies/countervailing duties, pub-
lic procurement, tariff evaluation, licensing, and technical trade barriers (Dam,
1970; Golt, 1978).
The point of this short history of GATT is that from a long-time perspec-
tive the individual GATT rounds should not necessarily be seen as separate
episodes in the evolution of the global trading system. Together they represent
a comparatively continuous process. The impact of this continuity seems to have
increased over time. The Kennedy Round was partly a result of the inadequacy
of the product-by-product approach to attain substantive tariff reductions in the
Dillon Round. A consensus emerged among the leading trading nations control-
ling the GATT system tha~in future multilateral trade negotiations a new ap-
proach of across-the-board tariff reductions would have to be attempted (Dam,
1970). The Kennedy Round has generally been celebrated as a success story, a high
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point in the process of trade liberalization after World War II. However, a sur-
prisingly strong protectionist reaction to the outcome of the Kennedy Round
manifested itself in many industrialized countries. In many cases increased em-
ployment of nontariff barriers compensated for the tariff concessions made in the
Kennedy negotiations (Baldwin, 1970, 1986).
Informal preparations for future negotiations of nontariff barriers to trade
began in various forums around 1970. A significant part of the necessary analyt-
ical work was undertaken in the GECD, the highly competent support organi-
zation of industrialized countries. Therefore, when the Tokyo Round formally
started in September 1973, draft texts already existed on several new nontariff
barriers to be dealt with in the negotiations. The continuity between the Kennedy
and Tokyo Rounds was even more clear-cut with respect to the then dominant
issue, that of tariffs. In the Tokyo Round the linear, across-the-board approach
to tariff reductions was used successfully for a second time. As a consequence,
many of the controversies of the Kennedy Round emerged in the Tokyo Round-
for instance, the question of whether liberalization efforts should include agri-
cultural goods, the problem of tariff harmonization, and the issue of how to treat
the extreme peaks in the tariff wall in the exchange of concessions (Dam, 1970;
Winham, 1986).
Against this background the prenegotiations of the Uruguay Round have
to be understood. The preparations for the Uruguay Round were firmly rooted
in the results of the GATT negotiations of the 1970s and in their unresolved
issues. In the area of tariffs as well as with respect to numerous other issues the
Uruguay Round was a direct continuation of the Tokyo Round; negotiations in
the 1980s took off from where they had been interrupted in the earlier round.
In addition, with respect to the new trade issues there were some backward
links from the beginnings of the Uruguay Round to the Tokyo negotiations. The
new trade issues were interlinked in various ways, organically as well as tactically
or strategically, because of the trade policies of leading countries. Basically, the
emergence of the new issues reflected the transformation of the advanced GECD
countries from industrialized to postindustrialized societies. This development
brought to the forefront new trade problems related to the increasing economic
significance of services, information, and knowledge in modern society. However,
in spite of these strong interlinkages the new issues were treated separately in the
prenegotiations; each had a story of its own.
New Trade Issues
Trade in Services. Trade in services was the most important of the new
issues. This area comprises a great number of economic activities-for instance,
shipping and other forms of transport, professional services of many kinds,
telecommunications, tourism, banking, and insurance. Although earlier they had
not been considered part of international trade, service activities as such were not
new phenomena in the interchange of nations. When the Uruguay Round began,
services had for many years made significant contributions to the economic flows
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between nations, which was acknowledged in the work program of the DECD
and other international organizations. In the 1970s services had evolved in
industrialized countries into the largest economic sector, which was also increas-
ingly internationalized in most countries (Bressand and Calypso, 1989).
Therefore, internationally oriented service companies in leading industrialized
countries, notably the United States, became increasingly concerned with na-
tional regulations and other obstacles hindering access to foreign markets
(Feketekuty,1988).
Already in June 1978 trade in services was suggested as a possible area for
multilateral trade negotiations; this was one and a half years before the
conclusion of the Tokyo Round. This initiative of the United States had the form
of a rather open-ended proposal in the Consultative Group of 18 (CGI8) (Report
of the Consultative Group of 18 to the Council of Representatives in GATT,
1978). This special GATT body neither was involved in the ~ultinai:ional
negotiations nor had any formal decision-making authority; but it had a high-
level national representation. Therefore, CGl8 was an important GATT institu-
tion; among other things, it was responsible for strategic planning within
GATT. The significance of CGl8 was underlined by the fact that in contrast to
other GATT bodies it had a restricted membership. The larger developed and
developing countries retained a permanent seat in the group, whereas smaller
countries alternated as members (Bradley, 1987; Winham, 1986). Later in the same
year the United States followed up this initial move with a proposal that trade
in services be included in the liberalization program of the DECD. This initiative
had an important indirect significance for a future GATT round as it began to
identify the exchange of services across national borders as a form of trade.
To begin with, the discussions about trade in services in CGl8 did not have
any visible impact on the work undertaken in other GATT bodies. However, by
March 1981 trade in services had clearly become a politicized and controversial
issue. Already at this point the pattern of conflict and cooperation typical for the
later, formal prenegotiations for the Uruguay Round was discernible. The United
States and other industrialized countries stated that trade in services should be
part of the next GATT round. Brazil, India, and other developing countries
represented in CG18 argued that, as trade in services was clearly not covered by
the GATT regime, it should not be drawn into the multilateral trade negotiations
(Report of the Consultative Group of 18 to the Council of Representatives in
GA TT, 1982). At this point the opposition to trade in services as a topic in the
multilateral trade negotiations prevented any formal preparatory work on this
issue in GATT itself. Therefore, the United States took the initiative in having
the DECD secretariat begin gathering information and analysis with respect to
trade in services. In the DECD, prenegotiation activities could be comfortably
carried out without the disturbing interference of the assertive opposition of
Third World countries (Activities of DECD in 1981, 1982). In June 1981 the
Council of the DECD, meeting at the ministerial level, issued a strongly worded
declaration pointing out the need to eliminate obstacles to trade in services and
to strengthen international cooperation in this area (Activities of DECD in 1981,
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1982). This resolution can be interpreted as a political signal showing the
determination of industrialized countries, especially the United States, to struggle
for the inclusion of trade in services on the agenda of a new GATT round.
Trade-Related Investments. The new issue of trade-related investments
was originally initiated in a process that closely resembled early prenegotiation
activities related to trade in services. At a meeting with CG18 in April 1979, again
before the closure of the Tokyo Round, the representative of the United States
urged that trade-distorting measures related to direct, foreign investments should
be brought under GATT disciplines. The U.S. delegate had some support from
other industrialized countries but, as in the area of trade in services, also met
strong resistance from a group of leading developing countries.
At the October 1979 meeting of CG18 the United States continued its
offensive to have trade-related investments accepted as a GATT issue. The U.S.
delegate insisted that the GATT secretariat be commissioned to make an inven-
tory of investment measures that might have a negative impact on international
trade. However, Washington could not, at this point, mobilize sufficient political
support for its view that trade-related investments represented a legitimate GATT
issue (Bradley, 1987).
Intellectual Property Rights. The assertion that intellectual property
rights represented a new trade issue in the Uruguay Round is not correct. During
the Tokyo negotiations Washington made an attempt to put this issue on the
agenda. In July 1979 the United States and the European Communities (EC)
tabled a joint proposal that the problem of counterfeit goods-one of the main
topics in the area of intellectual property rights-should be brought into the
Tokyo Round (GATT document L/4817, 1979). This initiative was, however,
unsuccessful as the Tokyo negotiations had gone too far in the summer of 1979
to permit the extension of the agenda to a totally new issue. Thus, the
significance of the U.S.-EC proposal was primarily as a signal for the future, a
declaration of intent.
In 1980 and 1981 the United States began a series of bilateral talks over
intellectual property rights, notably the alarming problem of counterfeit goods,
with a few other key members in GATT. In addition to the members of the EC,
these early consultations involved Canada, Japan, and Switzerland: altogether a
group of significant and relatively like-minded countries. In the autumn of 1981
the United States and the EC cosponsored extended informal consultations with
selected countries. These efforts were still not sufficient to bring opposing
developing countries in line. However, gradually, intellectual property rights
were drawn into the GATT system. For instance, this problem area was given a
certain legitimacy as a GATT issue when the United States and Canada succeeded
in having a dispute over patent rights considered by a GATT panel. GATT found
that the U.S. exclusion order under dispute with Canada fell under Article XXd
(Bradley, 1987). For the purposes of this analysis the significance of this ruling
was that for the first time a specific case relating to the infringement of an
50 International Multilateral Negotiation
intellectual property right was brought before a competent GATT body. To use
a metaphor, the ruling of the panel served as a letter of introduction to GATT
of the issue of intellectual property rights.
Old Issues
The informal prenegotiation activities related to the future Uruguay Round also
included many of the "old" trade issues. One reason is that some of these ques-
tions were generally acknowledged leftovers from the Tokyo Round. In some
cases formal follow-up measures had been decided in the Tokyo negotiations.
These activities represent a significant link between the Tokyo and the Uruguay
Rounds. The precise nature of these linking activities depended on the negoti-
ation results that had been attained in the Tokyo Round and could be quite
elaborate.
Take, for instance, the case of safeguards (Article XIX), which was a total
failure in the Tokyo Round. Because of the great significance of this issue, it
could not just be dropped. Therefore, the outcome of the Tokyo Round included
a plan for continued discussions. Likewise, the relative failure to bring the so-
called multilateral trade negotiations to codes on nontariff barriers to trade could
not be permanently accepted. Special bodies had been appointed to supervise the
implementation of the codes. The deliberations in these bodies identified unre-
solved matters that would have to be considered in a new GATT round (Golt,
1978; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1982). In this way
the implementation of the Tokyo Round was clearly linked to the prenegotia-
tions of the Uruguay Round.
General Developments
Thus, although the Uruguay Round did not formally start until the second half
of 1986, some prenegotiation work began in 1979. The prenegotiation activities
were initially diffuse in character and largely invisible. They were split up and
carried out in different forums, partly outside of GATT-for instance, in the
OECD. Within GATT itself prenegotiation activities were, until 1984, embedded
primarily in the ordinary GATT work that is formally unrelated to the multi-
lateral trade negotiations. This early part of the negotiation process was a subtle
game in which the United States and its allies were undertaking a variety of
measures to enhance the trade status of the new issues and to draw them closer
to the legal framework of GATT. At the end of 1981 this campaign began to
produce some tangible results. Now, a more comprehensive institutional infra-
structure for a prenegotiation process began to emerge. In 1981 plans were de-
veloped to convene a GATT ministerial meeting. Conferences at this high
political level had hitherto been exceptional events in GATT. The Conference
of Contracting Parties, the supreme decision-making body in GATT, normally
meets at the level of head of delegation. However, in June 1981 national delegates
to CG18 agreed to begin preparations for a ministerial meeting. At its regular
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yearly session, the Contracting Parties set November 1982 as the date for the
meeting.
The 1982 ministerial meeting was the result of mixed political motives.
One reason was the perceived need to make a strong manifestation in defense of
the GATT system, which was threatened by the alarming wave of neoprotection-
ism that was the companion of the deep recession of the early 1980s (Bhagwati,
1988). Another, and related, motive for the extraordinary ministerial meeting was
that many governments, particularly in the Third World, wanted to have a for-
mal, political assessment of the results of the Tokyo Round, which ended in
November 1979. A widely acknowledged problem was that there were too many
"backlog issues" from the Tokyo Round-matters that had been covered by the
negotiations but were not part of their results. Here belonged sensitive issues like
agriculture, textiles and clothing, and the so-called gray-area measures-that is,
import restrictions contrary to the spirit of the GATT treaty (Hufbauer and
Schott, 1985). A third reason for the ministerial meeting was that the coalition
led by the United States saw it as an instrument to bring the new trade issues
further into the GATT processes (Das, 1984).
The declaration of the 1982 ministerial meeting did not call for a new
GATT round. In particular, the large coalition of developing countries insisted
that the agreements of the Tokyo Round would have to be implemented properly
before discussions started about a new round of negotiations. Still, the ministerial
meeting represented some movement toward formal prenegotiations for the fu-
ture Uruguay Round. Ministers agreed on a medium-term comprehensive work
program for GATT. This plan covered many issues that were later to reappear
on the agenda of the Uruguay Round. It is especially noteworthy that two of the
new trade issues were included in the 1982 comprehensive work program: trade
in services and intellectual property rights (Bradley, 1987).
After the 1982 ministerial meeting, prenegotiation activities remained in-
formal for some time. Developments with regard to trade in services are illustra-
tive. As this problem area had not yet been given the status of a GATT issue, the
secretariat was not authorized to undertake studies related to it. Therefore, the
analysis undertaken by the OECD secretariat was essential to the prenegotiation
process. Also national studies, particularly those provided by the U.S. and Can-
adian governments, contributed greatly to the buildup of the necessary consen-
sual knowledge. Partly as a result of these developments, a series of informal
consultations could be held in the first part of 1984 concerning the treatment of
trade in services in the GATT context (Bradley, 1987). The next step in the U.S.
strategy to prepare for the introduction of the new issues into multilateral trade
negotiations was to call for a formal GATT working party to deal with trade in
services; this strategy was supported by some other countries. This attempt was,
however, unsuccessful because of strong opposition by the large coalition of
developing countries led by Brazil and India (GATT document CIM 183, 1984).
Also, with respect to intellectual property rights, Washington tried to con-
vert the 1982 comprehensive GATT work program into concrete political action,
primarily by proposing a special GATT working party in this area in 1983. As
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in the area of trade in services, developing countries blocked the creation of such
an institution. In this case their main argument was that intellectual property
rights were already the responsibility of a United Nations institution, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (GATT document 170, 1983). The
lack of a formal working party in GATT made prenegotiations over intellectual
property rights difficult but did not prevent them. That work continued is clearly
indicated by a substantial background note on intellectual property rights that
was prepared by the GATT secretariat in spite of the fact that it had initially
lacked a formal mandate to undertake this work (GATT document MDF/W/19,
1985).
In 1984 the prenegotiation process began to change character and speed
somewhat, although the United States proposal at the regular Conference of
Contracting Parties in November to start preparations for a new GATT round
was rejected. However, this outcome represented only a temporary victory for the
opposing developing countries. In the longer term it was probably more impor-
tant that at the same meeting Washington was successful in establishing formal
GATT bodies for both trade in services and counterfeiting, which is part of the
issue area of intellectual property rights. These working parties were by no means
empty shells with merely a symbolic significance, as is clearly indicated by their
rate of activity in 1985. The group on trade in services had six meetings, and the
working party on counterfeiting, eight (Bradley, 1987).
In February 1985 the intensive discussions about a possible new GATT
round were resumed in CGI8. Although no formal decision was made, it seems
that this meeting firmly anchored the plans for new multilateral negotiations in
the GATT context. At the same time the political support for another GATT
round was rapidly growing, primarily because of events outside of GATT insti-
tutions. A series of informal ministerial meetings involving approximately
twenty key trading nations from the South as well as the North was especially
significant in this respect. In this context the United States and its allies had an
opportunity for direct consultations at a high political level with the nations
opposing the plans for a new GATT round, particularly Brazil and India. The
general impression was that the ministerial consultations considerably narrowed
the differences between the two sides. At the fourth meeting in Stockholm, in the
spring of 1985, it was widely believed that an agreement had been reached to
launch a new GATT round (Bradley, 1987). Although this assessment proved to
be wrong, the Stockholm meeting did have a considerable impact on the prene-
gotiations as it helped to introduce the discussion about a possible new round
in the GATT Council. This development was significant because, in contrast to
CGI8, the GATT Council is a formal decision-making body (interviews with
officials at the Trade Department of the Swedish Foreign Office, Sept. 1986;
Bradley, 1987).
While prenegotiations for the Uruguay Round gradually unfolded in the
formal GATT institutions, the industrialized countries struggling for a new
round continued to put forth their arguments and display their determination in
forums other than GATT. For instance, the Council of the OECD and the Group
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of Seven expressed strong support for a new GATT round (Activities of GEeD
in 1985, 1986; Bonn Economic Summit Declaration, 1985).
At the meeting of the GATT Council of June 5, 1985, the negotiations
about a new round were still deadlocked by a coalition of some twenty developing
countries. The necessary consensus looked unattainable, even though at this
point a large majority of states were in favor of a GATT round. Then, on July
24 the United States found a way out of the impasse with a tactical move that
had hitherto been unusual in GATT. The U.S. delegation called for a vote on
its own proposal that the Contracting Parties to GATT be summoned to an
extraordinary conference in September in order to plan for a new GATT round.
Technically, the U.S. proposal concerned a procedural question, which required
only a majority vote to be settled. Therefore, the "dissidents" could not block a
favorable decision (Bradley, 1987; Winham, 1989). This defeat was, however, not
merely procedural; it broke the veto power of the dissidents with respect to the
real bone of contention-whether preparations for a new GATT round should
be started.
One significant outcome of the extraordinary meeting of the Contracting
Parties in September 1985 was the establishment of a so-called senior officials'
group. The mandate of this body was to find a viable compromise between the
positions for and against a new GATT round. The senior officials were not able
to complete this task, but still they significantly built up momentum in the
prenegotiation process. In January 1986 a preparatory committee was established
under the chairmanship of the director general of GATT to begin substantive
planning for the future Uruguay Round. The preparatory committee worked
hard in the spring of 1986 but was not able to fully clear the way for the min-
isterial meeting that was anticipated to open the Uruguay Round in September.
Had the prepatory committee been successful, it would have presented
ministers at Punta del Este with one single draft text for a final declaration.
Instead on the eve of the Punta del Este meeting as many as three competing texts
were left on the negotiation table. One text was signed by Switzerland and Co-
lombia but was sponsored by some forty industrialized and developing countries.
It argued for the immediate initiation of a new GATT round that, among other
things would deal with the new trade issues. This text defined the position of the
majority. The second draft text expressed the concerns of the dissidents and es-
sentially argued that it was premature to start new multilateral trade negotia-
tions. The third text, presented by Argentina, was an unsuccessful attempt to find
a compromise between the two other proposals (Winham, 1989).
Eventually, in September 1986 ministers met in Punta del Este to decide
whether a new GATT round should be launched. The outcome of the week-long
meeting remained uncertain until Friday night. The meeting involved a complex
distribution of work. During most of the week a conference took place in which
the lOO-odd participating countries presented formal position papers, which had
been prepared in advance. No real bargaining could take place in this body.
Therefore, the chair of the ministerial meeting-the foreign minister of Uru-
guay-organized a heads-of-delegation group to function as a supreme negotiat-
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ing body during the Punta del Este meeting. Generally nations were represented
by their trade ministers. In this supracommittee politically responsible delegates
could concentrate on the sticking points of the negotiation in all issue areas.
Special working parties were set up to deal with the most difficult issues-trade
in services and agriculture. By the middle of the week many of the controversies
had been settled.
To deal with the remaining and more difficult problems, a restricted group
of some twenty key countries was set up including main dissidents like Brazil and
India. In order to be able to work in secrecy, without media attention, they held
meetings outside Punta del Este. With this organization of the negotiations one
problem after the other could be eliminated during the week. Still on Friday
evening, when negotiations were supposed to be closed, there was no generally
accepted text for a final declaration of the ministerial meeting. During the week
the Swiss-Colombian text had been generally accepted as a draft, even by the
developing countries that were trying to prevent or delay new multilateral trade
negotiations. However, they submitted a long list of amendments to the Swiss-
Colombian text that reflected their position but could not be easily incorporated
into the proposal. Hard bargaining on Friday night and Saturday morning was
eventually successful. Early Saturday morning all secretarial resources available
were fully mobilized. On Saturday afternoon the final declaration of the Punta
del Este meeting was communicated to the media. Prenegotiations were over; the
Uruguay Round had formally started (Finger and Oleschowski, 1987; Winham,
1989).
Functions
This account demonstrates the complexity of the prenegotiations of the Uruguay
Round. In certain respects they originated in the Tokyo Round, but in others they
started much later. Initially, prenegotiations were split up into a number of
subprocesses, some of which took place outside the GATT context. The OECD
played a particularly important role in this respect. Gradually, the various sub-
processes became more and more integrated and increasingly channeled into
GATT institutions. At first, prenegotiation activities unfolded in GATT bodies
that were not directly related to the multilateral trade negotiations. Later on,
special institutions were established for the preparation of the Uruguay Round.
Essentially, the cumbersome prenegotiations served two functions: to build up a
political platform to support the proposal for a new GATT round and to delimit
and clarify the agenda of these negotiations. Setting the agenda implied the
establishment of a common outlook for the Uruguay Round.
Evolution of the Political Platform. Before the Uruguay Round a political
platform for multilateral trade negotiations had evolved. The United States had
taken the first initiative by inviting its main trading partners and competitors to
consultations about a new GATT round. Before the Tokyo Round these discus-
sions had been conducted among the big three in the GATT system: the United
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States, the EC, and Japan. A number of selected middle powers in the issue area
of trade were then allowed into the prenegotiations. These states were invariably
industrialized nations and members of the OECD: Canada, the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) group, and Australia and New Zealand with respect
to trade in agricultural goods. After they reached a general agreement to launch
a new GATT round, an invitation was issued to other trading nations-primarily
the Contracting Parties to GATT-to take part in the formal prenegotiations
(Golt, 1978; Winham, 1986).
This familiar pattern of interaction reemerged in the Uruguay Round, but
only partially. As in the past the United States was the initiator of the prenego-
tiations and conducted privileged consultations with its main trading partners.
From the start, however, a large coalition of developing countries led by Brazil
and India had been involved in the prenegotiations, they tried to prevent a new
GATT round in the near future as proposed by the United States and other
industrialized countries (Strange, 1984). This coalition of dissidents was partic-
ularly hostile to the idea that the agenda of the multilateral negotiations should
include the new trade issues-trade in services, intellectual property rights, and
trade-related investments. The new element in the prenegotiations as compared
with earlier rounds was the open confrontation between two blocks in which the
new GATT round itself was at issue. However, because of defections the balance
of influence between the two sides shifted gradually to the disadvantage of the
coalition of developing countries. The veto power of the dissidents gradually
weakened as a number of export-oriented countries in Southeast Asia and Latin
America changed their position and became favorable of a new GATT round.
Still, the deadlock in the prenegotiations remained until the summer of 1986-
only a few months before the official opening of the Uruguay Round.
If the protracted impasse of the prenegotiations was a new feature in the
multilateral GATT negotiations, so also was the process through which this
deadlock was broken. In earlier GATT rounds the great powers, especially the
United States, had exercised decisive leadership of the prenegotiations. At the end
of the prenegotiations of the Uruguay Round a growing coalition of middle
powers and small states partly took over some of the leadership role. The most
concrete manifestation of the accomplishment of this coalition was the Swiss-
Colombian submission that was eventually accepted as a draft text for the Punta
del Este meeting. The origin is to be found in extended cooperation among a
number of OECD countries with "free-trade" commercial policies, notably Can-
ada, the EFTA nations, Australia, and New Zealand. This group, commonly
called G9, invited a number of developing countries to join in its effort to draft
a viable text for a ministerial meeting opening a new trade round. Initially, some
twenty developing countries took part in this work, but in the end almost fifty
participated (Bradley, 1987). Thus emerged the large coalition of small and mid-
dle powers that was able to build up a tenable middle ground between, on the
one hand, the United States and the other two great powers (the EC and Japan)
and, on the other, the dissidents led by Brazil and India.
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Delimitation of Issues. Prenegotiations were partly about whether the
Uruguay Round should be held at all. They also included a confrontation over
which issues should be included in the agenda. This process of issue selection was
closely related to what may be called "the game of issue clarification." Some of
the issues to be dealt with in the Uruguay Round were leftovers from earlier
GATT negotiations; prenegotiations picked up these issues in the shape they had
been in when the Tokyo Round was terminated. As a rule, negotiators were
familiar with these backlog issues and the positions taken by key countries. The
issue of the safeguard clause is a good example. However, some of these old
GATT issues required clarification-notably, trade in agricultural goods, one of
the high-policy issues of the Uruguay Round. Early in the prenegotiations key
countries agreed that agriculture should be covered by a new GAIT round but
could not agree on the terms. For example, the United States wanted to phase out
all production and export subsidies, a proposal that many other countries, in-
cluding the EC, could not accept. In order to argue for a position, each side
needed an analytical model to aggregate and compare different types of subsidies.
For this reason, prenegotiations in the area of agricultural trade were to a large
extent a struggle among the United States, the EC, and other leading countries
about which analytical concepts and methods should be used in the negotiations
(Finger and Oleschowski, 1987).
The prenegotiation struggle over the new trade issues was still more de-
pendent on issue clarification. Take the case of trade in services. Under this new
heading a number of well-known economic activities were hidden-for example,
shipping, air transport, banking, and insurance. The problem was, however, that
these issues had hitherto not been considered part of international trade. The
framing of the international exchange of services as a trade issue required new
concepts and new data, including basic statistics. Furthermore, a careful analysis
was needed to clarify how existing GATT rules could be applied to trade in
services with due consideration given to the great differences among sectors. For
instance, only some services are transferred across national borders as if they were
goods. In other cases the export of a service requires the establishment of a firm
or a branch in the importing country (for example, in the sector of insurance)
or temporary migration (for example, construction) (Bressand and Calypso,
1989).
To become negotiable, trade in services, as well as other new trade issues,
required extensive as well as innovative analysis. The development of the Uru-
guay Round was seemingly considerably influenced by the fact that the secretariat
of GATT was not able to fully undertake this task in the early stages of prene-
gotiations. One explanation was the lack of necessary analytical capacity-the
staff of the GATT secretariat had been recruited primarily to manage the existing
treaty. A second reason was that it was not until late in the process of prenego-
tiations that the GATT secretariat was authorized to study the new trade issues.
Therefore, the prenegotiation work became heavily dependent on the analytical
work undertaken by the OECD and individual industrialized countries. Leading
industrial countries like the United States, the EC, and Canada were in a very
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good position to shape the consensual knowledge necessary for negotiations on
the new issues so that it was in line with their own particular interests. This
analytical dominance was strongly resented by developing countries, particularly
larger nations like Brazil and India with aspirations to influence negotiations.
It is very likely that this asymmetry with respect to analytical capacity and in-
fluence over the building of consensual knowledge hardened the position of the
coalition of dissidents.
Formal Bargaining
Once the Punta del Este ministerial meeting had succeeded in formulating a final
declaration, there was an immediate qualitative change in the process of the
Uruguay negotiations. A number of goals were set. The main objectives agreed
on were to strengthen and broaden the GATT system, further liberalize the
growth of world trade, strengthen and improve rules governing international
trade transactions, and increase the responsiveness of the GATT system to
changes in its international environment. Through these goals negotiations were
given a dear direction that, in turn, made it possible to set up an elaborate
institutional machinery.
Organization of the Negotiations
Leaning on the experience gained in earlier GATT rounds, participants estab-
lished an organizational structure for the Uruguay Round soon after the closure
of the Punta del Este meeting. Among the Uruguay Round institutions the Trade
Negotiations Committee (TNC) had the highest authority. Its tasks were to su-
pervise and coordinate negotiations in all issue areas. Below TNC were two main
bodies, one of which was the Group on the Negotiations on Services (GNS). As
the result of a compromise made at Punta del Este, GNS was technically outside
the GATT framework. It was to be decided at a later date whether the outcomes
of its negotiations were to be incorporated in GATT. The second main body
under TNC was the Group on Negotiations on Goods (GNG), whose responsi-
bilities covered everything negotiated in the Uruguay Round except trade in
services. Real negotiations were to take place in fourteen negotiating groups
reporting to the GNG and concerned with the following issue areas: tariffs;
nontariff barriers to trade; natural resources; textiles and clothing; agriculture;
tropical products; GATT articles; multilateral trade agreements negotiated in the
Tokyo Round; safeguards; subsidies and countervailing duties; intellectual prop-
erty rights; trade-related investments; dispute settlement; and functioning of the
GATT system. All these negotiating bodies were, in principle, open to all coun-
tries that were formal participants of the Uruguay Round (Finger and
Oleschowski, 1987).
In addition to dealing with all these issues, the parties engaged in the
Uruguay Round had committed themselves to undertake standstill and rollback
measures. The essence of standstill was a promise not to impose any new trade-
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restrictive measures even though they were not clearly prohibited by GATT (for
example, so-called voluntary export restraints) as long as the Uruguay
negotiations went on. Rollback meant that negotiating parties were to begin
phasing out existing trade-restrictive measures of this type. The implementation
of the standstill and rollback commitments, which represented a particularly
great grievance for developing countries, was to be supervised by a special sur-
veillance body (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1982).
The institutional structure created for the Uruguay Round indicates the
general character of the negotiation process. The large number of negotiating
groups gives support to the assertion that the Uruguay Round represented the
most ambitious multilateral trade negotiations attempted so far. In particular two
properties of the process should be emphasized; first, the complexity confronting
negotiating parties and, second, the compartmentalization of the agenda. Each
negotiating group in reality represented a quasi-autonomous negotiation process
in its own right with its own particular problems, sticking points, conceptual
framework, and to some extent national representation. Take, for instance, the
negotiating group on trade in agricultural goods, which, among other things,
was given the mission of dissolving the almost structural conflict of interest in
this area between the United States and the EC. Or consider the negotiating group
on textiles and clothing, which had the task of eliminating a regime of managed
trade (the Multi-Fibre Agreement) that had frustrated a great number of devel-
oping countries for many years (GATT document MTN/TNC/ll, 1989). These
two cases indicate the magnitude of the purely political difficulties that con-
fronted negotiating parties in the Uruguay Round.
The new trade issues were not only politically problematic but also rep-
resented another type of complexity because of the lack of sufficient knowledge
and information about the issues. Although progress was considerable with re-
spect to issue clarification in the prenegotiations, this work was not sufficient.
The buildup of consensual knowledge had to continue in the formal negotia-
tions. This necessity complicated negotiations, as some developing countries that
were acknowledged stakeholders in the issue area concerned were handicapped
in this continued process of issue clarification. Their only means to influence the
process was to obstruct or delay it.
An overview of the main problems dealt with in the negotiating groups
gives an idea of the complexity and magnitude of the agenda of the Uruguay
Round.
• NGI. Tariffs. Reduction of tariff rates; formula (related to across-the-board
reductions) versus request/offer procedures (related to bilateral negotiations);
tariff escalation.
• NG2. Nontariff barriers. Continued dismantling of nontariff barriers nego-
tiated in the Tokyo Round; procedures for assessing the equivalence of
offers/requests.
• NG3. Natural resources. Product coverage; tariff escalation; quantitative re-
striction; the problem of secure supply.
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• NG4. Textiles and clothing. Integration of the Multi-Fibre Agreement into
the GATT regime.
• NG5. Agriculture. Improved market access through elimination of special
import measures; changes in the GATT rules on subsidies.
• NG6. Tropical products. Product coverage; tariff escalation under general-
ized special preferences (to developing countries) or multilateral trade nego-
tiation (nondiscrimination) principles; reciprocity or nonreciprocity for
developing countries.
• NG7. GATT Articles. Revision of Article 2.la, tariff bindings; Article 24,
customs unions/free-trade areas; Articles 12, 14, IS, and 18, balance of pay-
ments; Article 28, modification of tariff schedules; Article 17, state trading;
Article 21, national security; Article 25, waivers; and the protocol for provi-
sional application of GATT.
• NG8. Multilateral trade agreements and arrangements. Elaboration and clar-
ification of the codes negotiated in the Tokyo Round; increased participa-
tion of developing countries.
• NG9. Safeguards. Selectivity with respect to the use of safeguard measures;
transparency; objective criteria for safeguard action; retaliation; structural
adjustment to preempt the need for safeguard action.
• NGIO. Subsidies and countervailing duties. Definition of subsidy; disci-
plines with respect to export subsidies; review of Articles 6 and 16.
• NGII. Trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs). Integration of
trade rules pertaining to TRIPs; consideration of international cooperation
and regimes related to other international organizations, especially WIPO.
• NGI2. Trade-related investment measures. Elaboration of GATT rules that
help eliminate the adverse effects of investment measures on trade.
• NG13. Dispute settlement. Effective enforcement of GATT panel rulings
through, for instance, increased transparency and improvement of
procedures.
• NGI4. Functioning of the GATT system. Procedures for the surveillance of
trade policies; enhanced decision making through ministerial involvement;
better coordination between GATT and the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank.
In addition, GNS was responsible for a considerable number of issues including
statistical reporting on trade in services, the conceptual framework for the inte-
gration of trade in services in GATT, coverage, and analysis of individual service
sectors (Finger and Oleschowski, 1987; The Uruguay Round, 1988).
In order to cope with this extensive and complex agenda an overall plan
of action was agreed on, including a timetable (Finger and Oleschowski, 1987;
The Uruguay Round, 1988). By December 1986 all negotiating groups had begun
to implement this general plan in their respective areas of responsibility. As
agreed, a midterm review was held at the ministerial level in Montreal in late
December 1988. The main purpose of this meeting was to take stock of activities,
although a few negotiation results were codified already at this point with respect
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to the issue areas of dispute settlement and functioning of the GATT system. For
instance, at Montreal it was decided that ministerial meetings should be held
more frequently than before and that reviews should recurrently be made of the
trade policy of individual countries (GATT document MTN/TNC/ll, 1989). In
the summer of 1990 another comprehensive stocktaking took place, although this
time at the level of head of delegation. The ambition, not realized, was to estab-
lish one single draft for an agreement in each negotiation group by the end of
July. These texts were then to be polished during the autumn so that a ministerial
meeting in Brussels scheduled for early December could terminate the Uruguay
Round (GATT document MTN/TNC/15, 1990). This plan of action was essen-
tially implemented.
Steered by this strategic plan, all negotiating bodies worked in approxi-
mately the same way. They were all serviced by the GATT secretariat on equal
terms, although GNS formally remained outside GATT. The secretariat has no
formal authority to take initiatives or otherwise steer negotiations. Still, the se-
cretariat exercised a certain influence. The input into the Uruguay Round made
by the secretariat consisted of background information and analyses, summary
records of negotiation sessions, and syntheses of country positions. In particular,
in the later part of the negotiations, when there was stalemate in important issue
areas, the director general of GATT tried to act as mediator.
Continuously serviced by the secretariat, the average negotiation group
worked approximately as follows during the Uruguay Round. Early in the ne-
gotiation active nations for the most part submitted papers discussing the issues
at hand and the problems or the tasks they would like the particular negotiation
group to address. The secretariat was asked to provide background information-
for example, about the work undertaken by other international organizations. In
the following stage of the process nations began to submit discussion papers to
the negotiation group that directly expressed their interests and ambition. Even-
tually, draft texts or elements thereof began to be tabled. Hence, activities in the
negotiating groups in many ways resembled committee work within a national
administration. All nations that were formal members of the negotiating groups
did not take an active part in the negotiations. For instance, many developing
countries were mostly absent from the sessions or were passive observers. Active
states behaved quite differently. In order to understand the working processes in
the various negotiating groups their performance as actors-nations-has to be
considered.
Actor Performance
Sometimes multilateral negotiations lead to an exchange of measurable conces-
sions. In the GATT context the typical example is negotiations on tariffs. Bar-
gaining over this type of issue, which can be distributed with the help of a clean
quantitative measure, can be handled easily through an offer/request procedure.
In the GATT process offers and requests with respect to tariffs have been made
in two different ways, either product by product or with a formula for across-the-
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board reductions. In the GATT negotiations the offer/request procedure had
been used in other issue areas as well as in tariffs issues. For instance, in the
Tokyo negotiations on government procurement a formula was found that per-
mitted an exchange of concessions; the measurable unit was the number of state
agencies to be covered by agreed-upon liberalization measures (Winham, 1986).
However, for most of the issues on the agenda of the Uruguay Round it
was not possible to find, or invent, quantifiable bargaining chips. Instead, the
exchange of concessions in most issue areas took place through a process that may
be described as "editing diplomacy": the establishment of a convention text. The
objective of this kind of bargaining was to reach agreement on the creation or
modification of regime elements-principles, norms, rules, procedures-related
to a particular issue area. In editing diplomacy bargaining does not concern the
immediate distribution of a certain value-for example, market access as indi-
cated by the size of an import duty. Instead negotiations concern the establish-
ment of conditions, in the form of "rules of the game," that influence the
disputed distribution of values in a more diffuse way in the longer term.
Editing diplomacy strongly characterized the negotiation process in the
Uruguay Round by conditioning the tactical and strategic considerations of par-
ticipating nations. Typically, editing diplomacy evolved in two stages. The first
was characterized primarily by the negotiation task of issue clarification, an ac-
tivity that usually started early in the prenegotiations. In this stage there was little
bloc building; instead nations tried to express their individual concerns in the
process of agenda setting. Typical submissions tried either to explain the nature
of the issue or to design general approaches to the resolution of negotiation
problems. In complex trade negotiations such editing is a demanding kind of
diplomacy requiring a high degree of professional skill and access to the neces-
sary technical expertise and information. These qualified demands help explain
the relatively low degree of active participation in the Uruguay negotiations.
Approximately 70 percent of the formal participants were passive, or almost
passive, in the negotiations following the Punta del Este meeting.
The second stage in the process of editing diplomacy was characterized by
text consolidation. This stage entailed the beginning of movements of conver-
gence in the many negotiating groups toward a few dominant positions followed
by the search for a single text. These developments coincided with the emergence
of coalitions of nations supporting the various main proposals or texts. 2 In this
connection noteworthy new patterns of conflict and cooperation emerged that
had not been present in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds. In these two earlier
GATT rounds the relationship between the United States and the EC, be it
cooperative or conflictual, had been the axis around which negotiations had
rotated. The key issue area of trade in agriculture is a good example. In the Tokyo
Round the conflict of interest, and recurrent confrontation, between the United
States and the EC set the terms for the bargaining process and for coalition
building. In several cases the U.S.-EC dispute over an issue was the main reason
that it had been put on the agenda in the first place. A common strategy for each
side was to try to build up a winning coalition before the end game started. The
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U.S.-EC confrontation contributed considerably to delimiting the strategic op-
tions of other countries. Thus, one policy choice many countries had to make was
whether they should basically support the U.S. position or the EC position. It
is interesting that the rapidly rising economic power of Japan was one of the
nations keeping a conspicuously low profile throughout the negotiations. Some
of the middle powers in the issue area of trade saw an opportunity to act as
creative mediators between the United States and the EC. One example is the so-
called Swiss formula, which helped to settle the transatlantic dispute over tariff
harmonization. Developing countries were essentially kept outside the negotia-
tion process until the last stage, when their options were limited to accepting or
rejecting draft agreements worked out by industrialized countries. As a result a
large protest alliance appeared at the very end, when active nations thought that
the time was ripe for the signing of the agreements reached in the negotiating
groups. The closure of the Tokyo Round was delayed several months, and still
only a handful of developing countries signed the codes on nontariff barriers to
trade (Winham, 1986).
The pattern of state interaction in the Uruguay Round had many similar-
ities with that of the Tokyo Round. There were, however, also significant dif-
ferences in this respect. Recall from the above account that many developing
countries asserted themselves in the earliest stages of the prenegotiations and then
remained active players in the process. The significance of the participation of
developing countries is indicated by the fact that representatives of the Third
World were elected chairpersons in several of the negotiating groups, including
the controversial and politically important GNS. In earlier rounds the govern-
ments of industrialized countries had retained a firm control over all significant
negotiating groups.
At the early prenegotiations the North-South confrontation that had dis-
turbed the end game of the Tokyo Round reappeared and threatened to block the
process. However, the Uruguay Round never developed into full-scale, ideolog-
ical trench war between developed and developing countries. One explanation is
probably that leading countries like Brazil and India abstained from taking grand
ideological stands. Instead they tried to defend their own national interests in the
negotiating groups of most significance to them. This posture was contrary to
the principles of a solidarity policy, which would have been to keep the large
coalition of Third World countries together. As a result the Third World alliance
gradually shrank as prenegotiations proceeded. A growing number of members
of this group chose, or were forced, to pursue national strategies. One result was
that developing countries increasingly chose to form or take part in coalitions
created to defend narrow sectoral interests related to market access for a certain
product group such as bovine meat.
Thus, in contrast to earlier GATT rounds there emerged a few issue-
specific coalitions made up only of developing countries. One example is the
surprisingly assertive coalition concerned with tropical products that was made
up largely of poor and weak West African countries. A second case is the "tiger
coalition" in the negotiating group on safeguards, which included newly indus-
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trialized countries in Southeast Asia, notably the members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations and Hong Kong and Korea (Hamilton and Whalley,
1989). A third example of a "pure" coalition of developing countries was the
Group of Ten of the Uruguay Round, the consolidated coalition of Third World
countries, led by Brazil and India, that was striving to block or at least delay the
preparations for new multilateral trade negotiations. Although it shrank over
time, this coalition continued to oppose the inclusion of the new trade issues on
the agenda of the Uruguay Round long after prenegotiations were formally con-
cluded at Punta del Este.
Another noteworthy development was the emergence of issue-specific
mixed coalitions consisting of both developed and developing countries. The
Cairns group, originally established in early 1986, is the most well-known exam-
ple. It included thirteen or fourteen countries that were competitive exporters of
agricultural goods: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji
(part of the time), Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines,
Thailand, and Uruguay. The Cairns group developed into a key actor in the
important sector of trade in agricultural goods (Hamilton and Whalley, 1989).
Besides the issue-specific alliances an important mixed coalition of indus-
trialized and developing countries emerged that did not limit its activities to a
particular issue area but tried to influence the Uruguay negotiations generally.
This was the de la Paix group, a continuation of the coalition of middle and
minor trading nations that had paved the way for the Punta del Este meeting. 3
Originally the de la Paix group consisted of Australia, Canada, Colombia, Hun-
gary, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden
(as a representative of the Nordic group), Switzerland, Thailand, Uruguay, and
Zaire. This grouping of states did not present position papers in its own name.
Rather, the members of the de la Paix group strove collectively to promote ne-
gotiation solutions at the table, which was a movement toward liberalization and
nondiscrimination in the issue area concerned. It is noteworthy that the de la Paix
group included neither any of the great industrialized actors (the United States,
the EC, or Japan) nor any of the dissident countries from the South (for example,
Brazil, India, or Mexico) that confronted the industrialized states in several issue
areas, notably with respect to the new trade issues (Hamilton and Whalley, 1989).
This make-up permitted the de la Paix group to playa role in the negotiations
that can be described as a mixture of leadership and mediation.
The End Game
In the summer of 1990, negotiations in the Uruguay Round had certainly moved
forward from the situation at the time of the Punta del Este meeting. Issues had
been considerably clarified. Negotiations generally concerned two, or a few, pro-
posals for a document defining the outcome of the work in the negotiating
groups. But still many of the basic negotiation problems remained unresolved.
In several areas the conflict of interest between the main contenders had attained
the character of a zero-sum game. This was notably the case in the most proble-
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matic conflict: that between the United States and the EC with respect to trade
in agricultural products. The transatlantic dispute over agriculture-as well as
over other issues-was, however, by no means the only remaining serious con-
flict. For instance, a group of Latin American countries delayed the signing of
the declaration from the midterm review in Montreal for several months on the
grounds that sufficient results had not yet been attained in the area of agriculture
and in other areas of interest to developing countries (GATT document MTN/
TNC/ll, 1989). Among the new trade issues, trade in services remained especially
controversial during the Uruguay Round.
Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that the results of the grand stock-
taking exercise in the summer of 1990 were disappointing. The initial goal was
to have a draft for a single text ready in all negotiating groups at this point.
When, in the spring of 1990, it became obvious that this objective was unrealistic
the new concept of a "profile" was introduced. A profile was not a single text,
but it described its main elements. However, by the end of July delegations had
not been successful in producing such profiles in all negotiating groups. In some
areas stocktaking had to substitute for a profile (GATT document MTN/TNC/
15, 1990). Part of the reason was that unfinished bargaining over relatively minor
details remained in the would-be single text. However, in other sectors unresolved
principal bones of contention prevented the drafting of a single text. One notable
example is trade in agricultural products; another is textiles and clothing. The
problem was that these difficult areas held back progress in other sectors where
it would probably have been possible to reach an agreement if negotiations had
been conducted autonomously. The basic conflicts of interest among the key
actors were, hence, not resolved and eliminated from the agenda. They were
rather swept under the carpet-a strategy that in the end proved to be self-
defeating (Winham and Kizer, 1993).
Preparations
In early December 1990 ministers from the nations participating in the Uruguay
Round met in Brussels in order to close the negotiations before the end of the
year. Intensive preparations for the Brussels meeting went on in all negotiating
groups from September onward. According to plan, the work was to be devoted
to hammering out the details of the remaining unresolved differences. The re-
sults, scheduled to be codified in Brussels, would be separate texts from all ne-
gotiating groups and a single final text summarizing the total outcome of the
Uruguay negotiations. Autumn was a hectic period with recurrent meetings in
all groups. However, in November it was clear that the Brussels meeting would
not merely be ceremonial. Instead, the outcome of the Uruguay Round clearly
depended on the ability of the ministers to conduct and terminate real negotia-
tions in the most difficult areas like agriculture, textiles, dispute settlement, and
the new trade issues. This task was highly complicated because negotiation work
in relatively manageable areas was severely restrained by the outstanding polit-
ically sensitive problems in other areas. Part of the reason is that some negoti-
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ation problems can be resolved only in a final and decisive exchange of conces-
sions. The dilemma is that negotiating parties will not engage themselves fully
in bargaining over such outstanding matters until they are certain that negoti-
ations are, in fact, in the process of being terminated once and for all.
Thus, when the ministers arrived in Brussels, they were confronted with
a heavy work load and a highly uncertain outcome to the negotiations. In was,
hence, not possible to bring the Brussels meeting to a successful end. The meeting
was organized in a constructive and effective way. Working parties were set up
under the leadership of selected ministers to deal with the outstanding issues.
Progress was made in many areas, and minor movements of position by principal
actors were discernible in some difficult areas. However, it was impossible to
eliminate the main sticking points in sensitive areas-for instance, those pertain-
ing to agriculture. The key actors were unwilling to yield sufficiently to pave the
way for an agreement. After a week of intensive, more or less continuous, nego-
tiations the ministers had to leave Brussels without having been able to bring the
Uruguay Round to a successful end.
Management of Failure
There seems to have been a wide consensus that it would have been disastrous
to acknowledge and accept the failure of the ministerial meeting in Brussels
officially. Accordingly, the outcome of the Uruguay Round was left indetermi-
nate. No formal decision was taken to continue negotiations after Brussels. How-
ever, in his concluding speech the Uruguayan foreign minister chairing the
meeting offered the suggestion that the director general of GATT undertake a
thorough evaluation of progress made in the various sectors during the meeting,
a proposal to which no nation objected.
Thus, in early 1991 the staff of the GATT secretariat started to analyze by
sector the progress made in Brussels. The criterion was the texts produced for the
ministerial meeting. Arthur Dunkel, the director general of GATT, had a pro-
posal accepted for a new system of negotiating groups in which some of the older
bodies were integrated into one. Formal decisions to that effect were taken in the
three main bodies of the Uruguay Round on April 25, 1991 (GATT, News of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations 047). The new groups were to deal
with the following issue packages: market access (tariffs, nontariff measures,
natural resource-based products, tropical products); textiles and clothing; agri-
culture; trade-related investments and rule making (subsidies and countervailing
duties, antidumping, safeguards, preshipment inspection, rules of origin, tech-
nical barriers to trade, import licensing procedures, customs valuation, govern-
ment procurement, and a number of specific GATT articles); trade-related
intellectual property rights; institutions; and trade in services (GATT, News of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations 047).
Some of these new groups had initial meetings in April. These sessions
dealt essentially with minor procedural matters but were still politically impor-
tant as they signified that the Uruguay Round had now been formally re-
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launched. However, the rate of activity was low in the formal negotiation ma-
chinery. In the summer of 1991 a new stocktaking exercise took place in Geneva,
where the progress made in Brussels and thereafter was formally assessed and
consolidated in most areas. A new plan of action was agreed on for continued
negotiation; it was implemented in the autumn. The overall objective was to
terminate the negotiations before the end of the year. Therefore, October and
November were scheduled to serve as a deal-making stage. The new revision of
the Final Act, originally prepared for the ministerial meeting of December 1990,
was scheduled to be finished by early November 1991 (GATT document
MTN.TNC/W/35.1; GATT, News of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Nego-
tiations 050).
Some progress was made in these consultations, as indicated by several
meetings of TNC during 1991. For instance, a seemingly viable general agree-
ment on trade in services was worked out in this period. Also, in other areas some
progress was made with respect to the technical problems. At a meeting of TNC
on November 7, 1991, it was decided that negotiations were going to be sped up
to ensure the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in December. From then on the
chairpersons of all the remaining negotiation groups were to conduct "contin-
uous and simultaneous negotiations." In his main stocktaking speech Director
General Dunkel of GATT, functioning as the chair of TNC, said that this
November represented "the best available window of opportunity" for making
constructive deals (GATT, News of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Nego-
tiations 050). However, Dunkel also reported that "the chairmen of the negotiat-
ing groups have informed me that progress so far has not been such as to offer
a sufficient basis for compromise solutions on the essential substantive issue"
(GATT, News of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations, 050, pp. 2-3).
Again the pessimistic assessment of the situation proved to be the realistic
one. In December 1991 a draft Final Act had been accepted including texts cov-
ering all areas negotiated on in the Uruguay Round. Furthermore, the draft Final
Act also included a revised proposal that GATT be transformed into a multilat-
eral trade organization. However, negotiating parties had not been able to agree
on commitments regarding market access in any of the three main areas-indus-
trial goods, agricultural products, and trade in services ("GATT infor Uruguay-
rundans slutforhandling," 1992).
In January 1992 TNC met to take stock of the situation in order to re-
launch the end game of the Uruguay Round. It was agreed that henceforth the
negotiations would be conducted on four parallel tracks. The first two tracks
concerned the difficult negotiations on market access with respect to, first, indus-
trial products and agricultural goods and, second, trade in services. On the third
track a detailed, final examination was to be conducted of all the texts that had
been negotiated in the Uruguay Round. Finally, the fourth track was reserved for
the eventual renegotiations of particular elements of the outcome and trade-offs
at the decisive stage of the end game. The new target date for the conclusion of
the round was mid-April 1993 ("GATT infiir Uruguay-rundans slutfiirhan-
dling," 1992). However, when, at the stipulated time, TNC had an informal
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meeting, it could note only that the end game had never actually taken off.
Participants felt that "despite efforts at the highest political levels in key capitals,
little or no concrete progress had been achieved since January and that tracks 1,
2, and 3 were, in effect, blocked" (GATT, News of the Uruguay Round of Mul-
tilateral Negotiations 052, pp. 2-3).
During the summer and early autumn of 1992 TNC held no formal meet-
ings, although several informal discussions took place. Of these the unsuccessful
bilateral talks between the United States and the EC on trade in agricultural
goods were crucial. The unresolved transatlantic conflict of interest blocked the
negotiations in all issue areas. At the time of the presidential elections in the
United States a new meeting of TNC was devoted primarily to crisis management
(GATT, News of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations 052). After
having noted the seriousness of the situation, "an overwhelming majority of
participants" expressed their "deep concern and helplessness" in the face of a
deadlock in the Uruguay Round because of the incapacity of the United States
and EC to resolve their conflict of interest (GATT, News of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Negotiations 052, pp. 2-3). These same nations voiced their dis-
satisfaction with this state of affairs and turned to the United States and the EC
"to urge their cooperation in restarting multilateral negotiations in Geneva"-
that is, within the formal, multilateral negotiation machinery of the Uruguay
Round (GATT, News of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations 052,
p. 4). The chair of TNC, the director general of GATT, was commissioned to
communicate these deep concerns to the EC and the United States.
When TNC reconvened on November 26, Director General Dunkel re-
ported on his meetings with the authorities in Brussels and Washington, who,
according to Dunkel, had responded in the most positive and constructive terms,
even more so because they "were already engaged in a process of intensive con-
sultations" (GATT, News of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations
054, p. 1). Therefore, Dunkel, widely supported by the majority of the partici-
pants in the negotiations, proposed the reactivation of the Uruguay Round on
the basis of the same four-track approach that had been established in January.
Also, in other respects the GATT secretariat elaborated a renewed negotiation
plan (GATT, News of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations 054).
This ambition was seemingly supported by the EC and the United States. On the
eve of the Christmas vacation the chair of TNC received a formal message from
the highest authorities of the United States (the president) and the EC (the chair
of the Council of Ministers and the president of the European Commission)
stating that "the aim should be to conclude a balanced and comprehensive agree-
ment by the middle of January" (GATT, News of the Uruguay Round of Mul-
tilateral Negotiations 056, p. 1). However, once more the target date was further
advanced with a remaining hope that, in the best of all worlds, negotiations
would be concluded before the extended mandate of the U.S. executive expired
in March 1993. This deadline too has past. Thus, the final outcome of the Uru-
guay Round still remains uncertain.
68 International Multilateral Negotiation
Outcome
It may be argued that whatever eventually came out of it the Uruguay Round was
a failure, at least in terms of its own objectives. The essence of the negotiation
after the unsuccessful ministerial meeting of December 1990 was the management
of failure. The Uruguay Round was seemingly too vast an enterprise to be per-
mitted to flounder. It should be stressed, however, that failure is relative. Even
if the negotiated results of the Uruguay Round appear meager, its total outcome
may still have some significance. According to the "bicycle theory" a round of
multilateral trade negotiations supports the international trade regime by just
being conducted, particularly in times of economic recession like the early 1990s
(Winham, 1986). The analytical work and the bargaining that have taken place
in the Uruguay Round have paved the way for future trade negotiations, not least
with regard to the new trade issues. However, these various contributions do not
conceal the fact that after the Brussels meeting no significant breakthrough oc-
curred in the main political controversies. The organizational plan for the end
game had to be redone repeatedly, and the date for the conclusion of the nego-
tiation was only finally set, by the fear of total failure, at the end of 1993.
This story does not provide a clear answer to the question of why it was
so much more difficult to bring the Uruguay Round to a successful end than
earlier GATT negotiations. It does, however, offer a few suggestions. Seemingly
some of the answers relate to the complexity of the agenda and the distribution
of power between trading nations. One dimension of complexity is simply the
number of items on the agenda. According to this criterion the Uruguay Round
was, no doubt, more complex than any of its predecessors, as is indicated by the
sheer number of formal negotiating bodies. Furthermore, the agenda dealt with
in some of the fifteen negotiating bodies in operation before the Brussels meeting
was extremely vast. For instance, trade in services pertains to a sector that makes
up 60 percent or more of the economy in many developed countries and includes
a multitude of highly different activities such as professional services, transpor-
tation, insurance, and banking. The agenda of the Uruguay Round was also
highly complex from a qualitative point of view. Several of the issues required
the gathering of a considerable amount of information as well as an extensive
technical analysis to become negotiable. This was typically the case with the new
trade issues.
One result of the extensive agenda was that the Uruguay Round meant
different things to different governments. Some governments, especially in the
Third World, were concerned primarily with the consolidation of the results of
the Tokyo Round and the old trade issues. Others were interested primarily in
bringing the new trade issues into the GATT regime. These countries were also
usually active in most negotiation groups. In contrast, many developing coun-
tries were seriously engaged in only a few sectors because their interests as well
as their negotiation capacity were limited. Thus, the Uruguay Round was char-
acterized by a wide variety of diverging interests even for a multilateral negoti-
ation. The traditional GATT procedure for handling this particular kind of
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complexity was to conduct the negotiations in the various groups independently
of each other until the end game at the highest political level started. However,
when constructive cross-sectoral trade-offs could not be worked out, the unmas-
tered issue linkages turned into major obstacles to a comprehensive agreement.
It seems that the success of earlier GATT rounds had been due partly to
assertive and effective U.S. leadership. For various reasons the United States was
not in a position to perform the same role in the Uruguay Round. First, the two
great economic powers, the EC and Japan, counterbalanced the U.S. leadership
and had more influence in these negotiations than in earlier multilateral trade
negotiations. For instance, one of the problems in the crucial agricultural sector
was the total inflexibility of the EC-and of Japan-in the face of strong U.S.
demands. In earlier GATT rounds the same kind of conflict of interest had been
at hand, too, but in the end U.S. pressure had produced a compromise. 4
Second, the power relationships among the leading nations had become
more symmetrical by the Uruguay Round; the number of active players had
increased considerably since the Tokyo Round. The reason was the higher and
more assertive participation of several developing countries. Thus, while U.S.
hegemony was definitely gone, the problem of leadership had become more pro-
nounced. At the same time as single actors were no longer able to confront the
negotiation process, the leadership function had become more demanding than
in earlier GATT rounds, since there were more significant interests that had to
be adjusted to one another. Thus, a disturbing observation is that the increasing
"democratization" of GATT talks occurring in the Uruguay Round-the partic-
ipation of more countries in informal negotiation groups-is not entirely bene-
ficial. It seems that multilateral processes tend to become unmanageable unless
some critical decisions can be taken by small groups of leading countries.
Notes
1. The Contending Analyses section of this book (Part Two) does not
cover the whole process of negotiations in the Uruguay Round, which is still
underway. The authors of the theory chapters were able to follow developments
only until about the time of the Brussels meeting in December 1990. The assess-
ment of the Uruguay Round at that point as basically a "failure story" has,
however, not been gainsaid by later events described at the end of this chapter.
2. This assessment is based on an overview of the submissions made by
active participants in the various negotiating groups. See GATT documents
MTN.GNG/NGI-14/W and MTN.GNS/W. The Contending Analyses section
of this book relies partly on the same sources.
3. This group initially had its meetings at the Hotel de la Paix in Geneva,
hence its name.
4. Seemingly, the gradual decline of U.S. leadership coincided with weak-
ening support for the multilateralism represented by the GATT regime.
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Chapter 3
Decision Theory
Diagnosing Strategic Alternatives
and Outcome Trade-Offs
Bertram 1. Spector (USA)
The essential task in analyzing any international negotiation process is to un-
derstand and explain modifications in the initial positions and interests of na-
tions that facilitate eventual convergence on mutually acceptable outcomes.
These shifts imply national preference adjustments and are usually related to
strategic and tactical trade-offs on alternative negotiation outcomes (Raiffa, 1982;
Spector, 1983). Decision analysis is a methodology that facilitates the evaluation
of such preference adjustments and trade-offs based on systematic and quantita-
tive techniques. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the utility of this
analytical approach in explaining these significant process dynamics specifically
in the context of multilateral negotiation.
The value of decision analysis as a systematic framework by which to
understand multilateral negotiation may be somewhat problematic however. The
technique is distinct from other analytical methods applied to negotiation in that
it is typically used in a normative, prescriptive mode. Decision analysis is applied
most often as a practical consultative tool to help negotiators diagnose strategic
alternatives and outcome trade-offs prior to or during negotiations and less often
as a technique to analyze, understand, and explain how and why negotiating
strategies were selected after the fact.
Moreover, decision analysis is a methodology inherently formulated to
deal with one decision-making unit at a time. Trade-offs are assessed against a
I wish to thank Daniel Druckman, I. William Zartman, James Sebenius, and several
anonymous reviewers for their many thoughtful comments and suggestions on earlier
drafts of this chapter.
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singular preference structure for a particular actor. Thus, a bilateral negotiation
requires comparison of two preference structures-only a slight complexity. Mul-
tilateral negotiations, on the other hand, involve multiple interacting preference
structures; the identification and comparability of theses structures introduce
significant methodological complexities.
One of the purposes of this chapter is to bridge the gap between decision
analysis as a consultative tool and as an analytical vehicle. Fortunately, this issue
can be reduced to a discussion of how the decision analytic model is populated
with data, not its inherent methodological attributes. The chapter focuses on the
central issue of identifying ways decision analysis can be used to evaluate inter-
national multilateral negotiations effectively.
Applying Decision Analysis to Negotiation
Decision analysis is a methodology typically used to support decision makers
actively assessing alternative courses of action. Generated from statistical decision
theory, decision analysis was developed in the field of business administration as
a practical approach to assist corporate managers in weighing their options and
designing logical solutions in a systematic fashion. It is usually applied in a
consultative mode with decision makers, helping them work through immediate
decision problems (Ulvila and Brown, 1982).
Decision analysis is a normative technique that seeks to prescribe for de-
cision makers appropriate courses of action that coincide with their values and
preferences. Behavioral decision theory, as reviewed by Slovic, Fischhoff, and
Lichtenstein (1977) and described by Kahneman and Tversky (1986), is the
broader theoretical structure within which decision analysis falls. It comprises
both the normative/prescriptive approaches and descriptive theories of how in-
dividuals incorporate their beliefs and values into their decision calculus. These
descriptive theories seek to explain how people perceive, process, and evaluate
decision situations and decision options, given uncertainty, risk, and interactions
with other stakeholders. The main psychological concepts encompassed in these
theories include the logic of probabilistic reasoning, choice, inference, heuristics,
biases, adjustment, and framing/reframing. This chapter focuses in particular on
the decision analysis because it has been applied to the negotiation environment
specifically and is a distinctive technique that can be used to understand the
bargaining process.
Decision analysis tools-in particular, multiattribute-value (MAV) analy-
sis models-have been applied prescriptively with negotiators and policy makers
to assist in prenegotiation strategy development regarding U.S. military bases in
the Philippines (1978), the Panama Canal (1974), and international oil tanker
standards (1978) (Raiffa, 1982; Ulvila and Snider, 1980; Ulvila, 1990). In these
cases, decision analysts supported negotiating teams by eliciting practitioner
preferences and values, generating models based on these subjective judgments,
calculating the decision analytic results, and feeding these results back to the
negotiators to help them evaluate alternative strategies. In these cases, decision
Decision Theory 75
analysis was used as an analytical support technique and was meant to guide
policy makers and influence the course of the negotiations not to explain
retrospectively why certain negotiation strategies were selected or why the process
turned out the way it did. Typically, decision analysis has not been used to
diagnose or evaluate the negotiation process after the fact, but there is no reason
why it cannot be applied this way.
Decision analysis focuses on several critical elements of the decision-
making process, suggesting that they are the keys to making and understanding
effective choices. Central to all these elements is the concept of preference. Kah-
neman and Tversky (1986) indicate that preferences are the filters through which
decision makers frame and reframe-perceive and define-their national interests
and salient issues as well. The decision maker's values or preferences are incor-
portated into decision analysis models along with objective inputs. If these pref-
erences can be defined and elicited directly from involved negotiators concerning
particular interests, then the technique can be applied proactively as a supportive
tool. If one is attempting to explain the process in an historical case, however,
one usually relies on indirect means of gathering data on preferences. Herein lies
the difficulty in using decision analysis as an analytical research technique for
negotiation processes. Some ways to overcome this data collection problem are
presented later in this chapter.
Decision analysis applied to the negotiation process can be helpful in
understanding strategy and outcome. The methodology is geared to evaluating
alternative strategy options based on trade-off analyses that take into account the
expected value of the projected outcomes. Probing evaluations of strategy deci-
sions are accomplished in decision analysis primarily by looking at negotiator's
preferences. The technique can help one understand why particular strategies
were selected and others rejected on the basis of negotiator preferences, the attrac-
tiveness of strategy options, the perceived likely outcomes of alternative strategies,
and the probabilities of the occurrence of other-party strategies and other uncon-
trollable events. Applied in the prenegotiation phase, an integrated family of
related decision-analytic methods can provide effective support to negotiators,
facilitating situational diagnosis, planning, and strategizing (Spector, 1993a).
Decision-analytic models offer the capability of disaggregating the deci-
sion rationale for selecting one strategy over another by evaluating negotiator
preferences, criterion by criterion. In so doing, it is possible to understand not
only the genesis of a country's bargaining interests and why certain outcomes are
seen as attractive but also the genesis of compromise formulas that provide an
improved distribution of benefits to all parties.
From Consultative to Analytical Tools
One of the primary features of decision analytic approaches is their highly sub-
jective nature; they depend on the decision maker's perspectives, preferences, and
values. In a typical application of decision analysis, the preferences of the nego-
tiator are elicited directly in the immediate negotiation environment. After the
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fact and without direct access to the negotiator, indirect means are required to
reconstruct these preferences. Several approaches can be used to perform this
reconstruction.
1. Cognitive Mapping Approach. Cognitive maps attempt to represent the
belief structure of individual decision makers as a series of interrelated causal
links (Bonham, 1993). Decision makers behave within the context of this network
of beliefs. If cognitive maps could be constructed for each negotiator in a mul-
tilateral setting, their preferences and alternative proposed outcomes could be
inferred and put into a decision analysis model. A practical problem in using this
approach is that developing a comprehensive cognitive map for each negotiator
would be much more difficult than identifying preferences on a limited number
of specific negotiation issues and would be somewhat out of proportion to the
task.
2. Expert Analysis or Content Analysis Approach. In this approach, richly
descriptive case study material or transcripts of the targeted negotiation process
are required. This textual material is presented to coders, who examine it and
code relevant passages into categories on specified actor preference scales. In the
case of expert coding, substantive experts are asked to reconstruct or role-play the
negotiating actors and code their presumed preferences on structured actor pref-
erence scales that are then used in the decision analytic models. Ulvila (1990)
reports on the coding of preference data for the 1978 U.S.-Philippine base nego-
tiations using case study material and statements of the negotiation parties; his
resulting decision analysis is based on preference data gathered by only one coder.
Ulvila and Snider (1980) collected preference data for other parties to the inter-
national tanker standards conference based on expert coding. In this case, the U.S.
negotiating team served as a panel of experts to code the perceived preferences
of the other parties to the negotiation. Two potential difficulties with this ap-
proach are obtaining sufficiently rich descriptive material on the case and inter-
coder reliability.
3. Nonquantitative Approach. A third approach avoids preference ratings
of the negotiating parties altogether. Instead, the graphic representation of the
decision tree can be used to display the sequence of offers, counteroffers, and
intervening situational factors without the probabilities and value judgments.
Although this approach results in a much watered-down application of decision
analysis, it requires much less information to implement and can still yield a
longitudinal depiction of the negotiation process from a strategy perspective.
Such an analysis might also provide a useful way of studying stages in the ne-
gotiation process.
Table 3.1 compares these three coding procedures according to ease of data
collection, the ability to utilize the features of decision analysis fully, and data
validity. Overall, the cognitive mapping approach is not attractive because of the
difficulty of coding preferences and the extensive time required. The nonquan-
titative approach is also attractive because it severely limits the researcher's ability
to fully utilize the analytical features of decision analysis. The content analysis
technique, although it has several drawbacks, is the preferred approach for cod-
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Table 3.1. Comparison of Indirect Coding Procedures.
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Utilization of
Ease of Decision Analytic
Procedures Data Collection Features Data-Validity Level
Cognitive Mapping Low High Medium
Content Analysis Medium High High
Nonquantitative High Low High
ing negotiator values. Although it requires considerable time and resources to
collect the data and intercoder reliability may present some problems, the result-
ing information can be used fruitfully within the decision analysis algorithm.
Friedheim (1991) describes an interesting empirical analysis of national
and coalition interests and preferences in the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). Although the case does not include development
of a decision analytic model, data on an issue-by-issue basis of the type required
for a modeling effort were collected systematically on the conference proceedings
using content analytical procedures.
Preference data for the two multilateral negotiation cases analyzed in this
chapter were collected using the content analysis approach. Based on this retro-
spective coding of negotiator preferences, we can run the decision analysis model
and conduct sensitivity tests as if the negotiators had provided their preferences
directly. The trade-offs of one negotiation strategy over another can be evaluated
in relation to these preferences. In so doing, we can draw inferences about the
reasoning used by the practitioners in the negotiation situation-why they pre-
ferred certain negotiation strategies and outcomes and why they rejected others-
and how shifts in these preferences over the course of the negotiation made certain
outcomes mores likely than others.
Analyzing Multilateral Negotiation
Ulvila's (1990) study of the Philippine-base negotiations is a good example of the
use of decision analysis to understand strategy development in a bilateral situa-
tion. As indicated previously, a content analysis procedure was used to code the
negotiator preferences. Two MAV models were developed-one for each actor-
by weighing the multiple issues in the negotiation and rating the perceived
attractiveness of positions on each issue. A compromise position that fell within
the range of negotiating positions was also rated in terms of relative attractive-
ness. Using these quantified models, Ulvila was able, first, to identify the attrac-
tiveness of alternative packages of agreements across all the key negotiating issues
for each negotiating party. Many alternative packages were simulated across the
issue areas and attempts were made to analyze their overall attractiveness to each
party. Ulvila was able, second, to identify an agreement space in which both sides
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could maximize their gains in the negotiation. The points along the optimal
frontier were explainable in terms of the actors' issue weights and position prefer-
ences. Raiffa (1982) describes a similar application of decision analysis to the
bilateral Panama Canal negotiations.
In the context of multilateral negotiations, multiple decision analytic
models can be built, each attempting to replicate the perspective of each nego-
tiating party. One can assume that the model structures (the inventories of in-
terests and outcomes) are the same but that actor preferences and priorities vary.
Players that are closely aligned with each other-with high interest commonal-
ity-have similar interest preferences: they perceive and frame the negotiating
problem in a similar manner, and their model weights are likely to be highly
correlated. However, players with strong interest divergence are likely to have
different perspectives on the criteria weights and the hierarchy by which courses
of action are evaluated; their decision calculus is different and thus may be framed
differently when modeled. In either case, it is possible to compare and analyze
both the assumptions of the analysis (weights, scores, probabilities) and the de-
cision results directly-that is, the prioritization of decision alternatives across
actors.
From a bureaucratic-politics perspective, decision analysis models built
and assessed as described above to simulate preferences of the various parties to
a multilateral negotiation can be meaningful as well in uncovering significant
milestones in the decision-making process within each party, identifying the
elements that were critical and examining the process of option selection and
modification. The models and their fine-tuning through sensitivity testing can
help to mirror historical negotiations from the perspectives of domestic stake-
holders, national parties, or coalitions of parties. The "trueness" of each model
can be validated by comparing the prioritized alternatives to historical accounts
or memoirs of the participating practitioners. If the model is valid, the analyst
can look back at the premises in the model-the hierarchy of criteria, the weights,
scores, and probabilities-to understand how and why decisions were made.
Negotiation processes are dynamic, meaning that many decisions on mul-
tiple issues are made and modified by each negotiating party over time. For each
issue area, different decision analysis models may be required. However, if coun-
tries have a consistent policy concerning their national objectives and interests
within a negotiation, one can assume that the underlying evaluation criteria and
weighting schemes will remain invariant-that they will be similar across deci-
sion phases and episodes. What will change over time, however, are the prefer-
ences for particular proposals under debate; in this area flexibility can occur.
Ulvila and Snider (1980) provide an interesting case of the use of decision
analytic models not only to support a particular negotiating team in an upcom-
ing multilateral negotiation but also to explain some elements of the process.
They used an MAV modeling consultative mode with the U.S. negotiating team
to the 1978 International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention
to prepare alternative strategies and consider trade-offs among them during the
prenegotiation phase. In building the decision analytic model, U.S. negotiation
Decision Theory 79
interests had to be compared with the interests of the other countries that would
participate in the conference. This comparison was accomplished by having the
U.S. team role-play their counterpart teams from twenty-one other countries.
A common set of criteria and negotiation was identified for the MAV
model structure, and a common set of scores was elicited from the U.S. team for
rating each proposal package against each criterion. In building the model, the
authors assumed that this basic structure of the negotiations was essentially
equivalent across participants. However, the relative importance given to the
various criteria were conceived as different across participants-that is, each
country's interests, while comprising the same set of issues, were prioritized
differently.
By analyzing the model and examining its component elements, the re-
searchers and the U.S. negotiating team were able to highlight some issues that
were likely to be contentious in the negotiations and to develop compromise
solutions. They were able to explain, in terms of the differential interests of
various countries on particular issues, why a specific U.S. strategy was not likely
to be successful in yielding agreement in the upcoming multilateral conference.
Friedheim (1993), while not implementing a formal decision analytic
model, used country-by-country and issue-by-issue preference data to produce
graphs indicating where consensus existed and where opportunities for com-
promise were possible in the UNCLOS III talks. His analysis used these data
creatively to track changes in preferences and issue salience over time, coalition
formation and modification, and the potential for the development of multi-issue
formulas for all nations participating in this multilateral conference. Based on
a set of assumptions, Friedheim was able to track position adjustment and fore-
cast likely multi-issue agreements but was unable to explain systematically why
these preference shifts came about. As demonstrated later in this chapter in two
case analyses, the application of decision analytic models using preference data
can extend the types of assessments that were produced by Friedheim from simple
descriptions of position modification to identification of the principal factors
underlying changes in position.
Spector (l993c) demonstrates a contingency decision analytic approach that
enables detailed probing of multilateral prenegotiation while the process is still
in progress. Using the preparatory committee meetings of the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development during 1990 and 1991 as the case,
Spector structured several MAV models on several of the key negotiation issues
using tentatively assessed interest profiles of various emerging coalitions as model
criteria. In this approach the MAV analysis is performed to identify the relative
preferences of these different coalitions to the negotiation proposals identified.
Sensitivity analysis is also conducted to determine the degree to which the various
coalitions must adjust their preferences to achieve agreement on potential mu-
tually acceptable compromise proposals. Because the interest profiles and tabled
proposals are dynamic during the prenegotiation, the analysis is conducted using
different coalition and outcome structures, where the analytical results are con-
tingent on these assumed structures. This approach is considered useful both
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from a perspective of understanding movement in positions and interests and in
supporting the United Nations secretariat for the conference in promoting its
understanding of the likely implications for agreement on various proposals.
Case Studies
The following application of decision analysis to both negotiation cases-the
Single European Act and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks-is based on the research by Ulvila and Snider
(1980) and Spector (l993c), and the content analysis approach for coding prefer-
ence data. Because of the multi-issue complexity of these negotiations, only one
key issue area is examined for each case.
Several procedures were followed in the analysis. First, national interests
in the negotiation were identified. Second, alternative negotiation outcomes, in-
cluding the final compromise, were defined. Third, the extent to which these
outcomes satisfied each of the national interests is assessed. The result of these
first three steps was an MAV model structure that can be used to evaluate context-
specific strategy development on a particular issue within a multilateral negoti-
ation. Fourth, the relative weights, suggesting the importance attributed to in-
terests by each negotiating party, were then identified. These weights were
applied to the model structure to develop an alternative model for each negotiat-
ing party. Finally, these models were analyzed to compare the differences among
and evolution of national preferences across negotiating outcomes. Comparative
analyses across parties on the possible outcomes help in assessing the determi-
nants of shifting preferences that result in compromises. 1 Because we know the
actual outcome of the negotiations, we can use the methodology to analyze and
diagnose how and why these initial positions and preferences were modified
during the course of the negotiations to arrive at the compromise outcomes. To
perform this analysis, a weighted deficiency index is calculated to measure the
preference adjustment dynamic, the difference between an actor's initial prefer-
ence and the total acceptance or endorsement of a formula. This procedure is
described more fully later in the chapter. A brief methodological appendix is also
given at the end of the chapter.
Data were coded to conduct the decision analyses based on content analysis
of the two case studies in this volume as well as additional papers written about
these negotiations by Winham and Kizer (1993), Winham (1989), Lodge (1986d)
and Moravcsik (1991). In particular, the coding was conducted on the targeted
negotiation issues to answer these questions: What are the national interests,
goals, or preferences that guide or motivate the actions of each national actor or
coalition? What is the importance or salience of each national interest, goal, or
preference relative to the others held by each nation or coalition?
Inputs to the decision analysis model are the going-in preferences of the
negotiating participants. Each mention of preference or salience in the case study
texts was coded and then corroborative information sought from other sources.
This cross-checking approach extends a degree of reliability to the data. Although
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numerical values were assigned to the preference weights, no engineering preci-
sion is implied; in fact, an ordinal ranking was assigned first that provided a
relative degree of magnitude in importance before an interval scale was applied.
For the purposes of this type of decision analysis, an ordinal ranking is probably
more appropriate and realistic than an interval scale; it suggests a limited range
of values for each preference rather than a precise figure. However, to facilitate
the calculations in this chapter, specific numerical values are used.
The analyses that follow are intentionally a simplification of the negoti-
ation cases evaluated. Issues are viewed as representative packages, and actors are
regarded as coalitions or marker countries that represent a certain point of view.
Analysis could have been carried out on a country-by-country basis, demonstrat-
ing internal divisions within coalitions but at the cost of a geometric increase in
the complexity of the analysis. We view these cases solely through the lens of
decision analysis, seeking to understand how preferences and values influence
negotiation behavior. Although these are certainly significant factors that can
reveal critical aspects of the process, they do not make up a comprehensive theory
of multilateral negotiation by themselves. Such a theory may be achieved only
by combining the strengths of several diverse theoretical perspectives in a syn-
thetic way.
Uruguay Round of GA TT
Model Development. Trade in services was one of the issues successfully
resolved in the Uruguay Round by the end of the Montreal midterm review in
1989. The debate concerning trade in services revolved around four national
interests:
• Transparency-accessibility of foreign markets to national corporations.
This interest manifested itself in two basic forms: transparent (foreign
markets are made accessible) and highly restricted (barriers are instituted to
restrict and regulate foreign entry into a domestic market to protect the do-
mestic industry).
• Sectoral reciprocity-the manner in which foreign corporations are treated
in a domestic market. This interest took two forms: national treatment (for-
eign entities are treated the same as domestic corporations in the same
market) and foreign standards (foreign entities are allowed to operate under
the standards by which they would conduct business in their home
countries).
• Treatment of developing countries-the extent to which a country's level of
development may be taken into account when applying liberalized standards
for trade in services. This interest took two forms: preferential treatment (ex-
ceptions to standards are made for developing countries) and uniform stan-
dards (all countries are treated the same regardless of their level of
developmen t).
• Enforceability-the extent to which standards are considered a legal GATT
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obligation. This interest manifested itself in two ways: legal obligation (ac-
ceptance implies a legally binding GATT obligation for the accepting coun-
try) and informal acceptance (acceptance implies no legal obligation).
These interests served as the criteria to structure the MAV model.
Four alternative negotiation outcomes were identified, including two ex-
treme options and two compromise proposals:
• Minimalist Option. The outcome at one extreme was to exclude trade in ser-
vices altogether as a valid area within GATT. However, if it were to be in-
cluded in GATT, the following provisions would be incorporated:
preferential treatment for developing countries, foreign standards applied,
domestic service industry protected as much as possible, no legal obligation
implied within GATT to observe the standards, and labor intensive employ-
ment services, such as those the developing nations might export, covered.
• Compromise!Transparency Option. This compromise was close to the min-
imalist option except it emphasized easy access to foreign markets and the
positive impacts of establishing trade in services as a valid GATT area. It in-
cluded the following provisions: trade in services incorporated into GATT
(but no legal obligation implied), preferential treatment given to developing
countries, and foreign standards applied.
• Compromise! National Option. This compromise included the following
provisions: establishment of trade in services as a GATT area with no legal
obligation implied, preferential treatment for developing countries, and na-
tional standards applied to foreign enterprises. This was the compromise fi-
nally agreed to by the parties to the GATT.
• Maximalist Option. The preferred outcome at the other extreme was to es-
tablish trade in services as a GATT area, institute uniform treatment for all
countries, apply national standards for foreign entities, and make GATT ar-
rangements legal obligations for signatories.
Table 3.2 identifies the extent to which each alternative outcome satisfies
the criteria for an acceptable conclusion to the negotiation. As defined earlier, the
criteria are the national interests at stake in the talks. The quantitative assess-
ments were made based on the cited case material. These assessments reflect the
content of each negotiation formula.
The compromise national option indeed bridges the gap between the two
extreme proposals put forth by the developing countries and the United States.
Making the agreement less than a legal obligation within the GATT framework
and offering preferential treatment to developing countries-positions viewed as
favorable by the developing countries-are traded for accessibility to foreign
markets and national treatment for foreign companies in the host market-po-
sitions favored by the United States. The European Communities (EC) held po-
sitions somewhat in between the two extremes.
Table 3.3 presents the relative importance of these national interests from
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Table 3.2. Trade in Services: Outcomes Scored on Each Criterion.
83
Compromise/ Compromise/
Criteria Minimalist Transparency National Maximalist
Transparency
Transparent 20 100 100 100
Highly Restricted 80 0 0 0
Sectoral Reciprocity
National Treatment 0 0 100 100
Foreign Standards 100 100 0 0
Treatment of Developing Countries
Preferential 100 100 100 0
Uniform 0 0 0 100
Enforceability
Legal Obligation 0 0 0 100
Informal Acceptance 100 100 100 0
Table 3.3. Relative Importance of National Interests by Country/Group: Trade in Services.
Developing
Criteria United States EC Countries
Transparency 33 35 7
Transparent 100 100 20
Highly Restricted 0 0 80
Sectoral Reciprocity 25 24 7
National Treatment 100 0 0
Foreign Standards 0 100 100
Treatment of Developing
Countries 9 12 14
Preferential 0 50 100
Uniform 100 50 0
Enforceability 33 29 72
Legal Obligation 100 100 0
Informal Acceptance 0 0 100
the perspectives of three major participants/groups in the negotiation-the
United States, the EC, and the developing countries. Although there were cer-
tainly other actors, these are the only ones considered in the analysis for the sake
of simplification. As described earlier, these importance weights were assessed
based on the case material cited.
The United States and the EC shared similar preferences in terms of their
national interests. Development of a formula that dealt effectively with issues of
84 International Multilateral Negotiation
transparency and enforceability was high on the list of these participants. The
regulations and standards under which their companies would operate in foreign
markets was also a major interest. Developing countries, however, were much
more focused than the United States or the EC on the issue of enforceability-
whether trade in services should even be incorporated into the GATT framework
at all and, if so, how strict the obligation to abide by these standards should be.
Model Results. Given this structure and set of preferences, the results of
the decision analysis are presented in Figure 3.1 as priority scores on each poten-
tial outcome for each actor. These results are calculated in the decision analysis
model by multiplying the outcome scores on each criterion by the relative im-
portance weights for each criterion. The products are then summed for each actor
on each outcome option.
Based on the initial going-in preferences of the parties, each country!
group shows a high preference for its own desired outcome-the United States
and the EC for the maximalist option and the developing countries for the min-
imalist option. If this were not a negotiation in which the parties were required
to search for a mutually agreeable outcome, each actor would clearly have chosen
the option with the highest priority score. These findings coincide with SjOstedt's
(Chapter Two) and Winham and Kizer's (1993) descriptions of the early negoti-
ations on the trade-in-services area: that there was extreme disagreement on the
original single text used.
Figure 3.1. Prioritization of Negotiation Outcomes for Trade in Services.
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Each participant's preference for the final compromise (compromise/na-
tional) option, as one would suspect, is always less than for its own proposal but
not the lowest among the range of options. The result suggests that each party
over time showed some flexibility in its interest preferences, with the goal of
achieving a commonly acceptable agreement. However, in examining the values
by country/group across the various alternative outcomes, one can infer that
more compromises had to be made by the United States and the EC countries than
by the developing nations to reach the final compromise option. Specifically,
there is much more variation in the preference figures of the United States and
the EC between their own proposals and the final compromise agreement (dif-
ferences of 42 and 30, respectively) than of the developing countries (a difference
of only 11 preference points). However, the final compromise actually represents
an optimal solution among the given options, equivalent to the Nash (1950)
solution when the product of the outcomes is maximized. Decision analysis al-
lows this point to be identified.
If these outcome priorities represent the initial position of each party, a
process of position modification must ensue if the final compromise outcome is
to be reached. Decision analysis can help to explain this preference adjustment
dynamic by decomposing the decision logic of each actor and specifying which
criteria were most likely responsible for the modification in interests. The ana-
lytical procedure is rather simple: it compares the negotiator's initial weighted
preferences on the final compromise formula, interest by interest, with the max-
imum preference for that same compromise formula (measured as a weighted
preference score of 100). The remainder, obtained by subtracting 100 from the
going-in preference, is defined as the weighted deficiency, the distance between
the actor's initial preference for or position on a particular formula (partial
acceptance) and its undisputed acceptance of that formula. This score represents
the degree to which the actor's preference must change from its going-in position
to reach endorsement of the formula. 2
Table 3.4 presents the results of this preference adjustment analysis for the
trade-in-services issue. The values in the weighted deficiency column can add to
-100 only in the extreme case, if total preference modification is required across
Table 3.4. Preference Adjustment Between Final Compromise and Ideal: Trade in Services.
Weighted Percent of
Interest Deficiency Total Deficiency
United States Legal obligation -33 80
Uniform standards - 8 20
EC Legal obligation -29 50
Foreign standards -24 40
Uniform standards - 6 10
Developing Countries Foreign standards - 7 56
Highly restricted access - 6 44
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all interest areas for a given actor. An example of such an extreme case would
be if negotiators finally capitulated to an agreement that was diametrically
opposed to their initial interests. Thus, high negative values in this column
suggest that major preference adjustments were needed, while low values indicate
that minor modifications in preference were required.
For the United States, the biggest preference adjustment that had to be
made to enable its acceptance of the final compromise formula was on whether
to make trade in services a legal obligation within the GATT framework. This
adjustment accounted for 80 percent of the total weighted deficiency between the
compromise agreement and the ideal case for the United States. The next most
important area of preference adjustment for the United States was on the uniform
treatment issue, which accounts for only 20 percent of the total weighted defi-
ciency. Thus, position modification for the United States essentially revolved
around the legal-obligation issue. For the EC countries, movement on the legal
obligation issue was almost equally matched by movement on the foreign stan-
dards issue; together they accounted for 90 percent of the deficiency in the com-
promise agreement. Position modification on the uniform standards issue again
was required but was of minor importance.
For the developing countries, preference movement to come to agreement
on the compromise option was required on the foreign standards and restricted
market access issues. It is interesting to note how low weighted the deficiency
values were for the developing countries. This analysis suggests that the final
compromise was cognitively easier for these developing countries to accept than
for either the United States or the EC nations. Developing nations had a shorter
distance to span between their going-in position and the final compromise; they
had to make fewer compromises that contradicted their national interests.
The developing countries were in this position because the dominant ele-
ment in their decision logic was, by far, enforceability, which received an overall
importance weight of 72 percent (see Table 3.3). In the final compromise agree-
ment, the developing countries' position on enforceability-to ensure an infor-
mal, nonlegally binding interpretation of trade in services as an area within
GATT-was satisfied. The next most important factor in their decision calculus
was gaining preferential treatment; this goal too was achieved in the final com-
promise. Only on criteria of low importance did the developing countries con-
cede. For the United States and the EC, however, the concessions and successes
in satisfying their national interests were more of a mixture. Some interests given
high importance were abandoned in the compromise agreement, while others
were satisfied. Overall, the developing countries were much more successful in
satisfying their high-importance interests through the negotiations than either
the United States or the EC, as demonstrated in the results of the decision analysis
model. The ability of these three actors to satisfy their interests appears to be
inversely related to the asymmetry in their resource-based power. The distinctive
advantage of effectively applied behavioral power by the ostensibly weakest party
is borne out in this case. 3
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Implications. How has decision analysis modeling enhanced our
comprehension of the negotiation process in the GATT trade-in-services case?
First, the analysis codified and evaluated the extreme divergence of positions of
the key parties at the beginning of the negotiations. The model not only iden-
tified and compared each actor's relative priorities toward the proposed formulas
but also facilitated a probing analysis of the component national interests and
of the preferences that resulted in the prioritization. The graphic device used to
display these results demonstrates fairly dramatically the size of the bargaining
space that must be bridged in the subsequent negotiations.
Second, the decision analytic model helps in diagnosing how that bridging
dynamic came about. All parties in the trade-in-services case modified their in-
terest during the course of the negotiation, some more than others. The extent
of preference adjustment required to achieve a successful outcome to the nego-
tiation was measured and assessed through the decision analysis. The developing
countries, for example, conceded little in order to satisfy their highly coveted
interests of preventing trade-in-services agreements from becoming legally bind-
ing obligations within GATT and gaining preferential treatment when applying
liberalized trade-in-services standards. The degree of adjustment to preferences
required of these countries was assessed by the decision analysis model as being
very low. However, the United States and the EC conceded dearly on their de-
mand for establishing trade-in-services regulations as a legal obligation within
GATT; this was a highly valued interest for both parties. As a result, the decision
analysis indicates that extensive preference adjustment was required of both the
United States and the EC to achieve the final compromise formula, primarily
because of this failed interest as well as the EC's "costly" concession on main-
taining foreign standards. Thus, this modeling approach offers useful insight
into the key drivers of position modification; it tracks the type and degree of trade-
offs required to achieve accommodation and compromise.
Single EUTopean Act of the EC
Model Development. The negotiations on the Single European Act (SEA)
covered many different issue areas, but one that was particularly central to the
goals of the EC and many of the EC member states was institutional reform
regarding the power and authority of the European Parliament (EP). The issue
revolved around whether additional legislative powers should be granted to the
EP, a supranational body, and the relationship of the EP to the Council of
Ministers, an intergovernmental institution in which the individual countries
can demonstrate their national sovereignty and exercise greater control than in
the EP. Two principal national interests emerged as pivotal from the debates.
First, national sovereignty related to the fear that increased powers for the EP
would erode national authority. Second, institutional reform related to the devel-
opment of improved institutional rules and procedures by which EC organiza-
tions, especially the EP, conduct business and interact with other EC units. These
two interests are used as the criteria for the MAV model structure.
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Three negotiation outcomes can be identified:
• Maximalist Proposal. This outcome would establish full co-decision for the
EP with the Council of Ministers for most areas of legislation, thus expand-
ing the power of the supranational parliament.
• Compromise Proposal. This compromise includes provisions for increased
cooperation with the Council of Ministers on a variety of issues and incorpo-
rates a limited ability for the EP to amend legislation. It expands the use of
qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers but only on certain
noncontentious matters related to the internal market, thus excluding fiscal
and social regulation. On other issue areas, majority voting is limited by the
maintenance of national veto rights. This proposal constituted the final
agreement achieved by the SEA negotiation.
• Minimalist Proposal. This formula would offer no colegislative role for the
EP. It would extend some collaborative and consultative actions to the EP
relative to the Council of Ministers but would clearly maintain the existing
power imbalance in the Council's favor. The right to veto would be main-
tained in the Council when "very important national interests" were at
stake.
Table 3.5 presents an assessment of the extent to which each alternative
outcome satisfies the national interest criteria. The quantitative values were as-
sessed based on the case study material describing the negotiation. The maximal-
ist formula pushes institutional reform ahead, seeking expansion of EC activities
and rapid movement toward European federalism and the expense of a perceived
loss of national sovereignty. The minimalist formula does just the opposite. The
job of the compromise formula is to build a bridge between these extremes by
extending new and real effectiveness to the EP while at the same time encourag-
ing institutional reform in an evolutionary manner so as not to alarm countries
fearing the implication of European federation.
Table 3.6 displays the relative importance of these national interests for the
three major national actors and leaders in the negotiation-Germany, France,
and the United Kingdom. Moravcsik (1991) describes the preferences of these
countries on the procedural reform issue: Germany was in favor of strengthening
the EP's role, was opposed to the right to veto, and was in favor of increased
majority voting. France was opposed to strengthening the EP's role, was opposed
Table 3.5. Institutional Reform: Outcomes Scored on Each Criterion.
Criteria
National Sovereignty
Institutional Reform
Maximalist
30
100
Compromise
70
60
Minimalist
100
30
Decision Theory 89
Table 3.6. Relative Importance of National Interests by Coalition: Institutional Reform.
United
Germany France Kingdom
National Sovereignly 5 25 85
Institutional Reform 95 75 15
Figure 3.2. Prioritization of Negotiation Outcomes for Institutional Reform.
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to the right to veto, and was in favor of increased majority voting. The United
Kingdom was in favor of the veto right and was in favor of informal efforts to
facilitate increased but limited majority voting. From Table 3.6 it can be seen that
the preferences of the three actors are differen t from each other. Given the clear
lines along which these priorities are drawn, one would expect the debate to be
extremely caustic and divisive with little hope of resolution.
Model Results. The results of the decision analysis model are presented in
Figure 3.2. As in the GATT case, each actor indicates divergent priorities across
the available formulas. The compromise proposal always holds the middle
ground, representing similar calculated preference scores for the three actors. The
attractiveness of the compromise proposal is enhanced by the fact that the dis-
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tance to be bridged between the most preferred option and the compromise one
is roughly equivalent across the three actors. (However, this is not a product
maximizing solution.)
An analysis of the preference adjustment that occurred for each negotiating
actor is presented in Table 3.7. How far off from an ideal formula is the com-
promise outcome for Germany? By far, the greatest deficiency is in institutional
reform, which exhibits 96 percent of the total deficiency. France, taking a some-
what more moderate position on procedural change, required movement on in-
stitutional reform interests that account for 80 percent. However, for the United
Kingdom, preference adjustment must come on its national sovereignty position,
representing 81 percent of required movement to make the compromise viable.
Overall, across the three major negotiation actors, agreement on the compromise
formula requires the greatest adjustment to Germany's interests on institutional
reform.
Implications. How, in the case of negotiating institutional reform in the
SEA, did decision analysis modeling help to understand the process? As Lodge
(Chapter One) indicates, the initial interests of the principal actors in this issue
were widely divergent; this divergence is reflected quite clearly in the outcome
priorities in Figure 3.2. Germany was very much the maximalist leader and the
United Kingdom, the minimalist leader, leaving France in between, though more
closely aligned with the maximalists. The decision analysis, thus, provides a
useful map of the initial bargaining space and the gap that must be bridged on
this issue.
The methodology provides meaningful insights, as well, in decomposing
the process by which compromise was achieved. As indicated in Table 3.7, the
United Kingdom conceded little in the final compromise on its demands for
minimal institutional reform; according to the model, the United Kingdom
needed to make only minor adjustment to its preferences on institutional reform.
The Germans and French, however, were required to make major modifications
to their initial interests to achieve the compromise formula. As Lodge puts it, the
compromise represents the lowest common denominator on institutional reform;
Table 3.7. Preference Adjustment Between Final Compromise and Ideal:
Institutional Reform.
Weighted Percent of
Interest Deficiency Total Deficiency
Germany Institutional reform -38 96
National sovereignty - 2 4
France Institutional reform -30 80
National sovereignty - 8 20
United Kingdom National sovereignty -26 81
Institutional reform - 6 19
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it was viewed by the main proponents of this issue, the French and Germans, as
the bare minimum and obviously inadequate. The United Kingdom, however,
had to modify its interest and make concessions concerning national sovereignty
in a major way to be able to achieve the compromise. Thus, trade-offs were made
by each party and an agreement was struck, but at a cost to all. The model helps
to identify the type and extent of these costs and benefits in the preference ad-
justment analysis.
Conclusions
Although it often has been applied in a prescriptive mode to assist a single
decision maker on a single issue at a time, decision analysis can be a potent
analytical methodology to explain multilateral negotiations. The technique is
best suited to address the process by which negotiators consider trade-offs across
multi-issue formulas and modify their preferences, thus yielding a convergence
of interests and compromise agreements. In the two cases reviewed in this chapter,
decision analysis has provided a meaningful approach to understanding the dy-
namics by which the negotiating coalitions made concessions that resulted in
agreements on compromise formulas. Negotiator preferences and priorities for
major national objectives and interests in the negotiation are the currency by
which decision analysis provides this understanding.
Negotiation is a dynamic process in which positions are modified by the
principal parties over time, enabling the development of an agreement. When
more than two parties are engaged, as in multilateral negotiation, this process
of position modification and search becomes complex to track and explain. De-
cision analysis models provide a tool that can assist researchers in this regard. As
demonstrated in this chapter, they facilitate measurement of the bargaining
space-the distance between actor priorities and preferences for alternative out-
come formulas-and specification of the criteria most responsible for the mod-
ification of interests.
The decision analytic approach, however, is not well equipped to address
other key dimensions of the negotiation process, such as structure, the effects of
situation, power, and strategy. Thus, decision analysis can be useful in evaluating
certain aspects of multilateral negotiation and can enhance a larger analysis of
such negotiation processes in collaboration with other approaches.
Decision analysis offers several substantial benefits that help researchers in
evaluating multilateral negotiations: First, the methodology is capable of exam-
ining multiple negotiating parties using a single model structure. In this struc-
ture all participant interests are arrayed, and the range of possible outcomes or
formulas are represented and scored against these interests. The model thus de-
picts the feasible bargaining space and the major gaps that must be bridged in
the negotiations. The scores of outcomes on criteria are invariant across actors
because the outcomes possess certain properties regardless of the actor. Unique
preference sets representing the relative importance of each interest for each ne-
gotiating participant are required for insertion into the model.
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Second, by developing the models using the actors' initial sets of preferen-
ces and the range of possible outcomes, including the final negotiated agreement,
decision analysis can assist in understanding not only a static but a dynamic
negotiation environment. As demonstrated in the cases described in this chapter,
the decision analysis model can be used to analyze the process of preference
adjustment and position modification across negotiation stages. By juxtaposing
the initial going-in position with final or compromise outcomes, one can eval-
uate movement in actor preferences over time. The development of several models
that essentially provides snapshots of preference modification at different stages
allows production of a moving picture of the incremental dynamic of the nego-
tiation, and feedback and learning that can be traced from round to round.
Third, the factors that leverage this adjustment can be pinpointed
throughout the analytic approach. The decision analysis allows researchers to
dissect the preference structure of each actor on each proposed formula, interest
by interest, to identify the relative satisfaction each alternative outcome provides
to the participants and why. The preference adjustment calculation decomposes
the decision rationale used by actors, as represented by their criterion weights, and
identifies the relative significance of each criterion in achieving the adjustment
between the going-in position and the final accepted agreement. As a result, the
methodology provides a level of granularity that enables meaningful substantive
understanding of the case in context, despite the reductionist tendencies of such
an analytical technique.
Fourth, the methodology can be used in a "what if" mode, enabling prac-
titioners to question the effects of changes in national interest profiles or different
negotiation proposals on the extent of preference adjustment required by the
various actors to achieve agreement and the likelihood of agreement overall
(Spector, 1993c). The approach can help negotiators diagnose the current situa-
tion and play out alternative situations in which coalitions or interests change.
Fifth, several generalized decision analysis software packages are commer-
cially available and easy to use; they can help negotiation researchers design MAV
models and decision trees. 4 Specialized negotiation software using decision anal-
ysis methods, such as MCBARG (Bronisz, Krus, and Lopuch, 1988), are also being
developed to analyze multicriteria bargaining problems. These packages are eas-
ily adaptable to the specific circumstances of particular negotiation cases.
Nevertheless, some problems exist in the application of the methodology.
Decision analysis can help to track, disentangle, and diagnose the preferences and
interests of multiple parties on the same issue, but it stops short of explaining
why the parties adjust their preferences. What stimulates movement? Why are
some parties willing to go further than others in modifying their positions and,
thus, move toward mutual convergence? Decision analysis can only hint at
answers to such questions.
Decision analysis models do not deal well with multiple issues simultane-
ously. They can process one issue area at a time. The linkage and interaction of
issues must be handled outside of the approach. Moreover, the validity and re-
liability of data collection procedures for negotiator preferences require further
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refinement. Systematic techniques using content analysis of transcripts, cognitive
mapping approaches, and expert panels need to be tested for intercoder
reliability, and taxonomies to facilitate preference coding are required. Exami-
nation of these methodological questions is likely to enhance the utility of de-
cision analysis as a valuable tool for multilateral negotiation research.
Appendix
The development and use of an MAV model to evaluate interest dynamics in
negotiation require several steps.
I. Criterion Structure. The range of national interests for all parties con-
cerning the issue under debate must be identified. These interests are represented
in the model as the criterion structure, the set of factors by which national policy
makers evaluate the costs and benefits of each possible negotiated solution.
2. Outcome Structure. The range of possible negotiated outcomes must be
specified and arrayed. This structure will include all the proposals currently on
the table as well as additional options that can be identified and may be generated
in the future.
3. Outcome Rating. Data must be gathered to estimate the extent to which
each possible outcome satisfies each interest in the criterion structure.
4. Criterion Weighting. For each nation or coalition, the relative impor-
tance of each criterion must be assessed.
5. Model Exercise. The MAV calculations can now be performed for each
nation or coalition; they yield a prioritization of alternative negotiated outcomes
for each entity. The calculation is simply the sum of all outcome ratings mul-
tiplied by criterion weights for each possible outcome by actor. Comparisons
across entities can be assessed to evaluate the extent of convergence or divergence
on the various possible outcomes. These comparisons can also pinpoint oppor-
tunities for logrolling across the set of possible options.
6. Sensitivity Analysis. The dynamics of preference adjustment can be
analyzed through sensitivity analysis. Prominent outcomes that are identified as
the most preferred by the key nations or coalitions are the basis for the analysis.
The objective is to evaluate the extent to which each principal actor must adjust
its interests and preferences to be able to accept these prominent outcomes. To
make this evaluation analytically, the initial weighted preference on each prom-
inent outcome, interest by interest, is compared with the maximum possible
preference each actor can have (equal to a weighted preference score of 100). The
difference between these two values is defined as the weighted deficiency, the
distance between the actor's initial preference for the outcome and its undisputed
acceptance of that solution. This score represents the degree to which the actor's
preferences must change from its going-in position to reach total endorsement
of the outcome option. Because this sensitivity analysis is calculated on an
interest-by-interest basis, it is possible to specify which interests must be adjusted
more than others by each actor in order for a prominent outcome to be acceptable.
For each issue to be analyzed, a separate model must be structured. For
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multilateral negotiation analysis, it is possible to develop a single model structure
for each issue, varying only the criterion weights for each actor, thereby enabling
direct comparison of preferences.
Notes
1. As in Ulvila and Snider's (1980) case study, it was decided not to use
probabilistic distributions in the MAV models developed for this analysis. Such
probabilistic assessments might be useful in a prescriptive application where
there is informational uncertainty and utility in simulating alternative transi-
tions from one negotiation stage to the next. However, when preferences and
negotiation proposals are known, as in the case of an historical multilateral
negotiation, uncertainty and probabilities playa much smaller role.
2. This measure provides a novel perspective on flexibility in negotiation.
While many negotiation analyses compare actor preferences with a baseline de-
fined as their best alternative to no agreement, this weighted deficiency measure
facilitates a comparison with the optimal alternative. Rather than focusing neg-
atively on how far an actor is from walking out of a negotiation, this index
highlights positive movement toward the actor's most preferred position.
3. Rubin and Zartman (1994) present an interesting collection of cases
concerning the effects of power asymmetry on the negotiation process and
outcome.
4. The decision analyses conducted in this chapter utilized a software
package for personal computers developed by James Huttinger at Booz, Allen and
Hamilton Inc., Bethesda, Maryland. Similar packages are available from the De-
cision Analysis Unit of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Chapter 4
Game Theory
Focusing on the Players, Decisions,
and Agreements
Steven]. Brams, Ann E. Doherty,
Matthew L. Weidner (USA)
Game theory assumes that each player in a game, in formulating its own best
course of action, takes into account the possible actions of the other players. It
assumes that negotiations that may lead to the settlement of a dispute depend on
the rational actions of all players.
Decision theory also assumes that players act rationally, but it does not
make the strategic interactions of players its focus. Rather, it postulates that these
interactions, as well as other forces that may affect the rational choices of decision
makers, can be summarized for a single decision maker by probabilities that
certain events will occur. This decision maker plays a "game against nature," or
a one-person game, in an uncertain environment.
One reason for making explicit strategic information about the choices of
all players, who may have partially cooperative and partially conflicting interests,
is that real-life decision makers seem to factor such choices into their calculations
in deciding what course of action is rational. They often ask themselves: What
is so-and-so likely to do if I do such-and-such? Depending on the answer, they
may decide that such-and-such is a sensible thing to do, compared with the
possible consequences of other actions they may consider. The assumption of
rationality underlying this kind of calculation is by and large realistic in the
study of negotiations: players do bargain to achieve certain goals, knowing that
other players may try to help or thwart them. But beyond its descriptive powers,
does game theory offer insights that other theories or perspectives do not?
In modeling negotiations, game theory has been used primarily, but not
exclusively, to study two-person strategic situations (Brams, 1990; Raiffa, 1982).
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What we shall endeavor to show here is its applicability to two n-person situa-
tions, one of which culminated in an agreement and the other of which did not.
In the first case, we use cooperative game theory, which assumes that a binding
agreement can be imposed that ensures all parties of some value. We then ask how
this value (in this case, voting power) will be distributed among the parties but
not whether it is in their interest to stick with the agreement were it not imposed.
In the second case, we use noncooperative game theory, which assumes that a
binding agreement cannot be imposed if it is not in the players' interests to adhere
to it. But if it is individually rational for the players to make such an agreement,
then it will perforce be self-enforcing and, therefore, need not be imposed. In
brief, cooperative game theory asks how value will be divided, whereas noncoop-
erative game theory asks what strategies rational players will choose in situations
of conflict.
We begin by using the cooperative theory to study the voting power of
members of the European Communities (EC) Council of Ministers. Looking
beyond the assigned weights of the twelve members of the Council, we next
analyze the effects of giving de facto vetoes to France and Germany and also
consider how grouping members into plausible coalitions affects their powers.
We then investigate the power of the Council to act under qualified-majority,
simple-majority, and unanimity decision rules.
Our analysis of both the formal and informal decision rules sheds light on
how the Single European Act (SEA) came to be adopted. The SEA, it seems, was
a response to outmoded rules, which no longer served most members' interests.
For example, the veto that all members had on matters they deemed vital to their
national interests had sometimes frustrated the will of the majority. By contrast,
the more realistic distribution of power under qualified-majority voting-and
weights under this rule that would allow both France and Germany to have
vetoes-suggests why these two countries supported the SEA. The United King-
dom probably also benefited, in part because it was able to gain concessions from
France and Germany that more than counterbalanced giving up part of its sov-
ereignty under qualified-majority voting.
We use noncooperative game theory to analyze the dynamics of negotia-
tions on two major issues-agricultural price supports and access to markets-
related to the liberalization of trade. Disagreement on the first issue was the
principal reason for the breakup of the Uruguay Round of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in December 1990, whereas the second issue
has been a bone of contention among the United States, the EC, and Japan for
some time.
We postulate a three-person game among these piayers, based on their
positions on both these issues (or platforms). We assume that the players begin
by supporting only their most preferred platforms, lending their support to
lower-ranked platforms, if there is no consensus, until they reach a point at which
they would prefer impasse to further compromise. This dynamic negotiation
model illustrates both the conditions that led to the conflict and the compromises
needed to overcome it.
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Whereas the cooperative model applied to voting on the EC Council is
most useful in drawing out quantitative implications of the formal and informal
rules of the voting game, the noncooperative model applied to trade negotiations
gives one insight into the actual jockeying for position among the main players
as each strives to attain its preferred positions in extended negotiations. Although
the viewpoints provided by game theory are quite different in each case, both
highlight nonobvious consequences of strategic interaction among players in an
n-person game.
Voting Power in the EC Council of Ministers
The SEA was approved by the EC Council of Ministers in December 1985 and
ratified by the member states in early 1986. When it came into force in July 1987,
it committed its members to the progressive establishment, by the end of 1992,
of an internal market, defined as "an area without internal frontiers in which the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured." The SEA has
been called "the most important amendment to the Treaty of Rome since the
latter was adopted in 1957," primarily because "it rejects the national veto"
(Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989, pp. 115-116) by extending qualified-majority vot-
ing to Council decisions pertaining to the internal market. Indeed, Cameron
(1992, p. 56) claims that this extension may represent the "most important" aspect
of the SEA.
Although qualified-majority voting was increasingly invoked from 1966
until 1985 (Moravcsik, 1991, p. 51), its scope was circumscribed by the Luxem-
bourg compromise. Under pressure from France, which had boycotted EC pro-
ceedings for six months in 1965, the other five EC countries reluctantly agreed
in January 1966 that France would be able to veto proposals of the Council that
it declared infringed on its "very important" national interests, which was a right
later invoked by other governments.
The expansion of qualified-majority voting (the decision rule is fifty-four
out of seventy-six votes on the Council, or 71 percent) under the SEA has greatly
reduced use of the veto. To be sure, the SEA allows for certain exceptions relating
to the internal market: fiscal (primarily tax) issues, the free movement of people,
and worker rights. But except in these areas qualified-majority voting can be
invoked relatively easily. If the Commission of the EC unanimously agrees that
a matter is pertinent, then a simple majority of the Council weighted votes
(thirty-nine out of seventy-six) can sanction a qualified majority of the Council
to act on the matter (Garrett, 1992, p. 550). As is usual in such cases, the proce-
dural threshold to decide that a matter is pertinent (thirty-nine votes), if unchal-
lenged by any member of the Commission, is lower than the substantive threshold
(fifty-four votes), necessary to act on this matter. The Council, acting unani-
mously, may amend a Commission proposal, and the European Parliament (EP)
may in turn approve, reject, or amend a Council decision. Other intricate rela-
tionships among the Council, Commission, and EP-as well as the Court of
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Justice and the national courts-are discussed in Garrett (1992), who offers an
informal strategic assessment of their effects.
Here we shall focus on the more formal implications of weighted voting
in the Council itself, based on a game-theoretic measure of voting power. Then
we shall modify this measure to take into account the de facto vetoes that France
and Germany allegedly exercise on the Council. We shall also consider likely
groupings of members, which reduce the number of players from twelve to three,
and analyze the power of the Council to act under different decision rules.
Brams and Affuso (1976, 1985a, 1985b) applied the Banzhaf index of voting
power (Banzhaf, 1965) to the original EC Council of six member (1958) and the
later expanded Councils of nine members (1973), ten members (1981), and now
twelve members (1985). They discovered striking anomalies of weighted voting
that have arisen, including:
• Luxembourg's "dummy" status from 1958 to 1973 (that is, it had zero voting
power).
• The "paradox of new members" (Luxembourg increased its voting power in
1973 and again in 1981 when new members were added, despite the fact that
it had an increasingly smaller proportion of the vote total).
• The failure of differently weighted members to have different voting power
(from 1981 to 1985, Luxembourg with two votes had the same voting power
as Denmark and Ireland with three votes each).
Brams and Affuso attributed these bizarre effects to the "capricious nature of
constitution writing-done mostly by lawyers uninformed as to the significance
of the weights and decision rules they set down-even today" (Brams and Affuso,
1976, p. 52). I
Because Banzhaf voting power is defined formally in Brams and Affuso
(1976, pp. 32-34), among other places, we shall give only an informal definition
here. This measure has been compared with other game-theoretic of voting
power-Shapley and Shubik (1954) and Johnston (l978)-in Brams and Affuso
(1976), Brams, Affuso, and Kilgour (1989), and Brams (1975, 1985, 1990). Because
these other measures generally attribute greater voting power to larger players
than does the Banzhaf index, we probably err in being too conservative in our
later estimate of the voting power of the big four (France, Italy, Germany, and
the United Kingdom) and of the even more substantial influence of France and
Germany when they have vetoes.
The Banzhaf power of a member is based on the number of winning
coalitions (WCs) in which it is critical-that is, in which its defection would
cause such a coalition to become losing. The (normalized) Banzhaf voting power
of a member is the number of WCs in which it is critical divided by the total
number of critical defections of all members (including this member). The sum
of these proportions for all members is, of course, one.
Table 4.1 shows the Banzhaf powers of the twelve current members of the
Council under qualified-majority rule (Brams and Affuso, 1985a).2 To illustrate
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the Branzhaf calculation, consider the case of Luxembourg, which has two votes.
A qualified majority of fifty-four out of seventy-six is required in order for the
Council to act. Luxembourg will be critical if the sum of the votes of the other
members of a coalition is fifty-two or fifty-three because then the addition of
Luxembourg's two votes will give these members, together with Luxembourg, at
least fifty-four votes, the minimum required to be a WC. It turns out that Lux-
embourg is critical in exactly forty WCs, ~ whereas all countries combined have
a total of 2,222 critical defections, giving Luxembourg 1.8 percent of the voting
power, or a Banzhaf index of 0.018, as shown in Table 4.1.
What is the rationale behind the decision rule of fifty-four out of seventy-
six? Note that not only does no single country have a veto, but not even two of
the big four (with ten votes each) do. At a minimum, a blocking coalition, whose
opposition prevents the Council from acting, must comprise two large countries
plus one other country with at least three votes, which excludes Luxembourg. For
this reason Luxembourg has significantly less voting power than either Denmark
or Ireland, each of which has three votes and therefore can be critical in many
different blocking coalitions with other members that have exactly twenty other
votes.
Interestingly, the Banzhaf values for Denmark and Ireland, as well as for
the nine larger countries, are roughly proportional to their voting weights. How-
ever, the weights-and therefore the Banzhaf values-are not proportional to the
populations: the populations of the largest countries, especially that of a united
Germany today, are disproportionately greater than their weights, which would
seem to give the advantage, in relative terms, to the smaller countries on the
Council.
To explore this question further, we next consider how the vetoes of two
members and plausible coalitions of other members that might form affect the
Banzhaf values. We then define a new index that is used to measure the power
of the Council as a whole to act, with and without the possibility of vetoes.
Table 4.1. Banzhaf Voting Power in EC Council of Ministers
Under Qualified-Majority Decision Rule.
Class of Member Banzhaf Power
Each Ten-Yote Member
(France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom) 0.129
One Eight-Yote Member
(Spain) 0.109
Each Five-Yote Member
(Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal) 0.067
Each Three-Yote Member
(Denmark, Ireland) 0.046
One Two-Yote Member
(Luxembourg) 0.018
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Vetoes, Coalitions, and the Power of the Council to Act
In calculating the "criticalness" of members, the Banzhaf index assumes that all
minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) are equally likely. Surely this is not the
case in most voting bodies, including the EC Council. We shall posit likely
coalitions of members-based on their apparent common interests-later, but
first we recalculate the Banzhaf values to take into account the fact that the
numerical weights of members, and the qualified-majority decision rule, may not
give an accurate picture of members' influence on the Council.
In point of fact, the big four are not all equal: "Where EC bargaining is
concerned, it is axiomatic to assert that no major initiative can proceed without
the consent of France and Germany. This is true even though qualified majority
voting in the Council does allow for other coalitions' formations. Politically,
however, it would be most unlikely for a major development to go ahead without
their endorsement. This "rule" does not apply to Italy or the United Kingdom"
(Lodge, 1991, p. 7). In a similar vein, after noting that France and Germany have
almost half the total EC output, Garrett (1992, pp. 546-547) argues that they
effectively have vetoes; because they can afford to "go it alone," they have an exit
option, whereas the United Kingdom, in particular, does not.
To take into account this informal rule, we can modify the weights of
France and Germany and the qualified majority necessary for the passage of acts
so that each country has a veto. Specifically, consider a hypothetical Council in
which France and Germany have 23 votes each (instead of 10) but assume the
weights of all the other countries are as given in Table 4.1, which gives a new
total of 102 votes. In addition, change the decision rule to a qualified majority
of 80 out of 102 votes.
Now the ten other countries, plus either France or Germany (but not both),
have a total of seventy-nine votes, which is one vote shy of the new qualified
majority. Consequently, France or Germany each has a veto-either's exclusion
from a coalition that includes all other members causes that coalition to lose. 4
In other words, the presence of both countries is necessary in every WC, but-
as in the present Council-they are not sufficient by themselves. In the hypothet-
ical Council, their combined 46 votes must be supplemented by an additional 34
votes to reach the decision rule of 80 (when the total is 102). In the actual Council,
their combined twenty votes must also be supplemented by an additional thirty-
four votes to reach the decision rule of fifty-four (when the total is seventy-six).
This equality in additional votes needed to form a WC means that the WCs in
the hypothetical Council completely overlap those in the actual Council, but the
actual Council contains 54 WCs (out of a total of 342) without France, Germany,
or both countries that the hypothetical Council does not contain.
How do France and Germany's de facto vetoes change the distribution of
power in the hypothetical Council? The new Banzhaf values are given in Table
4.2 and show that these two countries have 60 percent more power (0.184 versus
0.1l5) than Italy and the United Kingdom, their ostensibly equal partners on the
actual Council. With the exception of Luxembourg, which has the same Banzhaf
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Table 4.2. Banzhaf Voting Power in EC Council of Ministers,
When France and Germany Have Vetoes, Under Qualified-Majority Decision Rule.
Class of Member Banzhaf Power
Each Twenty-Three-Vote Member
(France, Germany) 0.184
Each Ten-Vote Member
(Italy, United Kingdom) 0.1l5
One Eight-Vote Member
(Spain) 0.092
Each Five-Vote Member
(Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal) 0.055
Each Three-Vote Member
(Denmark, Ireland) 0.0~6
One Two-Vote Member
(Luxembourg) 0.018
power as before (0.018), all the smaller countries suffer a power loss but not,
relatively, as much as Italy and the United Kingdom do. We conclude that the
Banzhaf power values given by the de jure decision rule (Table 4.1) change sig-
nificantly when the de facto vetoes of France and Germany are incorporated into
the calculation (Table 4.2). Not only are the de facto Banzhaf values probably a
better reflection of the actual power of the players on the Council, but-more
germane to negotiating the SEA-these values may better mirror the degree to
which France and Germany, rather than Italy and the United Kingdom, achieved
their goals in the SEA.
Garrett (1992) reaches a similar conclusion, based on locating three different
groupings of EC countries in an ideological space of two dimensions, one based
on "political authority" and the other on "economic principles." Thus, for exam-
ple, he locates the United Kingdom as favoring the national veto on the political
dimension and favoring mutual recognition-but not full economic integration
and social harmonization-on the economic dimension. In fact, Greece, along with
the United Kingdom and Denmark, favored the national veto (Moravcsik, 1991, p.
39; Lodge, 1991, p. 6). Following Garrett (1992)-except for Greece, which he puts
in group C (see below)-we call this group of countries group A (total votes:
eighteen). Group B comprises France, Germany, and the Benelux countries, all of
which supported a qualified-majority decision rule (total votes: thirty-two). Group
C, which favored a simple-majority decision rule, comprises Ireland, Italy, Portu-
gal, and Spain (total votes: twenty-six). In this three-person game, only coalition
BC, with a total of fifty-eight votes, has a qualified majority of at least fifty-four
votes, giving both Band C a Banzhaf power value of 0.5. Whether France or
Germany-and therefore group B-has a veto would not change this result; because
Band C are both necessary in the only WC, each has a veto. Group A, by contrast,
not only has no veto but also is a dummy, with zero power.
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Insofar as the present Council is a mirror of power relationships that
existed before the adoption of the qualified-majority rule, group A could not have
prevented enactment of the SEA. (In fact, because BC is the only WC, the SEA
would presumably be a compromise between B and C.) Group A's dummy status
perhaps helps explain why the United Kingdom, as the dominant actor in A,
decided in the end not to go it alone. Not only did its group not have veto power,
which requires at least twenty-three votes in the present Council, but it could not
combine with either B or C to produce a qualified majority of at least fifty-four
votes.
The United Kingdom's acquiescence on the qualified-majority issue may
have enabled it to wring concessions out of the other members on issues that it
considered more important. Indeed, Moravcsik (1991, p. 41) argues tha t the
United Kingdom was the real winner in a "victory for the minimalists" because
it had "little to lose from qualified majority voting on the internal market plan,
which it favored in general." In effect, Margaret Thatcher may have successfully
postured on the political dimension in order to get concessions on the economic
dimension (for example, liberalization of financial services or a reduction in the
United Kingdom's contribution to the EC budget), which is a well-known tactic
in bargaining theory that has an evident rational basis (Brams, 1990).5
One consequence of the compromises hammered out to secure passage of
the SEA is that whereas "bargains initially consisted of bilateral agreements
between France and Germany, now they consist of trilateral agreements including
Britain" (Moravcsik, 1991, p. 26). In fact, Moravcsik (1991, p. 49) claims that
Britain is the country "most satisfied with the final outcome." Notwithstanding
possible "inside" agreements among the big three (Italy's interest tend more than
this triumvirate's to echo those of the poorer, mostly southern countries),
Cameron (1992, p. 56) is undoubtedly right that "the broader application of
majority voting has changed the political calculus of Council of Minister
members, who must increasingly search for allies in majoritarian coalitions.
Moreover, in its broader application majority voting implies that national pref-
erences are more likely to be overridden and, as a result, that national sovereignty
might be eroded."
To shed further light on this "political calculus," we compute a final
measure, the power of a collectivity to act (Coleman, 1971), under both qualified-
majority voting and the alternative decision rules considered. This power is mea-
sured by the proportion of coalitions that are winning. If there are n members
of a voting body, and each member either favors or opposes a measure, then the
total number of coalitions favoring the resolution-or complementary coalitions
opposing-is 2n , which is also the number of ways of partitioning the voting
body into two subsets. 6
Because there are twelve members of the EC Council, there are 212 =4,096
partitions. Under a decision rule of unanimity, in which each country has a
national veto, only the grand coalition can pass a resolution. Hence, the power
of the Council to act under this decision rule is a minuscule 114,096 =0.000244,
given that all partitions, or divisions of the body, are equally likely. Under
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simple-majority rule. by contrast, the power to act is 1,800/4.096 = 0.439 because.
for every partition. the favorable coalition will win in half (2,048)-except for the
248 (= 2,048 - 1,800) partitions that lead to a 38-38 tie, in which both coalitions
are blocking but neither is winning.
Less obvious is the power of the Council to act under its qualified-majority
decision rule. It turns out that there are only 402 WCs under this decision rule
(342 are minimal WCs in the sense that the defection of at least one member
would cause them to be losing), so this power is 402/4,096 =0.0981. By compar-
ison, if both France and Germany have de facto vetoes, there are 288 WCs (all are
minimal because all include France and Germany, whose defections make them
losing). Thus, the power of the Council to act in this case is 288/4,096 = 0.0703.
This is a relatively small reduction (28.4 percent) from the Council's power to
act under the qualified-majority rule without the two vetoes. Far more striking,
a qualified-majority rule, with or without the vetoes, vastly increases the Coun-
cil's power to act-by factors of about 300 to 400-compared with a unanimity
rule (0.000244).
True, the national veto has rarely been invoked; but, on the important
occasions on which it was-for example, Charles de Gaulle's veto of the 1966
Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), which occasioned the Luxembourg com-
promise-it blocked a consensus on the part of all the other members. By com-
parison, under qualified-majority rule-with or without vetoes by France and
Germany-blocking coalitions are still far more numerous than WCs (more than
90 percent of the total), but the WCs no longer require a heroic effort if there is
a fairly broad consensus and some spirit of compromise.
The winning coalitions that form will obviously depend on the issue, at least
if the very different alliances that were put together in negotiating the SEA are any
indication (Lodge, 1991). Consequently, a purely formal "issue-independent"
power analysis can never perfectly reflect political realities; depending on the issue,
members will have partially overlapping and partially divergent interests, making
some coalitions more likely than others.
For this reason, we have tried to show how the special prerogatives of
members, like France and Germany, or likely groupings, like those given by A,
B, and C, might alter the de jure power calculations. Additionally, it is illum-
inating to view the Council as a whole and compare its power to act under
different decision rules. Unanimity, by a wide margin, is the most stultifying rule,
suggesting that the Council made a radical shift toward democratic rule in per-
mitting a 71 percent majority to prevail. Because this majority still requires a
preponderance of weighted votes, the Council's greatly enhanced power to act
will, one might hope, be power used to serve the interests of most citizens of the
EC countries. But the Council, of course, is not directly elected by these people,
so the "democratic" character of its rule can be questioned.
Presumably, the decision rule of qualified majority institutionalized by the
SEA reflected, at least to some degree, the bargaining power, skills, and interest
of the players in the preceding negotiations. Not only do our game-theoretic
results quantify the relative powers of the players on the Council-depending on
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which assumptions about individual and collective players, with and without
vetoes, are most accurate-but they also offer a precise notion of the ability of the
Council, as a body, to act. 7
Preferences of Players in the Uruguay Round (and Beyond)
Founded in Geneva in October 1947 by twenty-three countries, GATT is now an
organization with 108 countries; it has sponsored eight rounds of negotiations.
These multilateral talks have dramatically influenced international economic
relations since World War II, primarily through liberalizing international trade
by lowering tariff barriers on the order of 70 percent (Sjastedt, 1990, p. 5). It is
variously estimated that between one-third (Bentsen, 1991) and two-thirds ("Free
Trade Loses a Round," 1990) of world trade is covered by GATT rules, with total
trade amounting to about $4 trillion annually (Greenhouse, 1991; Silk, 1991a).
The latest negotiations have been dubbed the Uruguay Round because
they began in Punta del Este in September 1986. Scheduled to last four years, they
collapsed in Brussels in December 1990 (Farnsworth, 1990). Although they re-
sumed in February 1991, an agreement even on procedural aspects of the talks was
not in sight two years later, lending credence to the rueful GATT appellation,
General Agreement to Talk and Talk. As of fall 1993, the full reinstatement and
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round still faced formidable obstacles. The
increase in bilateral trade negotiations, the rise of regional trading blocs, and a
new debate about free versus fair trade all may undermine an already shaky
international trading regime riddled with protectionist proclivities. But the most
immediate obstacle has been the conflicting interests of the three major players
in the current trading round-the United States, the EC, and japan, which Oxley
(1990, p. 88) calls the "big three." Of course, there are other influential players,
most notably the so-called Cairns group (Higgott and Cooper, 1990), an associ-
ation of fourteen developed and developing agricultural-exporting countries that
pushed for lower agricultural barriers. Newly industrializing countries, like
South Korea and Taiwan, and developing countries, like Brazil, India, and the
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, also played a role in the
Uruguay Round.
The impasse, however, is due primarily to differences among the big three
on agriculture, which Winham and Kizer (1993, p. 43) characterize as "the pivotal
issue" and Sjastedt (1990, p. 3) calls "the most important" unsolved problem.
Although less consequential to the outcome of the Uruguay Round, the issue of
market access also pervades discussions of trade liberalization. Hence, we include
the positions of the big three on this issue-the "and beyond" allusion in the title
of this section-as well as the agricultural issue:s
1. Support of agriculture through price supports or export subsidies
(favored by the EC, opposed by the United States and japan).9
2. Barriers to foreign market entry (favored by japan, opposed by the United
States and the EC).
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The "barriers" in issue 2 do not necessarily apply to intraregional trade, such as
between the United States and neighbors like Canada and Mexico. In fact, issue
2 more and more may be interpreted as the issue of supporting regional pacts by
limiting outside access to internal markets (as the EC has done), which may
undermine the universality of GATT and which we shall say more about later.
Issue 2, of course, is related to issue 1 if agriculture is the sector being restricted.
japan, at least for its national market, is more restrictive than either the
United States or the EC. It therefore seems fair to say that japan "favors" barriers,
whereas the United States and, to a lesser extent, the EC oppose them. That the
nature of japanese restrictions is sometimes heavily governed by culture and
practice-not comparative advantage in resources or even wages-is illustrated by
the case of automobiles (Prestowitz, 1991, p. 28):
Even if U.S. and japanese automakers attained the same quality and
production costs, U.S. producer~ would likely lose out. Why? Be-
cause it takes dealers to sell cars. Establishing a national dealer
network from scratch in a country the size of the United States is
an expensive and time-consuming task-as it is in japan because
of stratospheric real estate prices. But japanese automakers selling
in the United States don't have to build from scratch. They can
piggyback onto existing, GM, Ford, and Chrysler dealers because
U.S. antitrust laws stipulate that producers must allow dealers to
carry other lines. In contrast, by custom and because the japanese
do not enforce antitrust laws, outside firms find it extremely diffi-
cult to hook up with dealers in japan.
In the face of such barriers, the United States and the EC have become increas-
ingly less content to be unilateral free traders. For example, the United States and
the EC have used import quotas and antidumping provisions-sometimes in
retaliation against restrictions of japan and other countries (or each other)-or
they have negotiated export restraints that evade GAIT rules. 10
At the same time, japan has not been totally recalcitrant and seems to be
improving (Sanger, 1991). It has, under pressure, lifted restrictions in certain
areas, like its beef market (Oxley, 1990, p. 68) and semiconductor-chip trade
(Prestowitz, 1991, p. 26) with the United States; the semiconductor-chip agree-
ment, which was in effect from 1986 to 1991, was extended for three years
(Bradsher, 1991). Currently, however, not only does japan have a blanket prohi-
bition on rice imports (Farnsworth, 1990), but its rice farmers also benefit from
subsidies and have, consequently, become "the most protected farmers in the
world" (Passel, 1990).
Other prominent issues debated during the Uruguay Round include intel-
lectual property rights, financial and other services, and textile trade (Winham
and Kizer, 1993). An agreement by developing countries to protect trade in intel-
lectual property and services in return for reduced barriers on food and textile
imports by developed countries will presumably be part of any eventual settle-
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ment, which is the kind of pattern that has been established in previous successful
North-South negotiations (Zartman, 1987).
But here we shall focus on issues 1 and 2 among the big three, in part
because the trade-offs are not so apparent. Call the positions on issues 1 and 2:
A (for agricultural supports) and A (against supports)
B (for barriers) and B (against barriers)
Positions on both these issues define four possible platforms: AB, AB, AB and
AB. We assume that the players can order these platforms from best to worst,
based on "primary" and "secondary" goals. A player's (1) primary goal distin-
guishes its two best from its two worst platforms, whereas a (2) secondary goal
distinguishes between its two best platforms and between its two worst platforms.
Thus, if (1) were A and (2) were B, the player would order the platforms, from
best to worst, as follows: AB, AB, AB, ARII We, in fact, assume this ordering to
be the preferences of the United States. We summarize below the goals, and the
preferences they imply, of the other players as well:
United States: (1) Aand (2) B(AB, AB, AB, AB).
EC: (1) A and (2) B (AB, AB, AB, AB).
Japan: (1) Aand (2) B (AB, AB, AB, AB).
Because of its pivotalness in the Uruguay Round, we make the issue of
agricultural supports primary for all players. It is certainly possible that the
players' positions on the market-entry issue-and regional versus worldwide
pacts, like GATT, which this issue raises-will assume greater importance in the
future than they now have. Indeed, the ultimate failure of the Uruguay Round
may lead to trade agreements by continental blocs, such as the Americas, Europe,
and Asia (Passel, 1991), which some analysts view with alarm (Silk, 1991b) and
others consider salutary (Prestowitz, 1991), but which may actually be strategic:
"By preparing the ground for a series of bilateral trade deals with every country
in Latin America," the United States and its potential partners may be "quietly
hedging their bets" ("Hedging," 1990). Conceivably, however, the "minilateral-
ism" of such blocs may evolve into the multilateralism of GATT, facilitating
rather than undermining world trade; but this consequence is hotly debated (Be-
lous and Hartley, 1990; Uchitelle, 1991; Milner, 1993; Yarbrough and Yarbrough,
1992).
Observe that each of the three players has a different first, second, third,
and last preference, suggesting a lack of social consensus. Nevertheless, if we
compare, for each pair of platforms, which is socially preferred (that is, by a
majority of two of the three players), we obtain the social preference ordering
shown in Figure 4.1. (Later, however, we shall indicate that social preferences
based on majority rule probably do not describe how negotiation outcomes are
determined. )
Notice that, as indicated by the three arrows emanating from AB, two of
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Figure 4.1. Social Hierarchy of Majority Preferences for Platforms.
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Note: Arrows emanating from a higher platform to a lower platform indicate that the
higher platform is socially preferred (that is, by a majority of two of the three players) to
the lower platform.
the three players prefer AB to each of the other three platforms. The fact that these
other platforms can also be ordered so that all social preference relations flow
"downward" from AB to AB to AB to AB establishes the existence of a social
hierarchy of platforms. 12 Even AB, however, if pitted against each of the other
platforms, would always be opposed by one of the three players. Thus, if each
of the players is able to veto the social choice of a platform, the fact that there
exists a social hierarchy based on majority preferences does not establish that a
social consensus will develop around AB at the top of the hierarchy. Quite the
contrary: each of the platforms would be vetoed by the player who prefers
another. Hence, if unanimous consent is required (as is probably the case among
the big three in the Uruguay Round), it will not be achieved.
A Dynamic Negotiation Model
Now consider a negotiation model in which players begin by supporting only
their first preferences. If there is no agreement among these, as in our example
(they differ for all three players), we assume players next lend their support to
their second preferences as well. 13 At this second stage, observe that AB would
have the support of the United States and Japan, as would AB. Only if the
players-at least the EC-then give their support to their third preferences will
a consensus (unanimous support) form around AB-but not around any of the
other platforms. The required support by the EC of AB (as a third preference) is
what led to the breakup of the talks in December 1990, when the EC failed to alter
significantly its position on agriculture. Resolving this sticking point, according
to our model, would end the conflict and produce unanimous consent for AB.
Moreover, having all the players pledge support for all platforms down to the
third preference would not induce unanimous support for any other platform.
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The United States or japan would have to dip down to their last preferences to
cement unanimity for either AB or AB.
We next introduce a player's N threshold, or point at which it would prefer
no agreement (N) to any lower-ranked platform. Assume the EC is adamant in
its position on issue 1; unalterably opposed to X, it insists on agricultural sup-
ports and so puts N in third place. Assume the United States puts N in fourth
place: it will not give up on both its primary and secondary goals. Then the only
way that unanimous consent can be achieved is if japan puts N in fifth place.
If this is the case, support for the various alternatives will evolve to the following:
United States: (AB, XB, AB, N lAB).
EC: (AB, AB, N I AB, XB).
japan: (XB, AB, AB, AB IN).
By the time the players have lowered their support to the points indicated by the
vertical bars-where they will stop because, by assumption, they prefer N to
further concessions (that is, support for lower-ranked platforms, if there are
any)-there will be unanimous support for AB.
Yet both AB and XB beat AB in the hierarchy! AB and XB platforms "lose,"
once we insert N in the preference rankings, because of the EC's hypothesized
intransigence-it will not support AB and XB because they rank below N on its
preference scale. The diminished intransigence we hypothesize for the United
States-and still less for japan-ensures that AB rather than AB will be the
outcome (the reverse would be the case if japan ranked N fourth and the United
States ranked it fifth). In this manner, a player's higher placement of N induces
the choice of a preferred platform, even though this platform may fall lower in
the social hierarchy, based on majority-rule voting, than others (Brams and Do-
herty, 1992; Brams, 1993, Chap. 7).
Time will tell, if our hypothetical attribution of preferences for the players
is correct and the unanimity rule is operative, whether the EC's N threshold is
higher than that of the United States and of japan. The U.S. and japanese N
thresholds also matter, as we have just shown, and also may not be as we have
hypothesized. Indeed, the fact that the big three have disagreed since 1990 suggests
that one or more of these players ranks N higher than we have hypothesized. The
hypothesized preferences of the big three (for N as well as for the different plat-
forms), the unanimity decision rule, and negotiations that unfold in the manner
of our model certainly do not capture all the nuances of any end game that may
be played out in the Uruguay Round and later. Other preferences and rules, and
even new players, might be incorporated into the analysis if doing so offers a
more realistic portrayal than our model of the current trade-negotiation game.
The game-theoretic methodology that we have introduced for analyzing
negotiation processes, simple as it is, is the main contribution of this section. We
believe it offers an enlightening way of viewing the unfolding of positions and
possible changes in support patterns, as players offer compromises-specifically,
by progressively supporting lower-ranked platforms, at least up to some point
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N.14 A model in which players respond to each other over time provides, we think,
an innovative and compelling way to explicate the dynamics of negotiation
processes.
Conclusions
Multilateral negotiations can often be reduced to bilateral negotiations, or a series
of bilateral negotiations, but sometimes they resist such a simplification. This
seems to be the case in both the SEA and the Uruguay Round negotiations, in
which there were at least three major players and a reduction of either set of
negotiations to two-person games would do violence to reality. It is true that there
has been a serious two-person conflict between the developed and developing
countries on the Uruguay Round, but these collective players also have intersect-
ing interests on which reasonable compromises seem possible. The fact that they
have yet to be fashioned after several years of negotiations suggests that more
basic conflicts divide other players. Also, the existence of the Cairns group, com-
prising both developed and developing countries that share an interest in low-
ering barriers to agricultural imports, is testimony that the North-South division
may not be the fundamental one.
We were thus led to analyze a three-person game among the big three, in
part because their positions on agriculture, the most contentious issue, were
divergent. But the issue of market access also seems salient, even if it is not so
relevant to the Uruguay Round but is instead part of a larger game. l !'> The issue
of market access, should it become paramount, may be instrumental in restruc-
turing the players into regional blocs and altering the fundamental nature of the
trading game. Our analysis of the game among the big three, reflecting their
positions on both agriculture and market access, indicates not only that their
preferences differ but also that they all will have to make significant compromises
to reach a consensus. Our dynamic negotiation model showed that a consensus
will not be achieved if the EC considers a continuing impasse preferable to
compromise on its primary goal of maintaining agricultural supports.
The SEA was successful in redistributing power, based on qualified-
majority voting, in a way that probably mirrored the strengths of the negotiating
positions of the main players, especially France, Germany, and the United King-
dom. The United Kingdom, even though it did not have a veto and therefore
could be isolated, nevertheless probably managed to attain most of its goals by
posturing on some issues in order to get concessions on others. In particular,
qualified-majority voting, which it opposed, probably was never a dire threat to
its sovereignty, so it could afford to compromise on this issue in order to get its
way on other issues, such as the liberalization of financial services or a reduction
in its contribution to the EC budget. To be sure, we did not explicitly model these
trade-offs but rather focused on the power-related consequences of voting. One
of the more revealing quantitative findings is that the Council enhanced its
power to act by a factor of between 300 and 400 by renouncing national vetoes
on most questions. At the same time, a 71 percent majority is not trivial to muster,
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especially if France and Germany have de facto vetoes, so precipitous action that
threatens major national interests seems improbable.
We view the SEA as a major step toward democratic rule, despite the fact
that the compromises reached so far may have a lowest-common-denominator
ring. Like the 69 percent majority needed to ratify the U.S. federal constitution
(nine of the thirteen original states), or the 75 percent majority (again, of states)
needed to ratify constitutional amendments, the 71 percent EC Council majority
is of the order of magnitude to make possible important and necessary changes
without trampling on the rights of individual members, who are likely to remain
the key actors even if most are dispossessed of their national vetoes. 16
It is hard to say at this point whether a compromise agreement will even-
tually be worked out on what seem to be the most divisive issues in the trade talks,
both inside and outside the Uruguay Round. If not, failure will occur because
an agreement, at least in the eyes of some players, is worse than no agreement.
Our game-theoretic analysis, we believe, illuminates why this is the case and why
a different game, in which regional blocs become the new players, may supplant
the present game.
Notes
I. Actually, the rationale of the weights and of the decision rule of the
Council today is quite transparent, leading to a good fit of weighted votes and
Banzhaf power values. But, as we shall show, a different story emerges when we
factor in the apparent special prerogatives of certain members as well as take into
account the likely coalitions.
2. Under a simple-majority decision rule of thirty-nine out of seventy-six
(used mostly for routine procedural matters), the Banzhaf values are: ten-vote
members, 0.134; eight-vote member; 0.107; five-vote members, 0.064; three-vote
members, 0.040; two-vote member, 0.024. Clearly, the decision rule matters, ben-
efiting the largest four members and the smallest member-vis-a-vis the seven
intermediate members-compared with qualified-majority voting (Table 4.1).
3. There are no nonwinning coalitions (NCs)-without Luxembourg-
with fifty-two votes, but there are forty NCs without Luxembourg with fifty-three
votes, in which case Luxembourg's two votes are, therefore, critical:
• Four with members (10, 10, 10, 10,8, 5)-four different countries may be the
included "5."
• Sixteen with (10, 10, 10,8,5,5, 5)-four different countries may be the ex-
cluded "10," and four different countries may be the excluded "5."
• Twelve with (10, 10, 10, 10,5,5, 3)-six different countries may be the two
included "5s," and two different countries may be the included "3."
• Eight with (10,10, 10,5,5,5,5, 3)-four different countries may be the ex-
cluded "10," and two different countries may be the included "3."
4. Other weights could accomplish the same end, but these are the smallest
that do so.
5. Cameron (1992, p. 62) also believes that British intransigence on certain
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issues may have enhanced its bargaining position, although the specific conces-
sons it gained are by no means clear. The budgetary rebates the United Kingdom
received, for example, may not have been in return for British support of
qualified-majority voting but instead for concessions on internal-market issues.
6. These complementary coalitions include the coalition with no members
(~) and the grand coalition with all members. Thus, if n =2, the four partitions,
indicated by a slash, are ~/12, 1/2, 2/1, and 12/~. If the coalition to the left of
the slash favors a resolution, and the decision rule is simple majority, the favor-
able coalitions in the first three partitions are losing and only 12 in the last
partition is winning. The favorable coalitions in the two middle partitions, 1 and
2, are blocking (as well as losing) because neither side of the partition is winning.
7. It should be noted, however, that many of the Council's decisions are,
in fact, reached without actually taking a formal vote. Yet this fact does not
detract from the thrust of our analysis, which is intended to establish a kind of
power baseline against which actual negotiations are played out. Moreover, as the
EC faces the possibility of expansion in the future, such an examination could
become critical not only because the proper distribution of power is important
but also because the enlargement of the membership is likely to lead to more
frequent use of formal voting procedures. Thus, despite its somewhat ambiguous
role in the daily proceedings of the Council, members' formal voting power
probably reveals important facets of Council negotiations, both now and increas-
ingly in the future.
8. Thereby we add "quantity" issues (for example, the volume of trade or
its management in particular sectors), which are not generally subjects of GATT,
to "quality" issues (for example, rules that allow market forces to operate), which
are subjects of GATT, as part of the negotiation game analyzed.
9. Paradoxically, the SEA has led to liberalization of agricultural trading
within the EC through the EC's CAP, "which protects 8 million EC farmers
against nearly 300 million farmers in the poor countries" (Bhagwati, 1991, p. 8).
CAP, incidentally, is estimated to cost more than $35 billion annually (Green-
house, 1991), with total subsidies running between $100 billion ("A Big Win-Win
on Trade," 1991) and $300 billion (Silk, 1991a).
10. U.S. retaliatory actions have been sanctioned by what are known as the
regular, special, and super 301 sections of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Compe-
titiveness Act, which were largely a response to U.S. trade and budget deficits (an
earlier trade act was passed in 1974 with weaker provisions). These actions have
been argued to be "GATT-illegal," on the one hand, and to be necessary for the
proper functioning of the world trading system by penalizing noncompliance
with a GATT tenet, reciprocity, on the other (Bhagwati and Patrick, 1990).
11. See Hillinger (1971) and Kadane (1972) for an analysis of the effects of
combining different positions into platforms. The use of primary and secondary
goals to order platforms is an example of a lexicographic decision rule, whereby
outcomes are first ordered on the basis of a most important criterion, then a next-
most important criterion, and so on (Fishburn, 1974); such goals are used to
define games in Brams (1983).
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12. Such a hierarchy will not exist if the players' individual preferences
lead to cyclical majorities, whereby social preferences cycle because no platform
is preferred to all others; for an example, see Brams (1975, pp. 55-57). Such a cycle
creates a paradox of voting, which may aggravate the problem of achieving a
consensus-or, for that matter, reaching an agreement in the dynamic negotia-
tion model described in this chapter.
13. The negotiation model to be described, with one significant difference,
is illustrated with another example-involving cyclical majorities-in Brams
(1991) and developed fully in Brams and Doherty (1992) and Brams (1993, Chap.
7). The significant difference in this other model is that it assumes that the players
have incomplete information about each other's preferences, which is revealed
only as they progressively indicate support for lower-ranked alternatives during
the negotiation process; also, the model does not assume an impenetrable "no
agreement" but allows players to breach this threshold if doing so may prevent
an inferior alternative from being selected. For more on games of incomplete
information as well as models relevant to negotiation analysis, see Siebe (1991),
Sebenius (1991), and P. Young (1991).
14. We are hampered, however, by having insufficient information to test
whether support patterns evolved in the manner predicted by the model. In fact,
we are not even sure what the "true" preferences of the players are, which is why
we claim only to have illustrated a methodology, not rigorously tested a model.
15. Clearly, the identity of the players and of the games being played is
not always evident. Most problematic in applying game theory is ascertaining the
preferences of the players, not so much on the broad issues we have discussed but
on specifics, to which we are simply not privy.
16. With respect to democratic rule, however, it should be recalled that the
Council (unlike the EP) is not elected, though it represents elected governments.
Also, the U.S. qualified majorities we refer to in the text apply to the enactment
and amendment of the U.S. Constitution; amendments to the Treaty of Rome still
rquire unanimity. Perhaps a more appropriate comparison is to the two-third
majorities of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate that are needed
to override a presidential veto.
Chapter 5
Organization Theory
The Interface of Structure, Culture,
Procedures, and Negotiation Processes
Deborah M. Kolb (USA),
Guy-Olivier Faure (France)
The study of negotiations of either the bilateral or multilateral sort has long
been dominated by models of individuals or small groups (or both). Most of our
theorizing provides a picture of freelance individuals, or combinations of indi-
viduals, conducting their negotiations unfettered by organizational expectations
or constraints. Yet organizations often figure prominently in negotiations. Many
negotiations are explicitly conducted under the auspices of a particular organi-
zation with a structure and culture that undoubtedly influences the form and
course of a negotiation. Furthermore, negotiators are often agents of organiza-
tions that have constituents they represent and must satisfy. Thus, organizational
issues influence and affect negotiation in potentially important ways.
Negotiation theory, however, has been virtually silent on this interface
between organizational structures, cultures, and procedures and negotiation. The
same can be said for a strain of organization theory, called negotiated order, where
negotiation is seen as a major organizational process (Strauss and others, 1963).
Negotiation from this perspective serves merely as another term for interaction,
and so scholarship on negotiated orders has contributed little to our understand-
ing of how negotiations are affected by the organizational setting in which they
are located. Although this state of scholarship is generally regrettable, it is even
more problematic in the international sphere, where most multilateral negotia-
tions actually take place within formal organizational structures.
An organization is a difficult entity to define because the elements one
identifies often depend on the theory one consults (Morgan, 1986). At a minimum
an organization can be defined as "a formal social grouping which is established
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in a more or less deliberate or purposive manner for the attainment of (a) specific
goal(s)" (Mouzelis, 1967, p. 4). From the perspective of formal structure, an or-
ganization can be described on the basis of the roles assigned to individual
members, the specialized functional areas among which the organization's tasks
are allocated, and the mechanisms for control and integration of effort. These
characteristics include hierarchical reporting relationships, the rules and proce-
dures that guide organizational activity, and goals and objectives toward which
members work (Etzioni, 1964; Mintzberg, 1979).
All organizations develop informal structures, a set of norms and taken-
for-granted understandings about how decisions are made and work gets done,
which complement (and sometimes modify) formal structures. Organization ana-
lysts diagnose these dimensions of organizational activity by attending to the
structure and politics of decision making, the informal social and work networks
that form around particular activities both within organizations and across or-
ganizational boundaries, the organizational culture and subcultures that form
among different functions and subgroups, and the areas of conflict and modes
of resolution (Crozier, 1964; Pfeffer, 1982; Schein, 1985; Silverman, 1971). We
think that a consideration of organizational structure in both the formal sense
and the informal sense can be used to explain the dynamics of international
mul tilateral negotiations.
International multilateral negotiations differ in many respects from their
counterparts in a national setting. First, these negotiations actually take place in
organizations. Both the European Communities (EC) and the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are organizations that serve as the background for
negotiations that take place under their auspices-in this case, the negotiations
for the Single European Act (SEA) and the Uruguay Round. The EC has an
elaborate organizational structure composed of a Council on Ministers, the Eu-
ropean Parliament, and the Commission-an organization of some 16,000
members. Similarly, GATT has a structure of a secretariat and various standing
committees; it has also developed sets of policies and procedures to handle dis-
putes arising among members. These structures continue in place even though
there are no active rounds under way. The second distinguishing feature of mul-
tilateral relations in the international setting is the cross-cultural character of
these organizations as well as of the negotiations. Both characteristics mean that
it is impossible to explain, much less understand, what occurs in these interna-
tional multilateral contexts without reference to the organizational issues that
permeate them.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the contributions an organiza-
tional perspective makes to the understanding of multilateral negotiations. There
are two major ways that the organizational perspective is used in this chapter.
The first is to treat GATT and the EC as organizations and to show how the
structures in these two organizations set the context for the Uruguay Round and
the SEA negotiations. The second is to use concepts from organization theory
to analyze basic features of the actual negotiations. From this dual focus we ar-
rive at an understanding of multilateral negotiations as organizational systems
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Figure 5.1. Perspectives of Organizations and Negotiations.
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(Figure 5.1), an understanding that contributes significantly to explaining the
process and outcomes of the Uruguay Round and the SEA.
The first section of the chapter describes two theoretical models of orga-
nizational structure and process, which we have labeled structural and actionist
perspectives of organizations. These models are used to develop three major di-
mensions of organizational function and process that seem most salient to the
workings of the EC and GATT. These dimensions are formal structure, decision-
making mechanisms, and conflict-resolution procedures. In the second section,
the two organizations are compared according to these thematic dimensions. We
find that GATT conforms more closely to an actionist model, in which structure
is primarily coalitional, decision making political, and conflict resolution
achieved on an ad hoc basis. In contrast, the EC has a formal, well-defined
structure, a shared culture, longstanding relationships, and an extensive set of
policies and practices for managing decision making and conflict. The negoti-
ation processes and the ways the two organizations respond to problems during
bargaining can be explained, in large part, by the different structures of the
convening organizations.
In the third section of the paper, the focus is on the ways in which the
Uruguay Round and the SEA negotiations accord with their respective organi-
zational context. Specifically, the discussion is on how decision making is struc-
tured in the negotiations and the ways conflicts and problems are handled.
Although there are some similarities, we conclude that the well-developed orga-
nizational structures and strategies that had evolved over time in the EC institu-
tions prepared it to meet the challenges of the SEA negotiations better than the
loose structure of GATT prepared it for the Uruguay Round. Furthermore, we
contend that negotiation processes replicate the rationale of the organizations in
which they take place and can be viewed as organizational processes. Ultimately,
we want to show how organizations or organizational settings (or both) influence
negotiations and lead to specific outcomes.
There are several caveats in this enterprise. First, the topic of organization
and negotiation has not been well developed either in theory or in practice. Thus,
we view this enterprise as a beginning, and, as in any new approach, much of
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what we propose will require further refinement and testing. Second, there is
always a danger in talking about organizations as singular entities. The tendency
is to reify them, make them appear more unified in purpose and more functional
than experience and research suggest that they are. We are not immune from these
charges; much of what we report reflects some notion about "ideal" rather than
actual types. Third, as organizational consultants and researchers, we realize how
difficult it is, given the complexity of organizational processes, to attribute
causality to a particular set of factors. Thus, we have chosen to be modest in our
claims about the degree to which organizational attributes determine negotiation
outcomes. Despite these potential limitations, we believe that an organizational
approach merits further consideration, and we anticipate that the reader will
concur.
An Organizational Approach to Multilateral Negotiations
Organization theory is rife with debates on the nature and structure of organi-
zations. One of the central debates concerns the question of whether organizations
are more accurately described as functionally rational and technically constrained
systems or as socially constructed, meaningful embodiments of individual action
(Astley and Van de Ven, 1983). In the managerial wing of organization theory,
structural theory has been most dominant. In this view, organizations are seen
as integrally linked to the environments in which they operate. This link suggests
both a contingent relationship between environment and technology and formal
features of structure such as roles and specialization of function (Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1967). Here the focus is on the formal dimensions of struc-
ture-that is, the allocations of tasks, formal roles and responsibilities, hierarchi-
cal decision making, the relationships between various elements of the organi-
zation, and the development of rules and procedures for handling recurring
problems. The argument runs that the degree of formal structure and hierarchy
reflects, among other factors, the nature of the technology involved and the en-
vironments in which the organization operates and that these structures channel
and control behavior in the interest of goal achievement (Emery and Trist, 1965;
Thompson, 1967; Williamson, 1975). These theories are labeled structural theo-
ries to highlight their attention to formal structure and the efficiency of decision
making. We use these structural theories in this chapter as a means to define
organizations according to the degree to which these attributes characterize their
functioning.
An alternative perspective, the actionist view, defines organizations not as
formal systems but rather as interacting individuals and groups who seek to reach
their own goals and do so using whatever influence and control they have (Astley
and Van de Ven, 1983; Silverman, 1971; Strauss, 1978; Weick, 1979). From this
perspective, organizations are joined together less by formal structure and hier-
archy and more by the individual choices actors make and the immediate actions
they take. Thus, environment is not so much a determining factor but rather a
constraint over which members have more or less control and which influences
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their decision making. Furthermore, structures are not presumed to have an ex-
istence apart from what actors give them. In the actionist view, meanings and
interpretations are important because they influence the degree to which actions
can be aligned, and these recurring patterns of alignment constitute structure.
Thus, structure according to the actionist theories is informal, adaptive, and
continually changing. Decision making in this approach tends to be political and
highly conflictual. Indeed, organizations that have these kinds of characteristics,
and they are often ones where professionals or other independent actors domi-
nate, are the ones that are described as negotiated orders (Strauss, 1978). Again,
it is possible to label an organization as actionist to the degree that its major
characteristics approximate those associated with the actionist view.
These two models of organizations, the structural and the actionist, can
be used to diagnose and analyze any organization. Indeed, the models highlight
different aspects of an organization and so elucidate different dimensions, some
formal and structural in character, others more informal and political (Morgan,
1986). However, it is also possible, given the history, size, goals, strategies, and
functions of an organization, that one or the other model does a better job de-
scribing that organization and the kinds of actions and strategies it uses to deal
with new situations. Part of this descriptive "fit" is that each model suggests some
of the ways institutions will strive to structure a new set of negotiations that take
place under their aegis.
Three major dimensions of organizational process seem to be most rele-
vant to the two organizations of interest here and to the negotiations that they
oversee. The first is the formal definition of the organization and its structure.
Structure concerns the design of an organization and the degree to which its
arrangements, specifically its goal-setting processes and control mechanisms, are
elaborated and formalized (Mintzberg, 1979). The second dimension is the
decision-making process. Here the focus is on the institutionalized procedures for
making decisions as well as the informal political contexts and cultural values
that influence the bases on which decisions are made (March and Simon, 1958).
The conflict-management function is the third major dimension we will consider
in organizations. Specialization of organizational functions and responsibilities,
the need for innovation as well as the routine requirements for integrated effort,
and the sheer complexity of integrating the efforts of diverse stakeholders create
the seeds of conflict and make the need for management mechanisms pressing
(Kolb and Bartunek, 1992).
Structural Dimension
Formal Mechanisms. Organizations differ according to the degree to
which their structures and procedures are formalized and institutionalized.
Organizations develop formal structures and procedures to allocate work, to
differentiate tasks and functions, and to control and regulate activities across
functional boundaries (Thompson, 1967). The challenge for the leadership of an
organization is to balance differentiation and integration in such a way that
lIS International Multilateral Negotiation
critical tasks are performed but that efforts are controlled and coordinated in ways
that promote the achievement of an organization's goals (Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967).
The challenge is met in different ways in organizations. In large-scale
organizations formalized and bureaucratic structures, procedures, and rules
channel and control major aspects of activity (Mintzberg, 1979; Pugh, Hickson,
Hinings, and Turner, 1968). These large-scale organizations operate in (and
create) environments that they exert more or less control over rather than the
reverse. They allocate tasks to specialized units, which develop their own
subgoals and modes of operating; these subgoals and processes mayor may not
support the explicit mission of the organization. Furthermore, these specialized
units have access to information and the resources to process that information
that others do not have (March and Simon, 1958; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978),
which sometimes makes integration of their efforts difficult. There is obviously
a political dimension within organizations as well. Departments carry out their
functions in such a way as to increase internal leverage, expand their purview and
jurisdiction, and so manage behind the scenes to achieve their own agendas.
These patterns of behavior become institutionalized, hence formalized, even when
circumstances change (Zucker, 1977).
A major problem that bureaucratic organizations face is the problem of
innovation. Given centralized and formal structures, it is difficult for new ideas
to be communicated and receive support. Thus, less hierarchical structures are
necessary to meet new challenges (Galbraith, 1973). Again politics is important
here as well. Organizational units that are well positioned to anticipate change
can exert influence in the design of lateral structures and increase their own
leverage on the outcomes (Pettigrew, 1973).
The formality of the convening organization's structure and the leverage
of specialized subunits have a number of potential impacts on negotiations. First,
an organization that has a well-articulated formal structure for managing the
routine elements of its work will be able to use its standard approach in the design
of negotiations in ways that make it likely that the process and outcomes it favors
will result. When innovation is required to meet changing circumstances, units
with specialized expertise and political leverage can use their experience and
position to take a dominant role in the design of alternative structures and
processes (Pettigrew, 1973). Second, organizations with well-articulated formal
structures are partially insulated from interference from constituent or client
groups (Blau, 1955). Thus, in the design of negotiated processes, they can exert
more influence than members, who are less organized. Organizations that lack
such structures will typically find themselves buffeted by their stakeholder groups
and have difficulty exerting authority over the course of the negotiations.
Role of Culture. In order to achieve their goals, organizations need to
control and coordinate the diverse activities that occur within them. Clearly,
formal structures and procedures provide one means for doing so. However,
informal structures and norms develop among members that have important
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impacts on how an organization functions (Dalton, 1959). The actionist perspec-
tive calls attention to the kinds of patterns and routines members develop through
interactions with each other (Silverman, 1971). In large-scale organizations, these
networks of relationships become essential for getting work done. As these
activities recur, they become institutionalized and part of the normative order of
the organization and influence behavior as surely as the formal mechanisms
(Zucker, 1977).
In this context culture refers to the informal behavioral norms and rules
that bind members of the organization (Schein, 1985). The degree to which a
culture can be said to be shared is always an issue in organizations and affects
the kind of control that is possible in negotiations. In international organiza-
tions, the notion of shared culture is problematic. First, these organizations are
mosaics of national cultures, which make communication, interpretation, and
coordinated action always a matter of translation (Hofstede, 1984). Second, as in
any large organization, the tasks of different units give rise to subcultures with
different interpretations of time, goals, and norms of work accomplishment.
Third, members enter organizations with different backgrounds and professional
experience, which also shape their interpretations of behavior. Thus, lawyers and
accountants have professional subcultures that may be at odds with those of other
groups in the organization (Van Maanen and Barley, 1985; Lang, 1993). The
referential cultures of the actor influence the way he or she interprets all levels
of organizational activity, but especially conflict and its potential resolution
(Faure and Rubin, 1993). Shared culture tends to focus effort, whereas diverse
subcultures contribute to conflict and make the tasks of decision making and
negotiation considerably more challenging.
Negotiations take place in the context of a set of institutional procedures
and cultural rules that are part of the established structure and routines (Walton
and McKersie, 1965). These cultural understandings and procedures lend a degree
of certainty and control to the negotiation process. Thus, in the absence of any
challenge to these procedures, negotiations will be conducted according to these
norms (Tolbert and Arthur, 1988). When an organization finds itself negotiating
in a new arena, its approach generally conforms to the existing practices.
However, if the new arena is sufficiently different, members of the organization
strive to find at least satisfactory ways of responding to the challenge (March and
Simon, 1958). A shared culture and a rich network of past relationships facilitate
the required changes.
Decision-Making Dimension
Mechanisms. Organizations are decision-making entities. Actionist and
structural models of organizations portray decision making differently. In the
structural view, decision-making procedures are guided by considerations of tech-
nical rationality and are designed to be responsive to the strategy of the organi-
zation and environment in which it operates (Williamson, 1975). Studies of
decision making in action suggest a rather different picture in which organiza-
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tions strive to reduce complexity in their decision making. They do so in a variety
of ways (March and Simon, 1958). They develop elaborate repertoires, or standard
operating procedures. Decision makers seek to frame problems in ways that make
them similar to those they have handled in the past (March and Olsen, 1976).
Furthermore, the tendency is to divide a problem and assign pieces of it to spe-
cialized individuals (roles) or to parts of the organization (functions) as a way to
minimize discussion and conflict. Given the segmentation of problems, it follows
that issues will be treated sequentially rather than simultaneously (Cyert and
March, 1963). The outcome of these efforts to reduce complexity is that optimi-
zation is rarely achieved.
Typically, in international multilateral negotiations numerous demands
of many different types need to be decided. Some relate to economics, others to
governance, others are time related, and still others may have ideological over-
tones. In addition demands present different challenges to potential agreement
making. Some will be distributive in that there is an implied winner and loser.
Others will contain integrative potential because the parties have different pref-
erences regarding them. And for some of the demands the parties' interests may
be overlapping. These characteristics of negotiated demands require that parties
have the skills to manage complexity in situations in which the outcomes are
always uncertain. Where decision making is compartmentalized and simplified
in organizations, it is much less likely that opportunities for joint gains will be
naturally discovered in negotiation. Organizations that can structure decision
making in more satisfactory ways and that have cultures that support such fram-
ing heighten the possibility that more integrative solutions will be discovered.
Goals. One of the characteristics that define organizations and differentiate
them from other collectivities is their goals. Organizations are presumed to be
goal-directed even though the nature of the goal-setting process is subject to some
debate (Perrow, 1961). Structural models envision goal setting as a rationalistic
and deliberate process in which a small number of strategic and consistent ob-
jectives guide the organization. Even within formal structures, goals are frag-
mented as subunits set their own goals, which do not necessarily support those
of the organization.
The actionist framework focuses on the process of goal setting; it sees goals
as the outcomes of a complicated negotiation process (Cyert and March, 1963).
Goals are never finally set but are subject to continual revision as negotiations
occur among different stakeholders. New goals emerge from interactions in
which neither party is necessarily aware that it is actually involved in the setting
of goals. Implicit action also leads to goals that are not formally articulated. As
organizations develop procedures and rules to manage uncertainties in a task, the
means of task accomplishment can become elevated to a goal. And, finally, any
number of unofficial goals are understood to exist but cannot be formally ex-
pressed because they challenge the mission of the organization.
The variability in the ways goals are set leads to inevitable problems of
consistency among them. Different processes may lead to a proliferation of goals,
Organization Theory 121
many of which are in conflict with each other. This is likely to be the case
especially where certain units are zealous in pursuing their own goals without
regard to those of the organization. One of the outcomes, particularly in large-
scale organizations that respond to multiple constituencies, is that organizations
often get paralyzed because there is no centralized procedure or uniform process
for setting goals or resolving conflicts among them. Without such processes, it
is difficult for an organization to act in a concerted manner in negotiations,
which in turn gives rise to political jockeying. Organizations that have formal
decision-making structures and procedures in place may be more likely to be in
a position to pursue more consistent goals in negotiation.
Even with structures in place, goal setting and decision making are highly
political processes. Certain groups and individuals come to acquire and exert
influence over decisions in ways beyond the formal positions they hold (Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978; Bacharach and Lawler, 1980). This influence may come about
in several ways. Members or groups in the organization control resources that the
organization needs. These resources may be money or new recruits or essential
information (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Control over critical uncertainties af-
fecting the functioning of the organization also gives members influence (Crozier,
1964). Or members may become powerful because they have the ear of key people
in the organization or because they know the nature of power relations (Kanter,
1977; Pettigrew, 1973). Use of these various sources of power can become critical
when organizations are in flux or transition (Pettigrew, 1973).
When organizations face new situations and challenges, they are forced to
adapt themselves through innovations in structure and process in order to en-
hance their decision-making capacity. Under these circumstances, certain indi-
viduals and groups are likely to emerge as influential. Individuals who occupy
strategic roles that span units either within the organization or across its bound-
aries take on responsibility for integrating efforts that were previously separate.
Boundary spanners playa critical role in gathering and disseminating informa-
tion and in representing the organization to its outside constituents (Adams,
1976). Specialized units and task forces that bring together people with particular
information and expertise are created and buffered from the rest of the organi-
zation and so accrue influence.
Complementing these formal structural adaptations may be activities in
the informal structure that promote change and innovation and provide windows
onto power politics in action. Members can act individually; they try to usurp
formal channels by gaining access to strategic information that would normally
not be available to them. They also apply unofficial or unsanctioned criteria in
making decisions. Strategic alliances, including coalitions, are formed behind the
scenes with people external to the organization (Tolbert, 1985). Through these
means the decisions that move the organization in new directions may be made
without any formal public consideration of the issues.
How an organization handles decision making affects the negotiations
that occur under its auspices. From what we know about decision making in
organizations, the possibility of deliberate and rational decision making is slim.
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First, the tendency for organizations to reduce complexity will have an effect on
the possibilities of finding mutually beneficial outcomes. Second, political
posturing means that unless otherwise controlled, negotiated outcomes will re-
£lect the individual interests of those in power. Finally, the complications of
cross-cultural organizations make communication and the possibility of under-
standing the interests of others that much more difficult.
Conflict Dimension
The hierarchical structure of most organizations and the requirement for integra-
tion of task and effort usually contain the seeds of con£lict (Kolb and Bartunek,
1992). In international organizations, the potential is increased. First, diverse
cultures and national groups complicate communication and increase the
chances for miscommunication and misunderstanding. Real differences in inter-
ests and positions can be exacerbated by these cultural differences, which make
decision making considerably more contentious than it would otherwise be.
Second, more or less con£lict occurs to the degree that innovation and
change are present. The structural mechanisms that keep con£lict in check-
hierarchical authority, division of labor, standardized rules and procedures-are
of necessity violate when change is the aim. Structures for innovation and adap-
tation, in contrast with normal structures, tend to be £latter, less hierarchical,
requiring increased teamwork and £lexibility (Kanter, 1983). These structures
breed con£lict, indeed view con£lict as essential to the innovation process. How-
ever, in order for these structures to produce the innovation they promise, mech-
anisms of con£lict resolution more elaborate than usual are also required
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Mediation-type functions are essential to making
these kinds of systems operate.
Mediation can become institutionalized in several ways. First, the organi-
zation can explicitly design a dispute-resolution system to handle the recurring
con£licts that surface. One of the problems, however, is that these systems can
become specialized. Mediators come to be seen as experts in certain disputes and
not others, and thus they tend to hear only specific kinds of disputes (Kolb, 1989).
Second, individuals who are known within the system and respected for their
skills take on the role of informal mediator. In both these situations, the mediator
role is institutionalized on either a formal or an informal basis.
In the actionist perspective, con£lict is recognized as an essential element
of organization. The coalitional and £luid structures of these organizations create
the conditions for mediation (Mintzberg, 1983). Indeed, it is impossible to con-
ceive how such an organization could function without the assistance of individ-
uals or groups who mediate on an ad hoc or even more or less permanent basis.
Because these organizations are negotiated orders, they require a regulatory func-
tion to keep the process going and to build coordination and cohesion among
the parts (Strauss, 1978). Mediation is such a function.
The individuals or groups who fulfill the mediation function do so be-
cause they provide a service to the organization. These organizations require
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coordination and unity of purpose. Individuals who fill this need, even though
they operate without formal authority, tend to gain power and influence from
this role (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Furthermore, in carrying out this function
they also serve their own interests in the ongoing negotiations. In this way, they
are neither neutral nor impartial for they have stakes in the outcomes and pref-
erences among the parties (Faure, 1989).
In sum, it is possible to distinguish organizations on the basis of these
dimensions and to predict some of the ways that negotiations will be affected. If
an organization has a well-articulated structure that allows it to work proactively
toward the achievement of a consistent set of goals and has an organizational
culture that supports these formal activities, the negotiations that take place
under its aegis will replicate these features. Organizations that are negotiated
orders, exemplified by diverse cultures and goals, and whose decision making is
highly politicized, will produce negotiations that are constantly in flux.
Applications of the Theory
The EC and GATT are organizations that act as conveners for negotiation and
also, at times, as parties to the process. The Uruguay Round and the SEA nego-
tiations, which occurred under their auspices, can be viewed as subprocesses
within a more global system of interaction, or as subsystems that more or less
reflect the characteristics of their convening organization. However, every nego-
tiation is in some way unique unto itself as the negotiators develop their own
rationale and strategy within the context of the organization. These actions in
turn influence the organization in its future negotiations. Our purpose in this
section is to compare the two negotiations according to the main structural,
decision-making, and conflict-resolution dimensions.
Formal Structure
The EC and GATT can be differentiated along a number of structural lines. The
EC has a well-articulated formal structure of roles and responsibilities and a set
of formal rules and procedures that enable it, in competition with the actions of
the member states, to have considerable influence in the design of negotiations.
The structural dynamics are so well established that the SEA can be perceived,
in its general features, to be the result of an ongoing process of constitutional
adjustment: the organization develops a set of new rules in order to promote
global integration in a way that is quite consistent with the aim of the SEA-
to advance European union. However, parties to the process may take extra
initiatives and develop increased influence. Indeed, units within the EC, partic-
ularly the European Parliament (EP), came to play pivotal roles because they
were able to find ways to avoid the failures of the past, particularly the problem
of national parliaments thwarting their efforts.
Each of the three major EC institutions-the Council of Ministers, the
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Commission, and the EP-has a clearly defined role in the ongoing work of the
EC and in major negotiations that occur. However, each part also has its own
goals, agenda, and modes of operating, which influence the course of negotia-
tions. The EP, although its formal role is marginal, came to play an active role
in the SEA process and to enhance its own influence in future negotiations. It
could do so because it had access to specific information from its Institutional
Affairs Committee, knew the rules and procedures intimately, had a well-
developed strategy of keeping itself involved, and had cultivated commitments
from key actors like Italy. Because of its formal position, it knew from experience
what had to be different in the SEA negotiations.
The EC also has rules and procedures in place that affect the negotiation.
Most critical are the voting procedures, which push the organization to a slow
but consensual approach in resolving differences. These procedures were so in-
stitutionalized that, when the Italian Council presidency tried to set them aside
in the interests of moving ahead, several governments pressed to continue accord-
ing to the usual practices. However, when these procedures proved cumbersome
later, they were altered.
In contrast, the GATT secretariat is considerably smaller than the EC
institutions and lacks a well-defined structure of roles and responsibilities. As a
result, it has difficulty taking control of a process in order to move it toward a
particular end. The deadlock that lasted several years on agricultural issues illus-
trates the relative weakness of the secretariat when facing the conflictual attitudes
of the United States and the EC. In the Uruguay Round there was evidence of
the fluidity of organization that marks these negotiations. Individual constituent
nations have considerable discretion in forming ad hoc groups, commissions, and
temporary organizations that bypass the secretariat. In marked contrast, the EC
has a much more formal, institutionalized, and well-tried method of handling
processes.
Culture. The existence of a shared organizational culture can aid negoti-
ations in a number of ways. All negotiations in the EC take place against a back-
ground of a shared culture of problem solving; when members come to negotiate,
others interpret their opening positions and tactics with a shared commitment
to problem solving in mind. Aspects of this culture can interfere with efficient
decision making by leading to lengthy deliberations in which action is deferred.
In the SEA case, knowledge of the problematic aspect of this culture, the lack of
an overarching European vision, led the EP to push for different kinds of voting
procedures.
The dominant culture within GATT does not appear to carry many, if
any, integrative values. It is not as a component of GATT that a party intervenes,
but as a state exclusively concerned with its own interests. The existing structure
is an arena where diverging interests confront each other rather than a place
where everyone contributes to the building up of a common destiny. As a con-
sequence the organizational culture is quite competitive.
Culture is also important in another way. Both organizations face, to some
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degree, the challenge of working across diverse national cultures. Absent a shared
culture, the kinds of assumptions that are critical to interpreting the actions of
others are not available to negotiators. The possibility of misunderstanding and
escalation is exacerbated. In GATT, the twenty, later fifty, key countries saw it
as one of their challenges to try to develop a shared perspective on the issues so
that productive negotiations could occur. Within the EC, half of the countries
were founding members of the Common Market in 1957 and so have been devel-
oping something of a shared organization culture for quite a while. Members
know how to interpret the tactics of others and develop their own approaches
accordingly. Cross-cultural communications become important, however, in the
relationship with the United Kingdom, which did not have this shared history.
Indeed, one of the ways one can understand some of the problems in integrating
the United Kingdom into the EC is by noticing that an existing cultural coalition
contributed to the United Kingdom's isolation, which led to a potential threat
to proceed without the British.
Goals. Both organizations have multiple constituencies and stakeholders,
each of which has both shared and divergent goals. The degree to which consis-
tency is achieved differs between the two organizations and begins to explain why
one is better able to take concerted action. The EC is a goal-directed organization
whose aim is to advance European integration. Within the EC, particular units
have their own subgoals, specifically the EP. However, its goals to get an equal
voice for itself and to enhance its influence worked to promote the achievement
of the overall goal of the SEA. Furthermore, it had, based on its past experiences
and knowledge of the informal organization, a lobbying strategy to do so.
In contrast, GATT has a number of goals that stem from the different
functions that negotiations might serve in the international trading system.
These goals include revising the international trading regime, handling a
number of specific issues concerning market access and national autonomy, and
keeping the process moving. There is nothing inherently inconsistent in these
goals. However, inconsistency can become an issue in at least two ways. The first
is that not all the players place the same value on each of the goals. As a result
each player pursues a differentiated strategy that makes some of the goals more
prominent to one group of players and other goals to other players. A second way
inconsistency becomes an issue is when multiple parties not only pursue different
objectives but, because of cultural and other differences, perceive even similar
goals in different ways. What constitutes market access, for example, differs de-
pending on whether one consults the United States or Brazil, among others.
These differences mean that parties frame the issues differently and pursue sim-
ilar goals that are in reality at odds with each other. In the absence of shared
goals, progress often proves elusive. The picture that emerges from the Uruguay
Round is one of disjointed bursts of activity but little progress.
Predicted Patterns of Negotiation. Differences in organizational struc-
ture-particularly the degree to which the organization (and its subparts) is
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poised to act, has a unifying culture, and has overall subunit goals that are
mutually supporting-will lead to quite different patterns of negotiation. GATT
is a coalition structure with loose integrative mechanisms, a weak hierarchy, and
a mosaic of cultures. It constantly struggles to find a structure to deal with its
conflicts over procedure and substance. It does not operate as an autonomous
organization; therefore, in the Uruguay Round individual members pursued their
interests without regard for the whole. It deals with complexity by dividing tasks,
assigning them to other organizations, and attending to the issues in a sequential
and segmented manner. Although this information-processing approach is char-
acteristic of many organizations, it requires elaborate integrative mechanisms in
order to achieve some unity of purpose (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). This kind
of structure tends to lead to negotiations that resemble a coalitional game in
which each party (or group of parties) is out for itself. Indeed, negotiations in
the Uruguay Round appeared to be largely distributive.
The EC has a formal organizational structure in which roles and respon-
sibilities are defined. Indeed, under ordinary circumstances, the Commission
would initiate negotiations. However, the SEA was the initiative of the EP, which
saw an opportunity for potentially advancing its own interests while moving the
overall aims of the EC ahead. An astute group can use a shared organizational
culture and a well-developed informal organization to move its agenda along.
Interactions within the EC are of a cooperative nature even if, for tactical reasons,
one party initially adopts an oppositional attitude. Such an organization has a
true propensity to generate package deals and integrative bargaining. The proce-
dures for negotiating differences are codified and promote problem solving.
Given this structure, the culture of this organization, and its goals, it was able
to design a variant of traditional negotiation that suited the challenges presented
by the SEA process.
Decision Making
Both organizations, GATT and the EC, have a decision-making system that aims
at producing legislation. The organizational procedures designed by the EC pro-
vide ways of accelerating European integration by facilitating decision making.
The principle of weighted majority voting in some instances is an example of
such a procedure, but often current practice still aims at reaching consensus
through negotiation. This process demonstrates the ability of the organization to
reconcile two somehow conflicting goals: the common concern for taking into
account the particular position of any state and the need for global efficiency.
Both GATT and the EC had to manage information-processing and decision-
making procedures during prenegotiations and then during the negotiations
proper. In the Uruguay Round, specialized organizations, such as the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the U.S.-Canada Na-
tional Studies, and the Australian Bureau of Agricultural Economics, gathered
information and performed technical analyses for the larger organization. This
procedure had two effects. First, these organizations provided frameworks that
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guided the negotiations on these issues and moved the negotiations forward.
Second, the countries that initiated these efforts benefited because the frameworks
enhanced the capacity of the organization to deal with complexity, a capacity it
did not already have (Crozier, 1964).
Complexity arises from the number of actors, the great variety of interests
at stake, the many variables involved in the negotiation process, and the number
of issues. To deal with this complexity in the Uruguay Round, negotiations were
conducted, by compartmentalizing the issues and by assigning them to different
negotiating groups. Dividing the issues among fifteen negotiating groups not
only reduced the number of interests at stake and the number of variables in-
volved but also reduced the number of actors within each group because each
country had interests in only a subset of issues and therefore could limit its
participation. In the context of multilateral negotiations, managing complexity
means dealing with information and issues primarily by segmenting information
processing and decision making.
In the SEA negotiations, the EP directed the process even though it lacked
the formal mandate to do so. Early in the process, the EP developed a strategy
of cooperation that allowed it to participate. Its clear agenda to expand its role
and its strategy of allying itself with Italy allowed it to influence decision making.
It managed the agenda in such a way that expedient, rather than optimal, out-
comes could be achieved. It easily dropped issues that lacked widespread support.
Under the informal influence of the EP, decision making led, as an outcome, to
a more integrative approach to negotiation than had previously existed.
From this comparison, it is clear that in any international, multilateral
negotiation, organizations will have to deal with significant issues of structure
and culture. The decisions that are made on this score seem to depend on how
the organizations manage complexity in both a structural and an information-
processing sense. Furthermore, in order to keep the process going, the rules of
the game will be continually modified in either a formal or a tacit manner.
Actors in organizations manage decision making strategically for their
own political ends. In the negotiation cases, for example, key players produced
new information to make their goals more prominent and so get more leverage
on the process. One of these activities was rumor management. The EP, which
had no formal role, was an important actor in the SEA prenegotiations. It acted
not solely because of its interest in the SEA process but because it saw that doing
so would allow it to gain power in other dealings. The situation in GATT was
different. In an effort to find some common ground, the executive director tried
with the secretariat to formulate an agreement that he would issue. However, his
weak position, among other factors, meant that his effort to control decision
making was rebuffed.
Both GATT and the EC found that existing decision-making structures
proved inadequate for the kinds of innovative negotiations that were required.
The parties in the Uruguay Round made use of a number of ad hoc and secretive
groups to carry out different types of work. In the face of GATT procedures and
pressures from India and Brazil, it was impossible to bring up the trade issues
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on services. The United States had overlapping membership in GATT and in the
GECD and used this boundary role to commission the GECD to perform the
technical analyses on trade in services. The GECD had the technical expertise to
carry out such a task and to produce a comprehensive framework for interissue
links. Likewise the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) was formed because
existing procedures would have proved too slow and cumbersome.
The parties also went outside the existing structures to increase their lev-
erage and position. A restricted group of twenty key countries constituted them-
selves a secret working group to deal with some of the political aspects they might
face during the Uruguay Round. International multilateral negotiations require
considerable creativity and innovation, and existing structures are generally not
appropriate to meet this challenge. Thus, organizations develop new structures
on either a formal or an ad hoc basis. For each party, a major part of prenego-
tiation seems to involve altering some of the existing coalitional relationships in
order to modify the structures of power and to affect those external elements that
act as a constraint on strategy.
The parties have options about the structures or settings in which to con-
duct the negotiations. Parties try to operate in the settings in which they think
they will be most powerful. In the Uruguay Round, the United States was rel-
atively powerless in the traditional setting because of the consensus requirement
and the opposition of some influential countries such as Brazil and India. So the
United States shifted the negotiations into an extraordinary meeting of the Con-
tracting Parties. To determine the organization of such a technical meeting, an
absolute majority was not required. The choice of structure for negotiation is a
function, therefore, of both rational and political analyses. Parties play out their
strategies within the structures and play with the structures according to their
strategies.
Conflict Resolution
Managing conflict through mediation occurred in both negotiations. However,
the function took on different forms in the two settings. During the Uruguay
Round, mediation was more of an ad hoc function performed by different groups
as they saw the need arise. Within the Cairns group, Australia mediated in order
to keep the coalition together. Similarly, the de la Paix group, in addition to
operating as a supercommittee, also mediated between the United States and
Third World dissidents. However, in GATT, conflict management is based on
widely improvised procedures that result in highly questionable efficiency if one
considers, for instance, the protracted deadlock on agricultural issues.
In the context of the EC and therefore in the SEA negotiations, mediation
was more institutionalized in the roles of the actors. Informal practices in past
bargaining fostered mediation as a means to find consensus with the Commission
traditionally playing the role of mediator. As there was more than one candidate
(the Commission, Italy, the Luxembourg presidency, the Dutch presidency) to act
as an honest broker in the SEA negotiations, it seems that the capacity to generate
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this function truly belonged to the culture of the organization. In addition, cer-
tain individuals developed reputations that enabled them to work as mediators.
James Dooge played this role during the early rounds of the SEA negotiations.
These distinctions between mediation as a function and as a role reflect
differences in the structure and size of these organizations and in the requirements
of negotiation. The Uruguay Round, because of its coalitional structure, required
the opportunistic use of mediation to move the negotiations along. In the EC,
mediation roles are more institutionalized at both the organization and individ-
uallevels. Thus, mediators were in place to help during the SEA negotiations.
Patterns of Negotiations. Contrasting patterns of negotiations lead to dif-
ferences in how one judges performance. The parties to the Uruguay Round
lacked organizational cohesiveness and so tended to act as individual parties.
Thus, they have only their own self-interest on which to gauge the negotiations.
The preference for problem solving and consensus evident in the SEA reflects the
long-term commitment of the member states. Thus, although the parties judge
the SEA negotiation according to the way it affected their national self-interest,
they are also concerned with its impact on the long-term relationships among the
parties. Given the long-term goals of the EC, every negotiation becomes an op-
portunity for building trust and for learning from the experience. These lessons
then are incorporated into the policies and culture of the organization.
It is clear that the two organizations-GATT and the EC-conduct differ-
ent types of negotiations under their aegis. But one can ask whether the patterns
in the negotiation contribute to the evolution of different organizational types.
One issue involved here is the nature of the interaction between the structure of
the negotiations and the associated organization. Do plurilateral negotiations,
such as the SEA negotiation, facilitate the development of an organizational
structure that in turn, and in subsequent negotiations, leads to a problem-solving
form of negotiation? By way of contrast, do multilateral negotiations, like the
Uruguay Round, because of their size and cultural diversity, not contribute to the
establishment of stable and efficient structures? And does this type of negotiation
explain, in part, why the organizations that develop find it difficult to influence
the negotiations and channel the natural coalitional tendencies into other forms?
These questions, as well as other relationships between organizational structure
and form and negotiation process and outcomes, certainly merit empirical
inquiry.
Conclusion
Negotiation is the organization in motion. By examining the interaction between
negotiation and organization, we become aware that the Uruguay Round and the
SEA negotiations cannot be viewed simply as negotiation encounters. They are
negotiation processes that are set and managed by organizations. As such they
replicate characteristics of the mother organizations that house them. Thus, the
structure of the organization, its culture, modes of decision making, and ap-
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proaches to managing conflict influence each particular negotiation and in turn
are affected by them.
These multiparty negotiations can be seen as organizational subsystems.
As a consequence the processes they go through can be explained by concepts
drawn from organization theory. In this sense organization theory can, as well,
explain why the SEA negotiations resulted in agreement and why the Uruguay
Round became deadlocked. It is impossible to understand these different out-
comes without reference to the efforts of organizational actors to control the
process.
At the same time, these interactions are dynamic-that is, what occurs in
the negotiation will affect the organization throughout a process of institution-
alization and learning. As parties negotiate, those strategies that prove to be
effective become apart of the organization's repertoire (Zucker, 1977). Organiza-
tions need to be structured to learn from experience. The structural model sug-
gests that knowledge can be accumulated and processes institutionalized. The
actionist approach is characterized by a much looser degree of institutionalization
and a weaker structure. Although individuals may learn, the very fluidity of the
organization means that the actors change and so it is difficult to accumulate
knowledge. For these reasons, the learning from one negotiation to another is
likely to be incomplete, and information about process and substance is likely to
be lost from one negotiation to another.
The organization influences the negotiation at another level. Organiza-
tions that fail to institutionalize their process and treat each negotiation de novo
will implicitly tend to structure these proceedings as encounters. Encounters
involve strangers who have a more or less fleeting relationship with each other
(Goffman, 1959). Negotiations in encounters tend to follow a competitive track
(Pruitt, 1981). In contrast, in integrated negotiations the parties have many strong
ties that bind them together in a shared history and future relationship (Grano-
vetter, 1973). These negotiations tend to follow a coordinative track and to be
associated with those organizations that have been able to institutionalize nego-
tiation processes and learn from round to round.
The environment in which negotiations take place also has a potentially
strong impact on the process. Because negotiations tend to replicate, at least at
the symbolic level, the key features of the environment, an organization needs to
transform and channel the features of the environment toward productive ends.
To the degree that an organization develops a structure for interaction and sys-
tems and procedures for handling routine and unexpected contingencies, and can
learn from experience and institutionalize that learning, it can focus the nego-
tiations on the tasks at hand.
When negotiations occur under the auspices of generally weak convening
organizations, the process is not insulated or buffered from its environment
(Thompson, 1967). In these situations, one can expect that the existing relation-
ships and antagonisms among the parties will be acted out in the negotiations.
Thus, in many multilateral negotiations the parties seem to replicate unproduc-
tive aspects of their relationship. Although substantive and procedural issues are
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ostensibly being negotiated, the negotiation forum becomes an arena for open
confrontation. Indeed, antagonisms may actually increase at the bargaining table
because the parties feel insulated by the rules of the negotiation game from the
risks of their actions. Interaction dynamics can appear as a symbolic substitute
for war, where the outcome is not the destruction of the other but the mainte-
nance of the status quo ante. When negotiations take on this kind of character,
the parties do not seek a common satisfactory agreement. Rather, their aim may
be to make things difficult for their adversaries, achieving their end by denying
the others.
Within the EC, there seems to be a unity between negotiation at the actual
and the symbolic levels. Hence, the likelihood of agreement, despite the difficulty
of particular issues, will always be high. The Uruguay Round, however, does not
have the same convergence. Differentiation between the actual and the symbolic
levels means that negotiations can become a forum for escalating hostilities rather
than for the settling of differences. Under these circumstances achieving satisfac-
tory outcomes is unlikely, if not impossible. This kind of situation may result
in a "negotiated symbolic disorder," where international multilateral negotia-
tions become a hindrance, not a contributor, to the global order.
We have used this chapter to begin to sketch out ways in which an orga-
nizational perspective can contribute to understanding international multilateral
negotiations and improving them. It is clear that this perspective calls attention
to facets of negotiation that have not been the subject of much serious study.
Additional attention and inquiry need to be directed at the organizations under
whose auspices these negotiations are convened, for these organization have the
potential to channel and direct the negotiations so that nations can put aside their
other agendas and focus on the substantive tasks at hand. Organization theory
has much to contribute to the kinds of structures we might consider building in
order to improve the practice of multilateral negotiation.
Chapter 6
Small Group Theory
Forming Consensus Through Group Processes
Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Walter C. Swap (USA)
The following opening passage from one of the most influential book-length
treatments of group dynamics (Cartwright and Zander, 1960, p. 3) captures both
the ubiquity and importance of the group in human activity:
If it were possible for the overworked hypothetical man from Mars
to take a fresh view of the people of Earth, he would probably be
impressed by the amount of time they spend doing things together
in groups.... He would see that much of the work of the world is
carried out by people who perform their activities in close interde-
pendence within relatively enduring associations.... [He] might be
puzzled why so many people spend so much time in little groups
talking, planning, and being "in conference." Surely he would con-
clude that if he wanted to understand much about what is happen-
ing on Earth he would have to examine rather carefully the ways
in which groups form, function, and dissolve.
As experimental social psychologists, we have learned that any form of social
behavior-of which multilateral negotiation is surely a cardinal example-can be
understood only if one takes into account the behavior of each individual in the
relationship, the influence each person exerts on others, as well as the particular
structural or organizational context in which the relationship is embedded.
When the relationship consists of two or more people who are interde-
pendent in some way and who share at least a minimal sense of identity as
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members of the same social arrangement, then (consistent with the definition
advanced by Swap, 1984, pp. 16-17) we say that a group exists. A small group,
in turn, ranges in size from three to twenty. The term small is used to distinguish
this configuration from one (for example, the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea) in which there are dozens, even hundreds, of participants. Even
such an arrangement, however, can work only if the dozens or hundreds of par-
ticipants arrange themselves in a series of subgroups, task groups, and commit-
tees that function naturally as small groups.
The concern with groups has been central to social psychology, and re-
search since the 1940s has resulted in a body of findings applicable to a wide range
of social settings.! In the spirit of this book's Rashomon-like intellectual exper-
iment, it is our contention that the small group perspective can be brought to
bear on multilateral negotiation. Indeed, although it may be useful to consider
game theory, decision theory, and leadership, organizational, and coalition ap-
proaches to multilateral negotiation, the fact remains that the actual multilateral
negotiation process during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the negotiations on the Single European Act
(SEA) in the European Communities (EC) occurred within a small group context.
To understand-really understand-that process and the decisions toward which
that process leads, one must grasp the essential dynamics of small group
interaction.
Along with Chapter Eight in this book, on leadership (a topic that has
long been an essential component of small group research), this chapter is dis-
tinctive in its emphasis on process in multilateral negotiation. As other chapters
document, a structural approach may be useful in understanding how groups
respond to organizational demands or the rational decision rules of game theory
or decision theory. But once we acknowledge that these groups are made up of
individual actors, interacting in face-to-face encounters, we have moved squarely
into the domain of social psychology. Small group research can inform us about
the rules governing these interactions, how the process can be facilitated, and how
pathologies may emerge to subvert effective decision making. This emphasis on
process is the particular strength of the small group approach.
For example, an inherent tension exists in many small groups, particularly
those that are highly cohesive. On the one hand, there is a need for fresh, inter-
esting ideas that may appear to be obstructive but that contribute to the group's
ability to appraise alternatives fully. On the other hand, there is a need to reach
consensus in groups, to make the decisions necessary to complete the group's
work. This tension, and the way in which it is managed by the group's mem-
bership, helps determine the difference between an effective and an ineffective
group process.
This chapter is organized into five parts. We begin by outlining some
central concepts in small group theory, as it has been promulgated by sociologists
and social psychologists since the 1940s. We then turn to a selective application
of small group theory to the SEA negotiations and to the Uruguay Round; in
each case we attempt to document a few of the ways in which small group theory
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can be used to explain why the negotiations followed the course they did. We
close the chapter by comparing the two case studies and then reflecting on several
prescriptive lessons for multilateral negotiation as these build on small group
theory and are informed by practice.
Some Key Ideas from Small Group Theory
Most groups come together because of some joint task that the members wish to
perform; this is certainly the case for groups that engage in multilateral nego-
tiation. As a way of summarizing work in the area, we focus first on the condi-
tions that facilitate effective task performance in groups, then turn to the
conditions that impede such work.
Conditions Facilitating Effective Task Performance
Although many conditions facilitate effective task performance, four are of par-
ticular prominence: leadership, group composition, group history, and group
cohesiveness.
Leadership. As Chapter Eight indicates, leadership can make the difference
between a group that works well and one that fails miserably in the completion
of its chosen task. Effective leadership, however, can occur only if the group
tolerates it; expressed another way, an effective leader is empowered by the group's
members, even as those members are empowered by an effective leader.
Leadership can emerge from within the group, as when a particularly
competent, powerful, or likable member moves up through the ranks (for exam-
ple, Australia's leadership of the Cairns group); or leaders can be appointed from
without (for example, the European Council presidency). Either way, research on
leadership indicates that effectiveness is determined by the leader's ability to
adjust his or her style to the particular task demands of the group. Years ago,
Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939) demonstrated the existence of two dramatically
different leadership styles: autocratic and democratic. The autocratic leader im-
poses decisions on the group because of greater strength and resources: "Do what
I ask of you:' this leader asserts, "because I am stronger, know better than you
what needs to be done, and have a right to make these demands of you." In
contrast, the democratic leader consults with the group members, canvasses opin-
ions and expertise, remains open to new ideas, and makes sure that the group does
not move ahead without some measure of consensus.
Although the democratic leadership style may appear preferable to its
more autocratic counterpart, research has indicated the importance of a match
between leadership and the group situation (Fiedler, 1967). When the group's task
is extremely simple (this will rarely be the case in multilateral negotiation), an
autocratic leadership style may prove more effective; if the task is to shovel a hole
in the ground as quickly as possible, the group has little to discuss. However,
when the group's task requires analysis of competing alternatives and evaluation
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of these in relation to some optimal decision, then a democratic style proves more
effective.
In addition to understanding leadership style, it is important to under-
stand leadership roles. Almost any group, as part of its work, is likely to require
the emergence of individuals who perform rather different functions or provide
different services to the group. As documented by Bales (1950), at least two kinds
of leaders tend to emerge from a group: a task leader, whose self-appointed job
is to keep the membership oriented toward the completion of its work; and a
socioemotional leader, whose responsibility is to ensure that group members are
reasonably satisfied with the process by which the group is functioning. Both
roles are necessary if a group is to function effectively, and they almost always
tend to emerge from within the rank-and-file of the group's membership. Only
rarely does a single individual occupy both roles, and Bales considers such people
to be "great leaders"-people who can accomplish the group's mission effectively
while maintaining the deep affection of the led.
Group Composition. This term refers, most generally, to the identity of
the members in relation to any number of attributes. Among the most important
is the degree to which members may be characterized as homogeneous or heter-
ogeneous. Social psychological research indicates that homogeneous groups
(those whose members have been selected or happen to be highly similar in their
background, skills, orientation) tend to perform better than more heterogeneous,
diverse groups when the group task is relatively simple and straightforward; if
an aspect of the GATT negotiations required analysis of plans for implementing
a relatively simple economic scheme, then a group of economists might be best
positioned to move this agenda forward.
If, however, the group's work requires brainstorming new and unusual
ideas or the invention of options without deciding on anyone of them, then
membership diversity is likely to be a virtue, not a liability; to wit, a group that
is stuck in a conflictual impasse and is looking for as many ideas as possible for
breaking out of this deadlock and moving toward settlement of the conflict may
be served best by allowing as many different viewpoints to be aired as possible.
Although a group whose members are heterogeneous is less likely to reach agree-
ment than a more homogeneous group, if and when agreement is reached, it is
more likely to be persuasive to one and all, hence more likely to endure.
As we will argue subsequently in our discussion of the Uruguay Round
negotiations, a number of small groups came into existence precisely because they
shared some mix of similarity and diversity. Witness the Cairns group in this
regard; it consisted of a heterogeneous cluster of developed and developing na-
tions, all of whom shared a common interest in creating a certain kind of agree-
ment. To this end, the members of the Cairns group formed a coalition whose
purpose was to move toward the creation of a larger consensus (Higgott and
Cooper, 1990).
Group History. Do group members know each other from prior work? Or
have they been convened for the first time? Are they likely to work together again?
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Groups whose members have a history of working together (and who may an-
ticipate doing so in the future) are likely to be more effective than those that do
not have such a history but only if their prior history has been one of produc-
tivity. Groups whose members have a long history of animosity and antagonism
may find they are so concerned about matters of precedent (in particular, the
possibility that other group members will attempt to take advantage of them
because of some previous alleged offense) that they are hindered from working
effectively. If the previous acquaintance and work are generally positive however,
then such acquaintance should facilitate the completion of work in the present
round. Furthermore, groups evolve over time, and goals may shift as alliances
change or strengthen. As we shall see, in the SEA negotiations, changes in group
history made it possible for crucial adjustments in voting rules to be introduced;
these adjustments, in turn, resulted in important shifts in group dynamics and
group effectiveness.
A corollary of group history is the possibility (witness the GATT nego-
tiations in this regard) that the group will have begun its work in some previous
incarnation, then have several important items on the agenda left incomplete.
Such items carryover to future rounds of the group's work; tasks that have not
yet been completed will be remembered better and will be more motivating than
those already finished (the so-called Zeigarnik effect).
Group Cohesiveness. Groups whose members are united in some common
purpose, or who have a strong esprit de corps, are more likely to work effectively
than less cohesive groups. Group cohesiveness can spring from one or more of
several sources, including a long history of positive relations among group
members, and consequent mutual trust and affection; the presence of a strong
leader, someone who has the personal appeal or charisma necessary to bind the
group's members to a common purpose; or the existence of some sort of external
threat to the survival of the group, some danger from without that leads the
members to band together. The greater a group's cohesiveness, the greater its
tendency to function in unison and to experience relatively little conflict, and for
members to believe that they are each part of a transcendent enterprise.
One of the things that an effective leader can do to create this sense of
"transcendence" is to introduce a "superordinate goal" (Sherif and Sherif, 1953),
a group objective that bridges existing bases of conflict or competition in order
to reach the goal of increased cooperation. 2 The deliberate introduction of such
a superordinate goal increases group cohesiveness. Note that a similar effect is
likely to result from the emergence of an external threat to the group's welfare
or survival.
In summary, if one wishes to enhance the task effectiveness of a group, one
can do so by modifying the group's leadership, membership composition, his-
tory, or cohesiveness-alone or in combination. Each factor varies in relation to
the others and in relation to the particular context in which group decision
making transpires.
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Obviously, the absence of any of the conditions for group effectiveness, as de-
scribed above, impedes the group's ability to accomplish its objectives. In addi-
tion, three factors hinder the group's work: the existence of blocking coalitions,
the presence of deviates, and pressures toward conformity.
Blocking Coalitions. As mentioned earlier, some coalitions of two or more
group members may come into existence in order to help forge consensus; if three,
four, eight, or ten group members can agree on the wisdom of a particular course
of action, then perhaps they, in turn, can persuade others. But in addition to these
consensus-building coalitions, there are also blocking coalitions, whose purpose
is to unify a subset of the membership around the common objective of opposing
the prevailing wisdom, blocking efforts to commit the group to a particular
course of action. During the Uruguay Round, for example, India and Brazil
repeatedly attempted to form a coalition whose purpose was to prevent the emerg-
ing majority from having its way. Blocking coalitions may be viewed as construc-
tive or destructive, depending on one's goals; proponents of a stronger European
Parliament (EP) rejoiced when it enlisted the support of Italy as a blocking
partner.
Deviates. If two or more opponents to a particular group recommendation
or action can be construed as a "social movement," then a single opponent is a
"deviate." This individual refuses to go along with the group philosophy or plan
of action; like the lone dissident juror portrayed by Henry Fonda in the film
Twelve Angry Men, these individuals stand up for what they believe-and, in so
doing, interfere with the group's ability to move forward. The United Kingdom
played this role during the SEA negotiations. In fact, some of the decision rules
in the EC were changed from unanimity to majority in order to avoid the neces-
sity of enlisting British support.
When a deviate exists, typically the majority (as well as the group's lead-
ership) attempts to take several sequential steps. First, the group tires to persuade
the deviate to come around to the majority position, to enter the warm confines
of the group, to accept the group's protective embrace (in exchange for recanting);
second, if and when efforts at persuasion fail, the group moves to isolate, ostrac-
ize, or forcibly extrude the deviate: "If you won't join us, then to hell with you!"
Conformity Pressure. It was argued earlier that highly cohesive groups are
often able to function more effectively than their more dissident counterparts.
Offsetting this virtue is the possibility that cohesive groups will be so eager to
instill uniformity of opinion and purpose that they apply undue pressure on
dissidents to conform to the group's agenda (Asch, 1952). "Unless you do our
bidding," the membership implies, "we will come to regard you as someone
unworthy of our support and affection." Under conditions of conformity, dissent-
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ing points of view are likely to be suppressed in favor of unanimity. The result,
too often, is a decision based more on expediency than on wisdom. 3
Janis (1982) has described at length a particular variation on the theme of
conformity in his discussion of the phenomenon of "groupthink." Patterned after
some of the ideas in George Orwell's 1984, groupthink is a pattern of ineffective,
faulty group decision making that results from excessive cohesiveness. As a result
of this cohesiveness, private doubts about the wisdom or efficacy of a particular
recommendation are suppressed in favor of what is believed to be the group
"will." As illustrations of groupthink in action, Janis offers the 1961 decision by
the U.S. government to support the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs (a
decision that led to an overwhelming defeat at the hands of Fidel Castro) and the
U.S. decision to move north of the 38th parallel in the Korean War (thereby
bringing the Chinese into the conflict).
In summary, groups that function effectively are likely to adjust them-
selves to the particular task demands at hand. Simple tasks can be completed best
by yielding to a common group purpose, setting aside private reservations, and
simply getting on with it-perhaps under a so-called autocratic leader who in-
dicates precisely which group member is to complete which piece of the overall
task. More complex tasks, however, of the kind that most multilateral exchanges
are likely to entail, requires openness to diverse viewpoints, group cohesiveness
(but not at the expense of suppressing differences of opinion), and leadership that
encourages heterogeneity of opinion and the development of decisions based on
consensus rather than imposition of the leader's unilateral wishes.
The SEA Negotiations
The process leading to ratification of the SEA provides ample material for dem-
onstrating the importance of small group theory for explaining complex mul-
tilateral processes (Lodge, 1986a; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1992). We begin by
stating the obvious: the processes that culminated in the ratification of SEA
occurred in groups of varying size, power, and complexity. Nearly a score of
acronyms for various groups pepper the pages of Chapter One. These groups may
be analyzed on the basis of the factors that characterize all groups: formal and
emergent leadership, composition, evolution over time, cohesiveness, coalition
formation, pressures toward conformity, and treatment of deviates-all central
components of the small group approach. Lodge has touched on each of these
factors, albeit to varying degrees, in her case history in Chapter One. We will
illustrate the utility of our approach by considering several of the most significant
of these factors. In so doing, we hope to shed some light on the course of events
characterizing the movement toward unity.
Group Evolution: Changes in Group Identity
As any group member can attest, the reasons for joining a group are seldom
identical to the reasons for remaining in it. A reading group may evolve into a
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political action or personal support group. Similarly, the reasons for participat-
ing in the EC have changed over time, an these changes have been reflected in
the rules governing the way its members make decisions. A voting rule requiring
unanimity was essential in the early stages of the EC to assuage fears of threats
to national sovereignty; it permitted each state to know with certainty that no
agreement could be reached unless it gave its consent. The rule of unanimity also
embodied an ideal state toward which the EC could aspire: a single community
of nations in which members decide on any course of action through persuasion
rather than coercion.
As any group matures, reservations about its continued viability begin to
wane, and the group agenda is likely to shift accordingly. Again, witness the SEA
talks. As the deadline of 1992, once comfortably in the future, began to loom
large, and as general concerns about sovereignty were reduced to the opposition
of one or two key dissenters, it became necessary to reconsider the way in which
decisions were made. The original system, as described by Lodge, for example,
included avoidance of divisive behavior that led to Council presidents' avoiding
putting proposals to the vote. The effect was nondecision and procrastination.
It was not unusual for several years to elapse before a proposal got adopted.
Eventually, unanimity was selectively replaced by majority rule; for example, in
the arena of environmental issues, unanimity is still required in defining aims
and principles, while majority rule applies to the implementation of specific
environmental measures.
Pressures from various sources to change the voting rules from unanimity
to majority would not have been possible, much less successful, had there not
been accompanying changes in group identity. The passage of time no doubt
assured many member states that although national sovereignty remains impor-
tant, identification with the concept of a single European community is also
crucial. As described by Lodge, pro-European Union stands have come to rep-
resent the high ground, with stronger moral justification than "mere" national-
ism. Indeed, the idea of a unified Europe has begun to attain the status of a
superordinate goal, one that can be used to heighten group cohesiveness and
provide leverage for group leaders to attain their goals. The initial failure of
Denmark to ratify the Maastricht Treaty, coupled with continuing British am-
bivalence and the marginal ratification by France, points again to the tension
between pressures toward consensus and tolerance of differences. Clearly, the
identity of the EC continues to change in response to this most recent challenge
to its very survival.
Treatment of Deviates
Once group members began considering the move from unanimity, policy dis-
senters could be dealt with much more effectively than was possible before. One
of the best documented findings in small group research is that when unanimity
is required, the group's undivided attention becomes focused on the deviate in
an effort to bring this individual around to the prevailing point of view. With
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majority voting schemes, however, the attention enjoyed by a deviate is short-
lived. A recalcitrant member is soon ignored or, if necessary, threatened with
expulsion.
This threat of "go along or go alone" was implicit in the European Coun-
cil's deliberations: "a carefully managed strategy evolved of allowing states to
isolate themselves from the wishes of the majority at their peril" (Chapter One).
The United Kingdom was a frequent target of this threat; Lodge describes Bri-
tain's frequent opposition as "irrelevant," and the threat of isolation served to
push the country, kicking and screaming, toward the new venture. Denmark is
the latest target. Of course, such pressures toward consensus, borne of general
adherence to a superordinate goal, may deter the group from thoughtfully con-
sidering legitimate, constructive objections raised by deviates.
Strategies of Empowerment
One of the surprising actors in the drive toward union was the EP. The actions
of the EP offer a classic illustration of a successful low-power influence strategy
at work; the EP evolved from a body to be "consulted" to a group that could push
hard for a central role in the adoption of reforms. Groups or individuals with
high vested power are able to accomplish their goals through more or less
straightforward social influence tactics such as threats and promises. Those lack-
ing power must navigate a far less direct route; essentially, they must persuade
their more powerful counterparts that their cause is just and merits a change in
rules. Such appeals must be nonrancorous (to avoid alienating other parties),
must be based on a deep knowledge of other parties in the process, and generally
must appeal to norms of fairness and legitimacy.
The process by which the EP attempted to attain power forms a centerpiece
of the case presented in Chapter One. The EP appear to have had strong, savvy,
innovative leadership. Pierre Pflimlin and Altiero Spinelli understood the polit-
ical process (including engaging Italy in a blocking coalition), realized the im-
portance of involving Fran~oisMitterrand, lobbied effectively (with, for example,
labor and business elites, governments, and opinion leaders), and were able to
represent the ideal of unity from the perspective of a large, representative, trans-
national body. This combination of political skill, an image of legitimacy, and
espousal of the superordinate, transnational goal of unity was successful in gain-
ing a number of significant concessions (although by no means all that had been
sought).
Emergence of Different Group Roles
Throughout the SEA talks, groups were propelled by leadership, both assigned
and seized. The exercise of leadership makes it possible for groups to go forward;
and, as described in the case study, there were ample opportunities for such
leadership to emerge. The Council presidency provided a formal opportunity for
the exercise of influence. One particularly theatrical moment must have occurred
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when the Italian Council president decided to take an unprecedented vote on
convening the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC), much to the chagrin of the
United Kingdom ("There was an uproar," Lodge reports.) This innovative tactic
subsequently served to warn other states that movement toward agreement would
not be halted by obstructionist tactics.
From Lodge's account, it appears that the two task leaders during the SEA
talks were France and Germany. At least one of them had to advocate a particular
position or policy-while neither could be actively opposed-if agreements were
to be reached. For example, we are told that Germany and France were essential
in EC bargaining-not so much that each had to support a particular initiative,
but rather that neither could actively oppose it. The third member of the big four,
Great Britain, did little to build an effective leadership role for itself and was
frequently dismissed out of hand.
Although Germany and France may have been the acknowledged task
leaders, the role of the remaining member of the big four, Italy, was more com-
plex. As "honest broker and coalition cementer" (Chapter One), Italy managed
to keep integrationist sentiments alive when the venture was threatened in 1985.
Consistently pro-Union and proactive, Italy was able to perform essential tasks
while avoiding alienating other states. The Italians went beyond Bales's notion
of "socioemotional" leader to be a "great leader." That Spinelli is referred to as
a "father of European integration" (Chapter One) is testimony to the appropri-
ateness of that label.
Effect of a Deviate's Departure on Group Functioning
The United Kingdom's role in the SEA process has been characterized by some
as obstructionist and anti-integrationist, with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
epitomizing British arrogance. No doubt her actions contributed to the frequent
isolation of Britain in the SEA negotiation process. But with the replacement of
Thatcher by John Major, an important dynamic change occurred. No longer do
the other eleven member nations have a common external threat to unite against
and to promote group cohesion. 4 With the more phlegmatic, less obstructionist
Major at the helm, internal disagreements that had been suppressed reappeared.
Specifically, France and Germany are increasingly antagonistic, as Bonn is urg-
ing delays in creating the regional central bank. At the same time, Britain is
enjoying something it had not had in Europe in some time-negotiating power.
In summary, the SEA negotiations offer a good illustration of small group
process at work. Through dynamics both at the table and away from it, the SEA
group evolved an identity, a set of decision-making rules and procedures, and a
means for addressing the problem of obstructionism that allowed it (at least for
a moment) to move forward with great effectiveness. 5
The Uruguay Round of GATT
If the SEA negotiations included a relatively small number of players represent-
ing each of the twelve European nations involved, then the Uruguay Round of
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GATT tells a very different story. The Uruguay Round appears to be far more
complex than its European counterpart because it consisted of 100 different
nations, extended back to 1947, when the first GATT meetings took place; and
focused on a great many different, highly complex issues. Indeed, in Chapter Two
Sjostedt has even dignified this distinction by referring to plurilateral versus
multilateral negotiations, where the SEA case would appear to be plurilateral
(involving relatively few players) and the GATT case, multilateral (involving
many). By implication, the key element differentiating plurilateral from multi-
lateral negotiations is complexity. Multilateral negotiations are more complex
because of the greater number of parties, issues, and perhaps a longer time frame
as well. Although we agree that increasing the number of parties to a negotiation
(from 12 to 100, for example) does lead to increased complexity, the underlying
processes are fundamentally alike. As small group theorists, we believe that any
social arrangement, no matter how large, quite naturally breaks down into
smaller groupings that allow work to be accomplished. Had all 150 or so nations
represented at the Law of the SEA negotiations insisted on meeting exclusively
in plenary session, virtually nothing would have been accomplished.
When large, variegated organizations are reduced to smaller groups (called
task forces, committees, working groups) the real work of negotiation takes place
in these far more compact and intimate gatherings. Although Sjostedt tells us that
the Uruguay negotiations were characterized by the "extensiveness and complex-
ity of the agenda as a whole," he goes on to enumerate the several dozen nego-
tiating groups that either were appointed during the Uruguay Round or evolved
because of member wishes to move (or block) a portion of the agenda. Because
of this natural tendency for large negotiations to devolve into smaller negotiating
groups, we believe that small groups formed the building blocks of the Uruguay
Round. In keeping with this view, we believe that the GATT process was influ-
enced-among other things-by four considerations: group history, external
threats, conformity pressures, and the success of the Cairns coalition.
Importance of Group History
GATT was founded in Geneva in 1947. Since then the membership was widened
and issues have proliferated, as one round of negotiations has followed another.
Each negotiating round has left unfinished items of business on the table, and
these, in turn, have had the effect of motivating the initiation of a successive
round. For example, Sjostedt points out that the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) in-
cluded agreed-upon procedures for continued postnegotiation deliberations. In
addition, he points to the many "backlog issues" that the Tokyo Round left
behind. These unresolved issues, when analyzed on the basis of group research
and analysis, would be expected to be more motivating (recall the Zeigarnik effect,
described earlier in this chapter) in shaping a subsequent agenda than those
issues that were addressed successfully and completely-or those that had not
previously been considered (for example, intellectual property rights).
Also noteworthy in this case is the generally hostile and contentious cli-
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mate that seems to have characterized much of the work in previous negotiating
rounds. As alluded to earlier, social psychological research indicates that groups
with a history of successful, collaborative work are more likely to adopt such a
style and to function effectively in the present than are groups with a history of
acrimony. A group culture of consensus-seeking develops and motivates future
behavior. The fact that the Uruguay Round (as of this writing) had not come to
a successful conclusion can be understood, in part, as a result of the influence
of a negative group history on subsequent behavior.
Motivating Effects of External Threat
After a careful reading of Chapter Two, as well as other documents on the Uru-
guay Round (for example, Higgott and Cooper, 1990; Prestowitz, Tone1son, and
Jerome, 1991; Winham, 1989; Winham and Kizer, 1990), one forms the impression
that a large group of national representatives, replete with conflicting interests
and agendas, many of whom (for example, India and Brazil) were quite reluctant
even to convene another GATT negotiation, were nevertheless thrown together
into the Uruguay Round. It is not so much that negotiators wanted to come
together or that they had a history of successful work together; rather, they were
impelled to meet.
Part of the reason for reconvening may derive from the motivating effect
of unfinished group work. In addition, negotiators at the Uruguay Round may
have been motivated by two forms of external threat. In explaining the decision
to convene the Consultative Group of 18 in June 1981, in order to plan a GATT
ministerial meeting, Sjostedt points to the key role of neoprotectionism. In the
face of this threat, a relative consensus emerged that the necessary defense of the
open, multilateral trading system required a strong manifestation in GATT at
the highest political level.
Time pressure constituted a second external threat with motivating prop-
erties. In describing the ministerial meeting at Punta del Este in September 1986,
Sjostedt points out that, although the meeting had gone on for the better part of
a week, no agreement appeared to be on the horizon. Only at the very last mo-
ment, and only after a last round of hard bargaining, could agreement be reached.
Positive Benefits of Confonnity Pressures
Earlier, we characterized conformity as a force impeding effective group work;
group members reach agreement not because it is sensible but because they wish
to garner group approval and avoid group censure. In the often chaotic environ-
ment of the Uruguay Round discussion, however, it can be argued that anything
that contributed to conformity may have also increased the chances of joint de-
cision making and goal attainment. Given the disarray and disagreement among
so many GATT members, it seems reasonable to inquire what factors contributed
to conformity with an emerging point of view.
First, recall the so-called bicycle theory of trade negotiation (Chapter
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Two). Just as a cyclist can stay upright only by continuing to pedal along,
international trade negotiations can continue only so long as the parties to the
discussions try to maintain their momentum through ongoing exchange. Unless
ways can be found to keep the conversation going, this position argues, interna-
tional trade negotiations are in danger of sliding into protectionism. So, any
passing reference (by the GATT secretariat or anyone else) to the invidious bi-
cycle theory could have had the effect of increasing pressures to conform with
plans to negotiate a new GATT in Uruguay.
Second, the decision to build into the Uruguay Round an opportunity for
midterm review, for the ostensible purpose of stocktaking and midterm adjust-
ment, may have had the beneficial effect of building greater commitment to
GATT. The mere act of convening the ministerial-level meeting in Montreal, in
December 1989, provided participating group members with the sense that their
opinions mattered, that their points of view had to be taken into account if the
process was to be an effective one. As social psychological research on motivation
in work settings has demonstrated (through the Hawthorne effect), group
members who believe their views are of interest and concern to the leadership are
more motivated and more productive than those who are not the beneficiaries of
such an approach. In general, the way to build commitment to a group process
or product is to first get one's foot in the door (Freedman and Fraser, 1966), then
extract a series of small, incremental decisions in support of the regime advocated,
and finally (using the psychology of "entrapment" among other things-see
Brockner and Rubin, 1985) persuade group members that they have too much
invested in keeping the bicycle upright to quit.
A Successful Coalition at Work
It is interesting to compare the unsuccessful efforts of the United Kingdom,
Denmark, and Greece to block efforts to move toward the SEA with the strikingly
effective work of the Cairns group during GATT. Why was one coalition so
ineffectual, while another worked so much better? Several differences are striking
in this regard. First, the Cairns group, consisting of fourteen nations, was sig-
nificantly larger than the three-nation potential blocking coalition of the SEA
talks. Although a larger group is a harder group to coordinate and manage, it
is also one in which more ideas and approaches are likely to be advanced. Second,
the Cairns group generated a great many proposals and alternatives, all pivoting
on issues of agriculture, whereas the SEA coalition was largely a "Johnny One
Note" group that perhaps came together solely for the purpose of blocking efforts
to create European unity.
Third, whereas the SEA coalition existed solely to block, the Cairns group
was oriented toward advocacy. Indeed, the Cairns group emerged to help bridge
the rift between the EC and the United States. Functioning as a go-between and
mediator of sorts, the Cairns group managed to place many ideas and approaches
on the table; in doing so, it helped to move the GATT talks forward, even if there
is as yet no conclusive agreement to report.
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Finally, note should be made of the effective leadership exercised by
Australia. Stepping into the large shoes of its coalition partner, Canada, Australia
revitalized the work of the Cairns group. Although we have no data to base this
guess on, we surmise that the three-nation blocking coalition at the SEA nego-
tiations had no such clear and effective leadership. Prime Minister Thatcher, the
obvious choice as leader of this little band of rebels, had already besmirched her
image through her rough treatment of colleagues in countless meetings. She thus
probably had little credibility as a leader, and it was not clear who could step in
to take her place.
A Comparison
There is little doubt that the SEA negotiations resulted in greater progress than
the GATT talks, as of this writing. Our analysis of the two cases suggests two
reasons for their differential success. First, in GATT the participants appear to
have been granted little autonomy; instead they were constrained by tight govern-
mental instruction; witness Chapter Three in this regard, where actors are typ-
ically identified by the country they represented rather than by name. Under these
conditions, many of the principles of group dynamics outlined in this chapter
are vitiated. Indeed, it is questionable whether we can speak of a group at all
when the participants are functioning as agents, marionettes whose strings are
pulled by players away from the table. The SEA negotiators, in contrast, were
often heads of state or, more commonly, close associates with wide-ranging power
to negotiate. It is in such face-to-face exchanges that group dynamics will likely
playa powerful, consensus-creating role.
Second, the SEA negotiations appear to have been characterized by the
presence of a clear superordinate goal that was simply not present during the
GATT talks. Representatives to the SEA talks were motivated either by the desire
for European economic union or by the fear of exclusion from such an arrange-
ment. In contrast, representatives to the Uruguay Round shared no such over-
arching concern; nor was fear of exclusion from an agreement sufficiently
powerful to drive the parties toward consensus.
Prescriptive Lessons for Multilateral Negotiation
In concluding this brief sojourn through the world of small group theory and
its relevance for multilateral negotiation, it may be useful to summarize our
analysis by indicating briefly some prescriptive lessons. We direct the following
advice to would-be organizers of a multilateral conference, regardless of its size
and agenda.
Remember to focus on process, not outcome. It is tempting to measure the
effectiveness of group work by looking at the products made or results achieved.
What small group theory, the two cases in this book, and other illustrations of
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international negOtiatIOn (see McDonald, 1990) make clear is that satisfactory
outcomes can result only if the underlying process is effective.
If process is as important as we believe, then it is essential that ways be
found to develop a group climate that encourages the open expression of ideas.
Early in the life of a group it is important that conflicting, dissenting points of
view be encouraged; to that end, we recommend forming groups that are heter-
ogeneous, thereby making it likely that many different ideas will be put on the
table. At some point, however, it becomes necessary to move beyond the creative
work of the group to a decision. At this time, a homogeneous group is more
effective than a heterogeneous group.
This move toward greater homogeneity is demonstrated by the group's
treatment of deviates. As illustrated by the two cases, deviates can be important
contributors to the work of a group. As outsiders, they contribute a different
perspective (making it less likely that groupthink will result); and as develop-
ments in the GATT negotiations make clear, they also offer a common focus for
the group's attention-at least temporarily increasing the sense of group solidar-
ity as a result. At some point, however, a deviate becomes a nuisance, even a
menace, to effective group work. If the deviate cannot be persuaded to come
around to the prevailing viewpoint, he or she may have to be excluded-or, as
in the SEA talks, decision rules may have to be changed in order to "legislate"
a conducive environment.
Develop a strategy for creating group cohesiveness. Group cohesiveness is
an important ingredient of effective group functioning, and it can be achieved
in several ways. One is by introducing dynamic, charismatic leadership-easier
said than done, we suspect. A second route, more open to intervention by the
innovative conference planner, entails identifying possible superordinate goals.
Such a superordinate goal already existed in the SEA case, in the form of alle-
giance (more or less) to the concept of a European union that transcends national
identity. In the Uruguay Round, however, which was fraught with dissension,
it appears that superordinate goals were few and far between. If ways could have
been found to encourage more of a global-rather than a strictly national-point
of view (as seemed to happen at the Law of the Sea Conference), perhaps more
group cohesiveness would have been the result. Depletion of the ozone layer is
a problem (an external threat, if you will) that confronts each and everyone of
us, as is the threat of worldwide recession in the absence of thoughtful trade
policies. Attention to such issues and countless others could have had the bene-
ficial effect of enhancing group cohesiveness.
If the group is to reach closure at some point, ways have to be found to
help move that process along. As described in this chapter, several techniques
may be helpful in this regard: extracting a small commitment from group
members, thereby getting one's foot in the door; using the psychology of entrap-
ment to engender the sense that one has too much committed to the group's work
to quit; and introducing stopping points along the way (witness the midterm
review of the GATT Uruguay Round) to encourage group members to take
increased ownership of the group's work.
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Finally, remember that most of the work in multilateral exchanges does
not involve negotiation at all. A small group approach can go a long way toward
explaining what transpires during multilateral exchanges. Although the stated
focus of this book is multilateral negotiation, we have been struck in our reading
of the two cases by the surprising paucity of evidence of negotiation per se. The
SEA and GATT talks seem to have been driven not by negotiation but by group
process. It is not the staking out of positions, from which concessions are sub-
sequently made, that best characterizes the work that takes place in multilateral
encounters. Building group consensus, through the dynamics of group process,
is the key feature.
Notes
1. Surprisingly little of this work has lent itself to a direct application of
small group research to international negotiation. For an important exception,
see Galtung (1968), and see Druckman (1990) for an excellent review of the rele-
vant literature that does exist.
2. In their research on intergroup conflict, the Sherifs describe the follow-
ing innovation used by them to create cooperation between cabins of adolescent
summer campers who had been caught in the throes of an intense rivalry. They
arranged for a vehicle that was to take the two warring cabins of adolescent boys
on a trip to run out of gasoline. Only by working together and jointly hauling
the truck to a filling station (with a rope that had previously been used only for
tug-of-war) were the boys able to get the truck filled with gas and reach their
destination; because neither group of boys alone had the strength and numbers
to do the job, they had to work together.
3. The twin concepts of cohesiveness and conformity bring into focus an
essential conflict in group functioning: although the members of a cohesive
group feel free to generate fresh and innovative ideas, such groups also tend to
be driven by the need to reach consensus before such ideas can be aired
thoroughly.
4. Actually, in light of Denmark's initial refusal to ratify Maastricht, this
is not strictly true. An external threat to the group's survival is alive and well!
5. In regard to dynamics outside the negotiations, witness the deliberate
spreading of rumor alluded to in Chapter One.
Chapter 7
Coalition Theory
Using Power to Build Cooperation
Christophe Dupont (France)
For many authors and researchers in political, organizational, and social sci-
ences the concept of coalition has "wide intuitive and scientific appeal"
(Stevenson, Pearce, and Porter, 1985). Coalitions and alliances are fundamental
and universal aspects of international relations and politics and therefore have
long been at the center of concern in these fields; social psychology has been
interested in coalitions as part of the exploration of group behavior; and the
organizational literature has increasingly used the concept in connection with
such issues as organizational processes, cooperation and conflicts, constraints,
and goals. Many efforts have been made to develop testable and relevant models
to describe accurately, explain convincingly, or predict probabilistically key de-
velopments in the field. Indeed, several of the previous chapters have incorpo-
rated coalition into their explanations.
Although there are different definitions of the concept, coalitions may be
defined as cooperative efforts for the attainment of short-range, issue-specific
objectives. In this sense coalitions are distinguished from formal alliances ("coop-
erative effort[s] in which the rights and duties of each member are codified in a
treaty"), informal alignments ("learned expectations [on the part of nations] as
to how much cooperation might be expected from other nations"), and behav-
ioral alignments ("actual efforts [of nations] to coordinate their behavior in a
similar manner with respect to common objects") (Sullivan, 1974, p. 101).
Another widely used definition from an organizational perspective posits five
characteristics that "must be present for a group to be considered a coalition":
it must be an "interacting group, deliberately constructed, independent of the
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formal structure, lacking its external goal (or goals) and requiring concerted
member action" (Stevenson, Pearce, and Porter, 1985, p. 261).
If coalitions are an ever-present possibility and most often an observed
reality in groups-whatever their form, structure, or purpose-it is not surprising
that they may be expected to playa role in conference diplomacy, a not entirely
new but increasingly observable form of international relations (Kaufmann,
1989a). Examples of conference diplomacy are the piurilateral negotiations that
took place to elaborate the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985 among the twelve
members of the European Communities (EC) and the multilateral negotiations
between 1986 and 1993 in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. These two
cases show evidence of coalition emergence and attempts to use collective influ-
ence to fulfill certain goals. This chapter analyzes these two negotiations from
the viewpoint of coalition theories. The first section gives an overview of these
theories; the second section examines their relevance to negotiation theory; and
the third applies the analysis to the SEA and Uruguay Round negotiations.
In this chapter I attempt initially to identify the number and types of
coalitions that could be observed in the two cases studied. Based on this descrip-
tive approach, I then tackle the difficult issue of coalition effectiveness. This more
exacting purpose (which could possibly lead either to predicting certain negoti-
ation processes and outcomes or to testing certain propositions of coalition the-
ories) has been inspired more deductively by operational taxonomy than by
detailed and inductive analysis-a taxonomy (for example, coding criteria) that
rests essentially (although not entirely) on the two cases in question.
On balance, the purpose of the chapter is to complement the concurrent
approaches to multilateral negotiations. If one of the main conclusions is rela-
tively unsurprising (that coalition formation and behaviors were important fac-
tors in the two cases, a statement that can be generalized to almost all multilateral
negotiations), another-more basic-result is that negotiators in multilateral en-
counters would be well advised to include in their thinking about prenegotiations
and formal negotiations the appropriateness of forming (or being part of) coa-
litions and the contribution this behavior may-or may not-make to the fulfill-
ment of their individual goals and their eventual reconciliation with the shared
goal of making the multilateral conference a joint success.
Coalition Theories: Approaches and Issues
Coalition theories-whether applied to political entities, groups, or organiza-
tions-are attempts to construct models of an explanatory or predictive nature (or
both). The main areas that are addressed fall into roughly three categories: for-
mation, stability and duration, and impact and outcomes.
Formation
Discussion of coalition formation can be 'subdivided into three subsets: rationale
(motivation), goals, and prerequisites (a problem of mobilization). Political mod-
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els place ideological variables at the center of the process; social psychology and
game-theoretical models-although with different approaches-assume the need
for a joint payoff not attainable through individual action alone. Motivations and
goals for a coalition have been apprehended differently by the various theories.
The first theories using power (Caplow, 1956), minimum resources (Gamson,
1961a, 1961b), and even bargaining (Chertkoff, 1970) emphasize the payoff dimen-
sion. In these theories, coalitions are formed on a utilitarian basis-for example,
coalescing to gain a reward (benefit, payoff) that individual action alone would
not permit. The motivation may be power maximization within and outside the
coalition (Caplow, 1956), payoff maximization based on "equity" (Gamson,
1961b), or some compromise between "equity" and "equality" (Chertkoff, 1970;
Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973). In these models, variables are the comparative
assessment of resources among members of the group, and the most important
issues are the definition and identification of resources, which results in compar-
ison of the resources obtainable through alternative coalition opportunities. The
number of alternatives available to members of a coalition has also been used as
a variable in the so-called weighted probability model (Komorita, 1974).
The models develop predictions of the number and composition of win-
ning coalitions, although they do not always agree on the results. These ap-
proaches have been criticized (see, for example, Bacharach and Lawler, 1980)
because they assume divisible payoffs; exclude some variables that playa role in
actual settings-for example, ideological factors; do not treat the dynamics of
coalitions over time; and do not deal with size. Political and "ideological dis-
tance" models have emphasized the role of ideological proximities and distances
as an important factor in coalition formation as well as the role of size (for
example, Riker, 1962; Lawler and Young, 1975; Murnigham, 1978). Organization
theories have attempted to combine the contributions of social psychology and
political science. Bacharach and Lawler (1980), for instance, have proposed a
"bargaining-and-power" theory of coalition that emphasizes, in particular, de-
pendence dimensions.
Stability and Duration
Another important area in coalition theories has been the attempt to explain and
predict the resilience of coalitions over time-in other words, their stability and
duration. The dynamics dimension takes on increased importance as soon as
some of the scope conditions of the theories have been loosened or enlarged. Thus
the introduction of such concepts as minority coalitions, nonwinning coalitions,
interest groups, influence versus power, countercoalitions and retaliatory actions,
constant intracoalition bargaining, and never-ending reshu££ling makes it pos-
sible to explore the preconditions necessary for a coalition to maintain or to
increase its role. Propositions to this effect have been offered, most of them qual-
itative in nature and not yet fully empirically tested (see again, for instance,
Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, or Stevenson, Pearce, and Porter, 1985, on a process
model of development).
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Political scientists have also proposed models in which they attempt to
identify stability/instability variables of alliances and coalitions-for example,
by making an inventory of causes of stresses and strains that eventually lead to
the disbanding of the group. For instance, in politicallmilitary alliances, a
number of cultural, military, economic, environmental, and structural factors
have been identified (see, for instance, Sullivan, 1974). Some of these approaches
have been qualitative as well as quantitative, two relevant illustrations being
Haas (1974) and Attali (1972).
Some general models-mostly inspired by game theory-have provided an
increased understanding of the process and conditions of stability. Prominent
among these has been the Shapley (1953) model, which has been complemented
by several subsequent contributions, as noted in Chapter Four. Shapley developed
mathematical tools and concepts that apply to coalition formation and stability
over time. The Shapley value, according to this theory, is a predictor of coalition
stability; shifts in coalitions are explained by the interplay of actors constantly
comparing the actual benefits they derive from present membership in a coalition
to what they could obtain in alternative opportunities. This value is subsumed
in an average value that takes into account actors' marginal contributions in the
large number of potential 2n-l coalitions (which is made additionally complex
by the order of appearance of the member concerned in the various coalition
alternatives).
Research (mostly of a descriptive nature) has also examined the main
organizational dimensions of coalitions. These include, inter alia, the degree of
size, formalism, leadership, commitments, decision-making mechanisms, power-
and-influence structure, relationships within and outside the group, and constit-
uencies. Links with related fields in the literature (for example, organizational,
social psychological, or political science) have proved useful regarding the orga-
nizational, behavioral, and operational variables of coalitions as well as their
potential transformations and changes.
Impact and Outcomes
Questions concerning impact and outcome are obviously of the greatest impor-
tance to both researchers and practitioners. Do coalitions, the networks that they
organize and rely on, the power struggle they initiate or are confronted with
(within and among themselves), the conflictuallcooperative moves and tactics
that they resort to have any influence on the patterns of events in the whole
group, the organization, the political entity, or the "conference" in which they
are created and where they develop, gain or lose strength, are countered, and are
reshuffled or disappear? Thus the relevant questions are: What degree of influ-
ence do coalitions have on processes and end results of the group-(its purposes,
goals, outcomes, and aftermath)? Through which mechanisms does that influ-
ence develop? What kind of changes (both internal and external) do they bring
about, and are such changes of a durable nature? To what extent can a coalition
be appraised as successful?
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Unfortunately theories have not been able to give unified and convincing
results. We do, however, have a set of testable propositions, most couched in an
"if-then" sequence in a probabilistic mold or in the typical social science propo-
sition: "the greater or the lower characteristic A or condition B, the more or the
lesser the probability of outcome characteristic X or variable Y." In the organiza-
tional field propositions of this kind have been developed in some details, mostly
on the problematics of change. To take a few examples, Bacharach and Lawler
(1980), Stevenson, Pearce, and Porter (1985), and Mahon and Bigelow (1990) have
been able to list propositions linking outcome (dependent) variables to various
organizational (independent) variables. Mahon and Bigelow, for instance, adapting
a typology borrowed from Eccles (1983), show that outcome is a function of the type
of coalition (policy- or resource-oriented, internal or external).
Using Coalition Theories to Explain Multilateral Negotiations
Coalitions are often presented as a specific bargaining problem; conversely, in
multilateral negotiations bargaining has a lot to do with building and working
with coalitions. Furthermore, a coalition emerges as soon as there are more than
two actors (although the coalition may even emerge in a dyad if external actors
and constituencies are included). In this section the focus is on the relevance of
the coalition conceptual and methodological framework to multilateral negoti-
ations (as distinguished from bilateral ones). The gist of the argument is that
coalition analysis is a key to explaining the processes and outcomes of multilat-
eral negotiations.
Aspirations, Purposes, and Goals of Multilateral Actors
Multilateral negotiations take many forms, among which conference diplomacy
is the most prominent. As defined by Kaufmann (1989a), negotiations in confer-
ence diplomacy are the sum total of talks and contacts intended to solve conflicts
or to work toward the common objectives of a conference. Conferences may have
many different objectives. Kaufmann distinguishes eight different categories, one
of which is to "negotiate and draft a treaty or other formal instrument" (p. 8).
The following analysis applies to this category, although most of it is also rele-
vant in general. Kaufmann's definition includes the "mixed motive" character-
istic of conferences. Negotiators-representing states-are inspired by two often
opposite motives: on the one hand, they (normally) share the common objective
of the conference (to solve a specific conflict or work toward a given objective
such as drafting a treaty); on the other, if not always by personal conviction, at
least by mission and duty, they have to present and defend the self-interests of the
nation they represent. This dual motivation is never ignored in the political or
diplomatic literature. Because of mixed motives members of a conference look for
ways to make reconciliation possible. The principal way is through coalition,
which has several consequences.
In multilateral negotiations, coalitions form and act according to the
amount of congruence in the aspirations, goals, and purposes of the actors con-
cerned. The more congruent these factors, the greater the coalition's activity and
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stability. If subsets of members share congruence, there will be competing coa-
litions. These ideas about congruence are roughly in line with coalition theory,
although they raise the question of size: does a coalition-in a conference setting
with the objective to draft a treaty-seek to increase its inflw;nce and work toward
its goals by gaining the largest membership or by restricting it to the minimum
efficient size?
Existing theories help explain, if not always predict, the emergence and
the composition of coalitions. Concepts like conditions to gain control, alterna-
tive opportunities, and above all ideological distances are certainly applicable.
Some of the sophisticated concepts may not apply as well or as easily. One major
issue is divisibility, a concept linked to a measure of resources. However, in treaty
drafting, concessions on content or formulation of clauses constitute a form of
divisibility. The concept of resources, basic to many theories of coalitions, is at
best fuzzy in conference settings. With these reservations, which call for adjust-
ments in order for coalition theories to be applicable to negotiations, there is a
large area in which coalition theories in general are relevant to multilateral
negotiations.
In a conference setting the dominance of a "winning" coalition does not
necessarily mean "success." Success depends on a decision rule that involves a no-
veto (or no-quasi-veto) mechanism, or else even a winning coalition could be
blocked. The coalition framework distinguishes formal success (formal achieve-
ment of aspirations, goals, and purposes) from inferior-yet potentially substan-
tial-results. For example, some coalition theories, by repudiating the winning-
coalition concept, have shown that minority coalitions may form simply to gain
influence or to attain some intermediate objectives (exerting pressure, gaining
recognition). Inverting this idea, one can see how a majority coalition may be
formed-even though members are aware that formal success is not achievable
at this point of time-simply because such an important body of congruent
interests may create background preconditions for future "success." One may also
take the view that minority (defensive) coalitions are built to protect themselves
from this time-oriented design.
The coalition framework has developed normative concepts (equity,
equality), that are often present in conference settings; they range from principles
considered shared by the whole group to the different and more difficult concept
of universal normativity ("what is good for my coalition is good for all"; "what
we believe to be the 'best' rules, regimes, or systems is 'necessarily' the best for
all"). This culturally ethnocentric orientation obviously is a key issue: in coali-
tion analysis ideological variables therefore appear crucial.
Coalition theories have sometimes made use of the concept of linkages:
coalitions develop because there may exist complementary self-interests, attain-
ment of which is helped by some potential linkage or trade-offs among members
of the coalition. These issue-linked coalitions are often observed more in small
groups, in which identification of potentially promising issues and potential
benefit measurement are easier, than in large groups, where complexity makes
it more difficult to create joint issue-linked platforms.
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Finally, coalition theories suggest some methodological devices; their use
can contribute to better organization and deeper analysis than are otherwise pos-
sible. Thus it may be of interest to build "congruence" matrices and attitudinal
(policy or issue preference) scales, as Chapter Three discusses.
In summary, in a conference-setting coalition, formation, composition,
behavior, and success depend on such qualitative variables as degree of congru-
ence, decision-making variables, criteria, stakes, and potential for issue links and
trade-offs. These seem to be the primary, but not the exclusive, variables. For
instance, external and time-contingent factors, the duration of past relationships,
past experience with coalitions or alliances, adroitness in or proneness to coalesc-
ing, the role of secretariats and presiding officers, and, above all, the capacity to
reward or punish should also be included in this inventory.
Decision Making, Power, and Influence
Among the factors that determine coalition behavior and outcomes in multilat-
eral negotiations, two important variables are the decision-making mechanism
and interacting power and influence patterns.
Decision-Making Mechanism. Procedures and rules have a bearing on
coalition behavior. For instance, organization theories admit that variables relat-
ing to authority structure (degree of centralization, degree of organizational for-
mality, communication lines) playa role in coalition formation and behavior
(see, for example, Bacharach and Lawler, 1980). The rule structure leads parties
to consider coalescing in order to change or (in the case of a "dominant" coalition
in the organization-theory sense) to reinforce or adapt the rule patterns, and to
behave accordingly. Although some of this analysis may be transferred to mul-
tilateral negotiations (for example, parties may coalesce in order to change the
rules of the game, such as reinforcing or loosening the scope of the rules or
modifying procedures of admission), multilateral negotiations may exhibit a
major difference, voting and veto procedures.
The problem of power has formal as well as informal aspects. The formal
aspects focus on the problem of voting. Voting rules condition member behavior
(for example, rallying members in a sufficient number to gain a simple or qual-
ified majority). More important, they define constraints to action. If decisions (be
they resolutions, binding commitments, or final declarations) are based on "le-
gal" or de facto unanimity, potential veto power exists. Veto power exists also
under nonunanimity procedures. Veto power constrains strategies of coalitions
to resolve the problem, to obtain (by whatever means and tactics available) im-
mediate backing or at least abstention (an interesting illustration is given in
Kaufmann, 1989a, p. 28, on an agreement in the United Nations Special Com-
mittee on Principles of International Law in 1966), or to build long-term influ-
ence to gain support later or to change the rules of the game.
As a concept, voting has been embodied in some of the important works
on coalitions. The rationale behind the Shapley value is that the real foundation
of the power of a member in a group/organization/assembly is his or her capacity
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to be indispensable for the success of any coalition. The pivotal member is the
one whose inclusion in the coalition is necessary for the coalition "to win." This
approach is of interest in legislative or quasi-legislative (such as a treaty-drafting
conference) settings because it makes use of such concepts as power indices and
indices expressing the capacity to block, blunt, or defer decisions. Although these
indices have not always shown convincing results, they are conceptually helpful
for understanding coalition behavior in the context of constraints related to vot-
ing (Attali, 1972, p. 109).
They can also explain certain institutional arrangements (or at least give
an ex post rationale to what are generally intuitive political decisions). Examples
borrowed, for instance, from the French coalition literature show some applica-
tions of interest, the most intriguing and convincing being the analysis by Pons-
sard (1977) of the changes in the voting rights in the European Parliament (then
the European Parliamentary Assembly) in July 1976 after EC membership had
been increased from the original six to nine countries and the number of votes
correspondingly adjusted from 198 to 410. The new partition of votes (which
conforms to certain formulas of coalition theory, notably the Shapley value and
indices of power) shows an elaborate construction of subtle power balances
among the "larger," the "medium-sized," and the "smaller" countries. An inter-
esting aspect of this construction is the de facto "right to veto" given certain com-
binations of these various groups, which are also examined in Chapter Three.
However, it would be inaccurate to emphasize only veto power in confer-
ences and similar entities. Many institutions are precisely built or organized to
achieve a common objective, and this objective may be attained only if veto power
does not exist or, if it exists, is not exerted. Veto power is often a protective
mechanism rather than a major strategy. In this respect a major difference exists
with bilateral negotiations. Strictly speaking, in any such negotiation each party
disposes, at will, of its veto power by refusing the terms and conditions of the
agreement. Refusing a negotiated settlement may not be in the final or long-term
interest of the party (for instance, because this decision is objectively not effi-
cient), but it may be due to misunderstandings or judgmental or behavioral errors
of the party or its opponent or both of them. Whatever the motivations and
causes, the capacity to withdraw from the relationship is equivalent to a veto
power.
Such is not the situation in multilateral negotiations because the decision-
making mechanism is not the same. There is not necessarily a veto power (for ex-
ample, if an agreement is binding subject to the extremely constraining rule of 99
votes out of 100, the 100th member may not be able to make its theoretical veto
power effective); but if veto power can be exerted, there are also other factors at play
(for example, moral suasion or pressure). These moves are not of the same nature
as those in bilateral negotiations. Thus one may regard the difference between
bilateral and multilateral negotiations as a difference between veto and contiguity.
Power and Influence Patterns. Typologies in coalition theories have dis-
tinguished "formal" and "informal" coalition (Eccles, 1983) and "explicit" and
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"tacit" modes of bargaining (Druckman, 1977) within or across coalitions. These
two dimensions find applications in multilateral negotiations, shedding light on
the often subtle way in which actors (within and outside coalitions) try to gain
control. The first distinction invites researchers to look not only at formal groups
(the degree of formality varying from a weak structure to official status, leading
even in some cases to the granting of specific rights) but also at less visible ones
(the looser form being interest groups or lobbies). Theory has shown that strate-
gies and tactics are often different in both cases.
These differences are the main focus of the second distinction. Coalitions
may use explicit behavior-for instance, demands, proposals, offers, and coun-
teroffers-or they may have recourse to tacit behavior, which handles information
and issues in a more ambiguous way. Organization theories have made attempts
to link these dimensions to other variables (internal/external, integrative/distrib-
utive nature of relationships), in order to submit propositions about specific
behaviors and outcomes.
Tactics constitute a vast domain in which there is clearly a close corre-
spondence between coalition and multilateral negotiations analysis. Coalition
theorists have conducted numerous studies on the use of tactics for making threats
(one of the main topics in most coalition theories), for manipulating information
(part of the more general subject of communication), for blunting and blocking
moves, for retaliation, and for coercion. Whereas these tactical moves are clearly
distributive in nature (corresponding to coalitions designed to combat rival or
minority adversarial groups), another part of the theory has rightly emphasized
cooperative moves aimed at influence rather than at power and based on non-
adversarial tactics such as persuasion, trade-offs, compensations and rewards,
concessions, creative new solutions, enlargement, openness and frankness in com-
munication, "principles" (including superordinate goals), loyalties and legiti-
macy of solutions, and small group cooperation.
A final domain in which coalition theories contribute to an understanding
of multilateral negotiation is the source and role of power. For example, Bacharach
and Lawler (1980) have presented a theory of coalitions based on "power and po-
litics," power being analyzed as a form of dependence of one party (coalition) on
another. This framework can be applied in the study of multilateral negotiations.
Coalition Approaches: The SEA and Uruguay Round Negotiations
The previous sections provide the theoretical framework for decoding concrete
cases such as the two negotiations under review. Such an effort can be subdivided
into several interconnected parts (Kremenyuk, 1991):
• Actors: Can we observe the actual emergence of coalitions as actors in these
two events? What kind of coalition patterns can be identified and decoded in
a relevant taxonomy?
• Strategies: To what extent did observed coalitions develop distinctive behav-
ioral roles and strategies?
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• Outcome: To what extent did the coalitions prove effective in making
significant contributions to outcomes and in ensuring their own durability?
Descriptive Analysis
Coalitions in the two negotiations can be depicted through the use of several
instruments. For example, one could use diagrams such as Likert-type scales or
mapping representations in order to identify similarity of positions (Figure 7.1)
or interconnected networks (Figure 7.2). By aggregating these itemized represen-
Figure 7.1. Initial Positioning of Countries on the Definition of
Internal Market: Proximity to Commission Proposals (Issue Col).
Farthest from
Commission Proposals
Closest to
Commission Proposals
Figure 7.2. Mapping (Networks) of Actors and Coalitions in Regard to the
Definition of the Future of the European Community Structure.
Note: The arrows denote influence strategies of the groups; the dashed line denotes that
members of national parliaments belonged to the EP committees indicated.
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tations, it is possible to gain an overview of the various groupings that could have
emerged or did emerge from the negotiations.
Another method is to scrutinize the descriptive material and reorganize the
information following a taxonomical approach. Table 7.1 starts with the iden-
tification of the various issues (for example, the need for a "qualitative leap
forward" in pre-SEA negotiations or the extent to which negotiating parties were
ready to call a conference to explore the ground for an ambitious program of
intensive European integration). As seen from the length of the table, the number
of comprehensive key issues at stake was large: eight broad categories with regard
to pre-SEA-including the general topic of the leap forward-and nine in the
1985-1987 negotiations proper. Table 7.1 provides the lineup on each broad issue
and then gives a description of the purpose and objectives of the various group-
ings, their key features, and the outcome. The same preliminary (descriptive)
analysis would be much more complex in the case of the Uruguay Round because
the number of issues (in each of the fifteen broad categories) was large and the
lineups more sophisticated (as seen in the following paragraphs). Table 7.2 pre-
sents a description of the various coalitions of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
This table has a descriptive quality but does not form the basis of a taxonomy.
Table 7.3 is another way to present the various positions of parties at the pre-
SEA and SEA negotiations. It clearly shows that the emergence of coalitions was
almost inevitable; a neat picture of convergences and divergences among nego-
tiating parties stands out.
These three tables constitute the raw material out of which a taxonomy
of multilateral negotiations can be built: this is the purpose of Table 7.4, which
combines concepts drawn from theory (as presented in the first and second sec-
tions of this chapter) and their application and relevance to the two cases. The
table suggests that these negotiations entailed different forms of coalitions,
namely:
• Type I: Groups that were broad-based, hard-core, and close on key issues; for
example, the Six in the SEA negotiations.
• Type II: Intrabloc groupings; for example, the Nordic countries in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations.
• Type III: Issue-specific (single-issue) coalitions; the Cairns group in the
Uruguay Round negotiations.
• Type IV: Opportunistic alignments and tactical alliances.
• Type V: Groups of external actors; the GATT secretariat in the Uruguay
Round.
The rationale behind this taxonomy-which seems validated by the spe-
cific references to the two cases-is threefold: visibility, cohesion or foundation
(the type of links that cements the group), and role (behavior and strategies).
Creating such a taxonomy is a first step in decoding the emergence of coalitions
in multilateral negotiations. It clarifies a particularly complex set of interactions
such as multilateral negotiations, but it is not explanatory. Explanatory analysis
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Coalition Theory
Table 7.4. Application of Coalition Typologies
to SEA and Uruguay Round Negotiations.
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Types of Coalitions
and Criteria·
Type I
Broad-based, hard core, prox-
imity on main issues
V: preexisting groups explicit
(quasi-institutionalized); rela-
tive size important (number
of conference members); abil-
ity to create majority status
(selectively, on certain issues,
or globally)
F: large degree of cohesion on
hard-core issues; shared inter-
ests; political will to cooper-
ate and unite forces toward
action (either toward move-
ment or defensively); poten-
tial ability to attract neutrals
or block rival coalitions;
large degree of stability and
duration; behavior sensitive
to "codes" (often unwritten
or informal)
R: driving (acting as leaders
or initiators), blocking (pre-
venting other coalitions or
entities from moving), or
modifying (bridging differen-
ces between groups or acting
as mediators or honest
brokers)
Type II
Intrabloc groupings
V: may be apparent in pre-
existing structures (e.g., Ben-
elux in EC) or result from
observed coordinated action
(e.g., France and Germany in
SEA); may form on selective
issues as well as globally (a
difference with type I
coalitions)
F: more varied than type I;
may be based on tactics and
therefore may be either dur-
able (as in type I) or less
stable
SEA (the Six)
Table 7.1 provides several
illustrations of the driving
role of the Six. However,
this role had to be supple-
mented by one or several
individual coalition
members acting as leaders
(e.g., Italy) and in some
instances by support of
parties external to the coa-
lition (e.g., IAC/EP). In
some instances the smaller
members of the coalition
(e.g., the Benelux coun-
tries) acted also as media-
tors or honest brokers.
These coalitions broke
down into subgroups on
certain issues (especially
the substance of the Single
Market, see Table 7.2).
Some groupings operated
with consistency and sol-
idarity (e.g., the Benelux
countries). Role was either
driving (to relaunch mo-
mentum) or modifying
(e.g., the Benelux coun-
tries; later in Maastricht,
1991, to prevent isolation
of United Kingdom).
Uruguay Round
(Industrialized Countries
and Developing Countries)
The role of ICs was in
general driving, especially
in the first rounds of nego-
tiations. But this role was
thwarted by disunity on
sectorial issues. DCs were
rather defensive at the start
of the conference but grad-
ually attempted to playa
modifying role as im-
passes (especially agricul-
ture) began to block
balanced progress.
The EC or the Nordic
countries can be consid-
ered an intrabloc coalition
within the type I coali-
tion: similarly, proximate
geography or ideological
leanings brought forth in-
trabloc coalitions within
DCs (e.g., the Latin Amer-
ican group, the French-
speaking African group).
Role was driving on se-
lected issues and mostly
modifying. However, on
one special occasion the
Latin American group
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Table 7.4. Application of Coalition Typologies
to SEA and Uruguay Round Negotiations, Cont'd.
Types of Coalitions
and Criteria'
R: may be based on issues,
timing, and special
circumstances
Type III
Issue-specific
Compared with type II these
coalitions are formed exclu-
sively on a specific issue: only
specific interests are shared,
and coalition membership
does not necessarily extend to
other interests, nor does it
prevent parallel membership
in other coalitions for other
issues. Hence:
V: occasional, constrained,
and shifting
F: opportunistic
R: adapted to the particular
strategies of rival coalitions
These coalitions may be more
or less cohesive; they may-or
may not-develop into
stronger, broader ties as those
in type I or II.
These coalitions may also be
de facto alliances of parties
(generally smaller states) that
see their role as semiperma-
nent mediators or honest
brokers and consistently act
in this capacity; they may be-
long to otherwise rival type I
or II coalitions.
Type IV
Opportunistic alignments
One should not consider
these coalitions except in a
loose sense. There is no spe-
cific coordination.
There are major differences
with type III; opportunistic
alignments are based on
chance encounters of similar
SEA (the Six)
Such coalitions were typi-
cal of the minority group
(the United Kingdom,
Greece, Denmark). But the
United Kingdom joined
the majority type I coali-
tion on the problem of
political cooperation; sim-
ilarly certain members of
the majority occasionally
coalesced with the minor-
Uruguay Round
(Industrialized Countries
and Developing Countries)
forced blocking in order to
put pressure on breaking
the deadlock on
agriculture.
Chapter Two provides
many illustrations of such
coalitions. Perhaps the
clearest examples were the
Cairns group and the de la
Paix group, whose pur-
poses and objectives were
precise and limited to
achieving a specific goal.
These groups saw their
role as essentially
modifying.
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Types of Coalitions
and Criteria-
positions or temporary tacti-
cal opportunities.
All multilateral negotiations
involve such alignments oc-
casionally. Generally these
can be depicted only by de-
tailed review of the records.
Type V
External actors
Individual actors (e.g., per-
sonalities or entities) may
coalesce to bring pressure on
negotiators.
Constellations of personali-
ties-operating in an active
network-may temporarily or
more durably form to cumu-
late their individual influ-
ence (political clout,
charisma, media coverage,
etc.) in order to change the
course of events.
To some extent one can also
often observe secretariats of
international organizations
and presidents in conferences
entering into this pattern of
largely informal groups that
operate as de facto relation-
based, often behind-the-scene
coalitions.
SEA (the Six)
ity group on certain issues
(see Table 7.2).
The role of such groups of
personalities was impor-
tant (e.g., the "crocodile"
initiative, the pro-EP net-
work of domestic
politicians).
Uruguay Round
(Industrialized Countries
and Developing Countries)
The GATT secretariat, its
president, and at times the
presiding officers of the
conference were instru-
mental in helping to con-
stitute these networks.
-V: visibility; F: foundation; R: roles.
must therefore be based on the study of concrete cases, which is the purpose of
the next subsection.
Explanatory Analysis
A number of crucial dimensions have to be examined to explain the process and
outcomes of the negotiations form the perspective of coalition theories. These
dimensions may be divided into three main, previously noted categories: emer-
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gence of coalitions as actors, behavioral roles and strategies, and effectiveness and
outcomes.
Coalition Formation. Several factors appear to be crucial to the formation
of a coalition in multilateral negotiations. We can list as the most important the
appropriateness and maturity of the context, the nature of the issues, and the role
of initiators or leaders. The SEA negotiation exhibits a series of contextual factors
or developments that seem to have been important in the formation of the two
main coalitions (maximalist and minimalist) observed (see Tables 7.1 and 7.3).
The first major factor was the presence of preexisting commonalities and toler-
ated discrepancies regarding the "future of Europe." These shared views led to
the formation of the two groups, which engaged in the negotiations with differ-
ent-and almost opposite-goals and ambitions.
For the majority, the negotiations were designed minimally to permit
continuation and maximally to permit reinforcement of the enterprise that began
some thirty years before-including, in the institutional field, the need to give
the European Parliament (EP) legitimacy and the EC a democratic foundation.
Hence a shared spirit of having to do something to prevent stagnation and pro-
vide renewed momentum was a sufficient common denominator or condition to
coalesce in order (ideally) to finish the job previously undertaken in Paris (1950)
and Rome (1957). Conversely, doubts about the radical transformation of existing
arrangements (and the fact that adhering to the EC had been at least partially
opportunistic) were enough to unite (albeit with some heterogeneity) the minor-
ity. Thus members (including the institutional actors) were already part of pre-
existent alliances whose composition and goals were well known and could be
anticipated. Under these conditions there was hardly a need for special circum-
stances or events to trigger the formation of coalitions.
These separate and opposite views on policy and choices (and to some
extent ideological leanings) were sufficient conditions to coalesce two main
groups but were in themselves not enough to produce or block initial movement.
They had to be supplemented by the actions of initiators or leaders-either in-
stitutions (for example, the EP), certain member states (Italy, France), or even
individuals-at least as regards the majority group (the minority, the United
Kingdom, can be seen as the initiator/leader acting mainly through counter-
proposals and rallying reluctant neutrals or doubters). There was in addition the
"negative constraint" of the de facto need to obtain French and German agree-
ment to create momentum (Chapter One). Furthermore, movement depended on
appropriate timing, which proved crucial at several key moments.
Proximity in motivation and purposes, tempered by the need to satisfy
members' sectorial or strategic self-interests (a good example being the mixed
feeling of the Commission to grant the EP broad decisions powers), proved to be
an accurate predictor of coalition formation. The coalescing of positions is con-
firmed in Table 7.3 for selected issues relating to the internal market and for the
new domains such as the environment and political cooperation. In the pre-SEA
negotiations a clear pattern emerged (distinguishing pro- and anticommunitar-
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ian groups); the pattern is also visible in regard to the Single Market (with
however a few divergences within coalitions); and the pattern holds again (but
with more divergences) for the new domains.
Although the context, the nature of the issue (the importance given by the
various participants to the problem of the future of European integration), and
the role of initiators go far to explain the coalition pattern that developed in the
SEA negotiations, we may also note three important developments:
• The dispute throughout the negotiations between a de facto, rather cohesive
dominant coalition and a more divided minority
• The fact that coalitions crossed pro-Union cleavages on matters of substance
• The de facto alliance of institutional (nonstate) actors-the EP and subunits
(such as the Committee on Institutional Affairs), the Commission, and to
some extent national parliaments and diverse lobbies-and member states
The formation of coalitions in the Uruguay Round negotiations could be
analyzed in the same way: context, issues, and initiators/leaders. But the analysis
of these negotiations is much more complex because, as Table 7.2 amply dem-
onstrates, the Uruguay Round negotiations had several complex networks of
cross-cutting coalitions (several countries being part of several-at times contra-
dictory-groupings). For most of these groupings it is possible to depict the role
of context, issues, and initiators. To illustrate coalition formation selectively, we
can base our analysis on the Cairns group, a case that has been analyzed in depth
by Higgot and Cooper (1990). In their analysis they show how crucial these three
factors were. The role of context is clearly illustrated by the circumstances in
which many food exporters found themselves during the early 1980s and by their
analysis of shifts in the world power structure. The context was thus favorable
to unite a number of heterogeneous countries ("a profile of strange bedfel-
lows")-from Australia and Canada to Hungary and Fiji-to respond to the
rallying cry of Australia: the mission was to redress a situation in which these
countries felt themselves to be victims of protectionism on food products but also
(for example, Latin America) of the debt burden. The context was favorable; the
issue could be isolated in a joint platform (producing a single-issue coalition);
there were (at least in the beginning) two strong motivated leaders (Australia and
Canada); and there was a clear focus on goals. Altogether the preconditions were
ripe for the formation of a coalition (which was created at Cairns, Australia, in
August 1986).
Behavioral Strategies. The role of coalitions in multilateral negotiations
may be very different because goals vary greatly and because leadership and power
are exerted in a number of ways and are of different strengths. In the SEA ne-
gotiations a majority coalition defined its role as proactive and determined (to
see a breakthrough toward European integration), and a minority coalition saw
its role as containing "progress" within well-defined limits. Therefore, differing
goals led one coalition to press toward moving on the agenda, to expect a rapid
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procedural pace, to set precedents, and so on, while the other group saw fit to
proceed more slowly and pragmatically. In this manner roles were dependent on
goals. They were also dependent on leadership (France and Germany, on the one
hand, the United Kingdom, on the other) and relative strength (the numbers were
simply in favor of one group).
Turning to the Uruguay Round one again may well refer to the Cairns
analysis. The group saw its role as a balancing act between three (sometimes
contradictory) tendencies: promoting its specific purpose of changing the rules of
the game with respect to world trade of food products, being a mediator/bridge
between conflicting parties (especially between the main players: the United States
and the EC), and promoting (alternately with showing restraint toward) a mul-
tilateral agreement. Part of the role was inducing confidence among actors and
searching for middle-ground formulas, transparency, and step-by-step approaches.
This role was defined and aptly implemented by the two leaders of the group
(although tensions arose subsequently). In the end Australia became the driving
force as Canada and some Latin America members found it necessary to defend
their own separate positions on certain issues (such as domestic support measures
as opposed to export support measures, services, and intellectual property). As a
leader Australia contributed resources, was the chief architect and organizer, and
succeeded in providing intellectual dominance and innovativeness.
Coalition strategies are generally classified using several complementary
criteria such as proactive/reactive, "hard"/"soft," and driving/modifying/block-
ing. The two cases provide many illustrations of these different options. As in
every negotiation there may be a dominant strategy (for example, predominantly
cooperative or predominantly competing), but many shifts may occur (for exam-
ple, combining "hard" and "soft" devices).
Illustrations of such options may be found in the SEA and the GATT
negotiations. The pro-Community coalition in the EC had as its main objective
to make a substantial advance toward a fully integrated market and to build the
foundations of an economic, monetary, and political union. In its maximalist
form this objective would have led to a treaty close to the proposed European
Union Treaty (EUT). In order to reach that goal several strategies were available
to the dominant coalition, but these strategies were also constrained by a major
problem. The strategies were rather traditional (see Chapter One), although they
also involved a number of special devices:
• Setting a December 31, 1992, deadline for implementation.
• Using precedents, even if not implemented (for example, the EUT) and leg-
islative bases (such as referring to Article 236).
• Using the large initiative powers of presidents who happened to be at that
particular time favorable to the "leap forward" (mainly France and Italy,
and in a more indirect way Ireland and Luxembourg).
• Letting the EP and its nonmember-state allies be at the forefront of the insti-
tutional debate, which raised sensitive questions about adopting "more real-
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istic" positions in the negotiations (making it easier to reach a coalition
consensus).
• Concentrating efforts on reaching the overarching goal of attaining at least a
minimalist result: establishment of the Single Market and the first elements
of a monetary, economic, and political union. As long as progress was vis-
ible toward that goal, tactical flexibility was permitted; also impasse or par-
tial failure on one issue was not allowed to block the global advance (a
strikingly different development compared with the situation in the Uru-
guay Round); similarly, partial progress on one issue was used to create mo-
mentum toward progress on other issues.
These strategies met generally with success, but a major problem arose: the
strong resistance of the minority coalition against the project, which raised the
fundamental question of the substance and composition of the proposed union.
First, individual members of the dominant coalition did not share the same views
on how to deal with the minority resistance; the coalition then resorted to a kind
of middle-of-the-road strategy (as formulated most clearly by the Benelux coun-
tries), which led to the combination of several positions-for example, on ma-
jority voting after the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC). Second, pressure
was softened by agreement that only in extreme circumstances would full isola-
tion of the United Kingdom be the sanction. Rather it was felt that the partic-
ipation of the United Kingdom was a positive element in European integration
and that consequently a "two-speed" Europe should be avoided, if not at all costs
at least as long as the entire project would not be deprived of its minimal sub-
stance. The important strategy was agenda adjustment as well the inclusion of
declarations or statements in the preambles and texts of the final act (the SEA).
The opting-out clauses were thus a forerunner of the subsequent developments
at Maastricht (1991). Third, the debate was refocused more on economics than on
politics and, within the economic sphere, more on free trade and services (an
orientation of the United Kingdom and Denmark, for instance) than on the future
European Monetary Union (EMU) (for which only broad lines were defined).
Strategies of the minority group showed a skillful adaptation to the strate-
gies of the rival coalition. Attempts to change the course of the negotiations could
not be realistically envisaged. Introducing counterproposals had a limited chance
of success. Most promising were repeated and, on the whole, successful initiatives
to modify and soften the commitments that were gradually being spelled out in
the negotiations. As a last line of defense, the opt-out device could conceal and
temporarily reconcile differences on the most sensitive issues; in this manner the
coalition avoided a showdown that could have had grave consequences.
Strategies in the Uruguay Round negotiations were extremely complex
because of two developments. The first was the breakdown of one of the two
leading coalitions on the issue of agriculture. In terms of the previous (typolog-
ical) analysis, a traditional type I coalition thus broke down into type II subcoa-
litions, which showed a large measure of inflexibility and mutual mistrust. In-
depth analyses of the structural and conjunctural elements behind this lack of
174 International Multilateral Negotiation
understanding and flexibility (each side being able to show impressive sectorial
arguments to legitimate its position)-along with intrabloc bargaining-should
be topics of interest for future research. Interestingly the first phase of the nego-
tiations (the prenegotiations leading to Punta del Este) evidenced the traditional
strength and cohesion of the type I coalition consisting of the industrialized
countries (ICs), which was united and effective in gaining agreement-although
reluctantly-from the coalition of developing countries (DCs). An interesting
feature was the role of leaders: traditional strong leadership by the United States,
on the one hand, and an emerging strong leadership from the Cairns group and
Brazil and India, on the other hand. Subsequently developments showed, how-
ever, a weakening of these smaller coalitions (see Chapter Eight).
The second development was the appearance in the negotiations proper
of many type II and type III coalitions, which gradually gained visibility and
status, and implemented their own strategies. These strategies were based mainly
on a modifying role (with accidental use of more coercive actions such as block-
ing the negotiation as long as the agriculture issues were not solved). However,
these intermediate coalitions lacked power and influence and could not be effec-
tive enough to produce acceptable solutions for the disputants.
Coalition Effectiveness and Outcomes. Coalition effectiveness can be mea-
sured along several dimensions. To what extent have coalitions helped members
reach their joint and individual goals? To what extent have coalitions succeeded
in maintaining their cohesion and stability over time?
A summary view of the SEA negotiations leads to the following conclu-
sions. Processes were highlighted by the gradual step-by-step advances of the
majority group, which capitalized on each opportunity (notably summit confer-
ences and EP meetings) to get closer to the objective of creating a new dynamics
in European integration; however, in view of the declared reluctance of the mi-
nority, the majority had to make successive retrenchments from the ambitious
proposals. The semiconsensual approach led to the signing of the SEA-very
close to an EUT and very far from the 1957 Treaty of Rome. In this sense the
outcome was more joint than unilateral.
In the case of the Uruguay Round, the process, especially after the midterm
review, was more erratic and the outcome less predictable. An important factor
was the mutual undervaluation of the degree of flexibility that underlying eco-
nomic interests and ideological political forces left to the negotiators. Given this
limiting factor and the enormous complexity of the issues at stake, the more
powerful actors in the negotiations sought to tackle the problems on a frag-
mented basis. This strategy could have produced global trade-offs but did not in
this case. Each compartmentalized issue proved to be a huge negotiating block
fraught with intricate technical difficulties and real clashes of contradictory
"bonafide" perceptions and "legitimate" interests. It is not enough to analyze the
process and its present, if temporary, failure in terms of lack of political will. A
more balanced assessment would emphasize the fact that issues were not yet
mature enough for details to be worked out; there was not even a clear idea of
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what the formula could be. Hence the paradox is that, despite the length of the
negotiations, time did not play in favor of narrowing differences, and time limits
and ultimatums had little impact in this respect.
A point of interest in coalition analysis is the degree of group strength and
the capacity of a group to maintain cohesion and stability. Subsequent events
regarding the SEA (notably events linked to the Maastricht Treaty) point to the
relative stability of the groupings as depicted in the previous analysis. The ma-
jority coalition had elements of strength at the time of the negotiations, but one
may well question whether these elements (such as ideological cohesion, parallel
interests, and economic circumstances) have proved durable over time. The ma-
jority coalition is still powerful, but its strength is probably less now than it was
during the SEA negotiations (as the Maastricht negotiations and developments
subsequently showed).
In the case of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the relative strength of the
various coalitions did not lead to full effectiveness. Many of the groupings had
to make difficult compromises and goal reformulations because they were often
confronted with differences in the options and priorities of their members. Even
if a group had strong leadership (such as the Cairns group), it proved difficult
to avoid internal tensions and rifts. For this difficulty several explanations may
be found: first is issue complexity; second, the number of participants; third, the
ever-present competition between existing groupings; fourth, the uncertainty of
outcomes; and, fifth, changes in the environment (internal and external), which
became increasingly important as the negotiations extended over several years.
The variety of ideologies and national idiosyncrasies regarding the rules of the
game (for example: To what extent do we want free trade? To what extent does
a gap exist between rhetoric and acts?) made it difficult to attain a shared plat-
form. The job in this respect was easier for SEA negotiators than for the Uruguay
Round negotiators.
Higgot and Cooper (1990) offer an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses
of the Cairns group. The strengths were, according to these authors, a strong
identification with a common single issue, the capacity and will of leaders to
make solidarity (relative to the key question of new rules) predominate over
conflict on other issues, the acceptance of compromises when needed, strong and
imaginative leadership (which, however, subsequently became less so), interna-
tional credibility, an adequate power base (for example, the large market share
of the combined countries in certain exports), and balanced strategies, which
successfully raised the debates from technical/bureaucratic to political/decision-
making levels. Following Young's (l989b) approach, they see the strength of the
group as combining the three dimensions of a coalition (structural, technical, and
entrepreneurial). But these strengths were more useful in attaining success in
procedures than in substance. External factors were of course preponderant in
this development: the United States and the EC stuck to their positions with only
minor adjustments (and subsequently even the Cairns group's aligning oppor-
tunistically with the United States to pressure the EC was not successful). In
addition, the Cairns group had to face a countercoalition of food importers.
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Furthermore, internal weaknesses also developed in the group: heterogeneity
caused some members to detach themselves or to act as free riders, and some key
members of the coalition felt isolated as tensions arose about certain issues and
on the appropriate strategies to counter U.S. and EC resistance (for example,
blocking the negotiations on all issues as long as the agricultural deadlock was
not resolved or taking specific types of diplomatic actions). Thus strengths and
weaknesses somewhat offset each other, allowing for some impact on the out-
comes but not all that was hoped for.
Concluding Remarks
Coalition formation and behaviors were important factors in determining the
outcomes of the SEA and Uruguay Round negotiations. In both cases most coa-
litions were predictable, although this outcome is clearer in the SEA negotiations
than in the Uruguay Round. Proximity-a concept developed by certain coali-
tion theorists-proves to be a useful analytical tool. Similarly, differentiation
helps characterize the various groupings that could be observed. Together these
two concepts give interesting clues to coalition building, role, behaviors, and
strategies.
As regards process and outcome, it may be objected that coalition theories
perform well in an ex post perspective but that their explanatory power is far less
evident from an ex ante, predictive viewpoint. Whereas the performance in this
respect seems rather good in the SEA negotiations, it is far from satisfactory in
the GATT negotiations. The mixed outcome of these negotiations (limited agree-
ment at Punta del Este, uncertainties at and since Geneva) could not be predicted
accurately in advance; internal and external bargaining proved to be more in-
volved and uncertain than could have been expected; the occurrence of new
(smaller and more composite) coalitions, their role in the process, and their
strategies were far from predictable.
Are generalizations from these comparative studies possible? Could these
generalizations be applied to the differences between bilateral and multilateral
negotiations and (in a stricter sense) between plurilateral and multilateral nego-
tiations? The SEA and the Uruguay Round negotiations exhibit both sharp dif-
ferences and strong similarities. Differences concern size, the nature of preexisting
institutional relationships, the purposes and constraints of actors, the nature of
issues, the degree of symmetry/asymmetry of information, relative power im-
balances, the involvement of constituencies, and the role of prenegotiations with
regard to process. Agenda adjustment, the use of reservations, and declarations
and compromises were prevalent in the SEA but not in the Uruguay Round
negotiations, where strategies were more oriented toward fragmentation and con-
frontation. Except for this important factor, however, strategies (as influenced by
congruence with goals and priorities) and tactics (as determined by opportunistic
behavior) were not very different between and within coalitions. The practical
limits of veto power were also somewhat similar, although veto threats were more
effective in the Uruguay Round than in the SEA negotiations. The role of third
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parties (and mediating groups or individuals) was also similar in both negoti-
ations. Smaller, sometimes heterogeneous coalitions (such as the Cairns group)
played a not insignificant role in the Uruguay Round negotiations, and they
achieved a certain amount of effectiveness in exerting pressure of the main actors
to convert the pyramidal structure of GATT-linked negotiations into a more
diversified structure; however, this success did not extend to substantive as op-
posed to procedural outcomes. Time was in both cases an important variable, and
the evidence was again that complex negotiations develop as a set of episodes in
a cumulative process; successive phases have both similar and different functions:
clarification, coordination, adjustment, counterproposals, compromises. Finally,
postnegotiation issue resurgence can be observed in both cases.
This complex pattern of similarities and differences makes it difficult to
draw generalizations; rather it shows the need for building up many more "ex-
periences" of conference diplomacy. The emergence of coalitions, as well as veto
power (together with the different nature of the negotiating relationship and of
the organizational and time constraints), is no doubt an important criterion in
differentiating bilateral negotiations from multinational negotiations. The dif-
ferentiation between plurilateral versus multilateral negotiations is more difficult
to depict. However, one could guess that size is more than a mere definitional
variable. If there are n parties and n issues the situational variables are not added
but multiplied. This simple, trivial observation has more important implications
than would appear at first glance.
The previous chapters of the book have addressed some of these questions.
This chapter has focused on coalitions from the perspective of how existing the-
ories help us understand process and outcomes. The preliminary conclusion is
that they shed light on observed developments, help delineate the relevant prob-
lems and issues, and offer typologies of interest. These theories seem to provide
some relevant analytical/descriptive tools. Only further research advances-both
theoretical and applied-can result in detailed and concrete prescriptive (and per-
haps normative) propositions. But both cases convincingly show that parties in
multilateral negotiations would be well advised to include the coalition dimen-
sions in their prenegotiation and actual negotiation strategies.
Chapter 8
Leadership Theory
Rediscovering the Arts of Managen1ent
Arild Underdal (Norway)
I n this chapter I argue that theories of leadership can offer important contribu-
tions to our understanding of multilateral negotiations. In order to substantiate
this claim, I must demonstrate that leadership itself (the subject matter of the
theory) is an important element of multilateral negotiations and that existing
theories of leadership are capable of providing important nontrivial insights into
the "logic" of leadership. Each proposition is a necessary premise for the main
argument. Even an elegant and accurate theory of some peripheral aspect of
negotiation can be of no more than marginal interest in predicting and explain-
ing actor behavior or the outcomes. Conversely, a "poor" theory can easily be
dismissed as being of little or no significance, no matter how important the
phenomenon it attempts to grasp. These two propositions, then, set the agenda
for this chapter.
Before addressing these issues, however, a brief discussion of the concept
of leadership is necessary. Leadership can be defined as an asymmetrical relation-
ship of influence in which one actor guides or directs the behavior of others
toward a certain goal over a certain period of time. l Leadership clearly involves
the exercise of influence and perhaps power, but only some relationships involv-
ing influence or power qualify as instances of leadership (compare Burns, 1978,
p. 18). For one thing, a leader is supposed to exercise what might be called
positive influence, guiding rather than vetoing collective action. Thus, leader-
ship is associated with the collective pursuit of some common good or joint
I gratefully acknowledge comments to earlier versions from Dag Harald Claes, Morten
Egeberg, Helge Hveem, Albert Weale, and I. W. Zartman.
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purpose (see, for example, Burns, 1978, pp. 19-21; Lindberg and Scheingold,
1970, p. 128). According to this definition, being the first to defect from a joint
undertaking would not qualify as leadership, however great and immediate the
impact of that defection might be on the behavior of one's partners. Kindleberger
(1981) even considers a particular "responsibility" of behavior to be a defining
characteristic of leadership.2 The notion of a joint purpose also implies that
leadership cannot be based only on coercion, let alone brute force. There must
be a platform of shared values, interests, and beliefs; successful leadership builds
on and cultivates this platform. Finally, a particular instance of leadership may
be confined to one single project, but as defined here it must at least be a fairly
consistent pattern of interaction extending throughout a certain period of time.
Once in a rare while having a bright idea accepted by some others is not sufficient
to make you a leader.
Is Leadership an Important Aspect of Multilateral Negotiations?
Answering this question is clearly the easy part. The two case studies reported
in this book speak well to the significance of leadership in multilateral negoti-
ations. From Sjostedt's account (Chapter Two) we may conclude that there would
have been no Uruguay Round had not the United States, with varying degrees
of support from other countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), undertaken a strong campaign to put the new trading
issues on the agenda of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
(compare Winham, 1989). Lodge repeatedly refers to leadership as a key factor in
determining the outcome of the SEA negotiations, in both the process taken as
a whole and the work of specific committees and decision-making bodies. Similar
conclusions are offered in many other case studies. Thus, in their analysis of the
process leading the "1992 program" of the European Communities (EC), Sand-
holtz and Zysman (1989, p. 96) conclude that the process succeeded "because the
institutions of the European Communities, especially the Commission, were able
to exercise effective policy leadership."~ In his account of "ozone diplomacy,"
Benedick (1991, p. 6) emphasizes that "the activities of a multilateral institution
[U.N. Environmental Program] were critical to the success of the negotiations"
and that "an individual nation's [the United States] policies and leadership made
a major difference." Snidal (1990) argues that differences in the quality of Amer-
ican leadership explain why the United States has succeeded in exercising effec-
tive "hegemony" in some intergovernmental organizations but not in others.
Also, students working to develop general theories of international coop-
eration consider the quality of leadership to be an important determinant of
success. To give a few examples: Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, p. 128) argue
that "leadership is the very essence of a capacity for collective action." o. R.
Young (1991, p. 302; compare Young, 1989, p. 23) suggests that the presence of
leadership is a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition for reaching agree-
ment on the terms of constitutional contracts. 4 In general, it seems that the more
complex the negotiation setting (that is, the larger the number of actors and the
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number and "intricacy" of issues), the more likely that some actors will emerge
as leaders and others as followers (compare Berelson and Steiner, 1964, p. 358),
and the more critical leadership becomes as a determinant of success. 5 A strong
case can be made for concluding that students of multilateral negotiations would
be well advised to invest a fair amount of their energy in efforts to understand
how leadership emerges and how it is exercised. And this is where we would turn
to existing theories of leadership for help.
The Study of Leadership: The State of the Art
Students of negotiations have generally considered influence and power to be key
elements of bargaining, but only a small fraction of that interest has been geared
toward the study of leadership in multilateral negotiations. Conversely, students
of leadership have by and large paid little attention to the specifics of interna-
tional negotiations. The dearth of research dealing specifically with leadership
in the context of multilateral negotiations means that we shall to a large extent
have to transpose findings and propositions from other settings, ranging from
social life and business management to international politics in general. As in-
dicated in Table 8.1, the setting to a large extent determines the kind of actors,
the systemic context in which leadership is studied, the mode of leadership an-
alyzed, and the set of independent variables examined. Transposing finding
across these different settings is by no means a straightforward operation; clearly,
there are important differences between leadership of a hierarchical organization
(such as a firm) and leadership of a United Nations (UN) conference on strategies
for controlling global environmental change.
Nonetheless, to understand the logic of leadership in multilateral negoti-
ations, we shall have to try to integrate findings and propositions from these
different perspectives. For example, although leadership in international nego-
tiations obviously is exercised by individuals, these individuals act as represen-
tatives of states or organizations, and their roles as agents bring characteristics of
the units they represent to bear on the negotiation process. Thus, a diplomat
representing the present government of the Republic of Iraq, however strong his
Table 8.1. Main Themes in the Study of Leadership in Different Contexts.
Actors
Context (system)
Main Mode(s) of Leader-
ship
Determinant
Domestic Politics,
Business, Social Life
Individuals
Hierarchy, polyarchy, social
group
Instrumental, charismatic
Supply side: behavior (stra-
tegy, tactics)
International Politics
States, governments
Anarchy
Unilateral action, coercion
Supply side: capabilities,
(interdependent) structures
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or her personal standing might be, could hardly escape the fact that the status
of the Iraqui government as an outcast in world politics significantly impairs the
diplomat's prospects of exerting leadership in multilateral diplomacy. The rel-
ative significance of individual versus state capabilities may vary significantly
from one setting to another, but available evidence seems in most circumstances
to point in favor of state capabilities (see, for example, Cox and Jacobson, 1973,
p. 394). Similarly, although leadership in an international conference may derive
from the skill and effort displayed by a diplomat in the negotiation game itself
(pointing toward what I shall call the instrumental mode), influence can also be
derived from the position of the diplomat's country in the basic game (that is,
the system of activities constituting the subject of negotiation). The basic game
determines the capabilities for leadership through unilateral action or coercion.
And, finally, to understand adequately the logic of leadership in multilateral
conferences, we have to come to grips with the interplay of (state) capabilities and
(individual) behavior.
Despite some obvious and important differences in focus and perspectives,
there is much common ground as well. Thus, the study of leadership is generally
concerned with identifying those actor capabilities and relationship structures
that constitute the sources from which leadership can be derived, and with un-
derstanding the operation of the social mechanisms and behavioral strategies
through which it is or can most effectively be exercised. More specifically, at least
three main questions seem to constitute a common core of the field: Which are
the primary sources from which (a position of) leadership can be derived? How
(through which strategies and tactics) is leadership exercised or how can it be?
What difference does it make? More specifically, how important is the quality of
leadership to the overall outcome of different kinds of processes?
As defined above, leadership is a relationship between leader and follow-
ers. The strength of this relationship may be seen as a function of the supply of
and the demand for leadership services. Some minimum supply is clearly a nec-
essary condition for a leadership relation to emerge and be sustained. Positive
demand on the part of prospective followers seems not to be strictly necessary in
all modes of leadership, but it is generally an important determinant of the
strength of leadership relations. Leadership will clearly be most effective when
supply matches demand. Students of leadership have by and large paid more
attention to the supply side than to the demand for leadership services. Some of
the reasons for this "bias" are fairly obvious. For one thing, leaders tend to be
more fascinating objects of study than followers. And those aiming at producing
knowledge that can be of practical relevance will certainly find that the demand
for insight into the "art" of leading by far outstrips the demand for manuals
teaching how to follow. Nonetheless, we must insist that leadership is a relation-
ship, shaped by the demand and responsiveness of the followers as much as by
the supply offered by the leader(s) (compare Burns, 1978).
As indicated in Figure 8.1, the amount of leadership actually supplied by
an actor can most simply be conceived of as a function of two major determinants:
capabilities and structural positions, constituting sources of potential influence;
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Figure 8.1. Potential and Actual Leadership.
Behavior
Capabilities/Position Amount of Leadership
(potential) ....------------.....;~Actually Supplied
by an Actor
and behavior-which more or less effectively transforms potential into actual lead-
ership. For all practical purposes, certain capabilities and a certain minimum of
effort and (tactical) quality of behavior may be considered necessary conditions for
being able to provide leadership in a negotiation process. As indicated by the roles
played by the European Parliament and Italy in the SEA negotiations, enthusiasm
and effort are not enough. However, much can be lost in the process of converting
potential into actual influence, and effort and tactical ingenuity can to some extent
compensate for a weak power base (see, for example, Bacharach and Lawler, 1981,
pp. 96-98; Habeeb, 1988, p. 132). The fact that students of leadership often pay
more attention to one of these determinants than to the other probably most often
reflects different interests and perspectives of analysis rather than different assump-
tions about their relative significance in explaining outcomes. Thus, to provide
inputs to praxis one would, for obvious reasons, concentrate on behavior-the
only determinant that an actor alone can manipulate in the short term. Con-
versely, if one is engaged in macro studies of the rise and fall of hegemons, the
focus would probably be on actor capabilities and (inter)dependence structures.
But in either case the underlying model would almost certainly conceive of actual
supply as a function of both capabilities and behavior.
The demand for or responsiveness to leadership can similarly be conceived
of as a function of the characteristics of the followers themselves and of the
negotiation problem they are faced with. Social psychologists have pointed to a
set of personality characteristics that seem to imply a predisposition to subject
oneself to and perhaps even demand leadership. The relevance of these findings
to intergovernmental negotiations is not clear; presumably, individuals with a
strong predisposition to subject themselves to the leadership of others would
normally not aspire to the role of principal negotiator nor be considered strong
candidates for such a position. Other actor characteristics-such as the level of
subjective competence-may be more important than predisposition in this con-
text. All things equal, we would expect negotiators with a low rating of their own
competence in the subject matter itself or in procedural or communicative skills
to be more inclined to accept for themselves a role as follower. Similarly, an actor
who is close to indifferent with regard to alternative solutions is likely to accept
(although not actively support) the leadership of others. Also, characteristics of
the problem to be solved and of the negotiating situation are likely to have some
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impact on the demand for leadership services. Thus, a short decision time, a
strong element of potential surprise, and high complexity (number of actors
multiplied by the number and intricacy of issues) are factors that can be expected
to increase the demand for or at least the tolerance of leadership.6
A leader does not supply leadership in the abstract but provides a partic-
ular "product"-a particular set of services designed to achieve some particular
purpose. Similarly, followers do not demand, and will not subject themselves to,
any kind of leadership; they are prepared to let themselves be led only in a
particular direction and perhaps only in a certain fashion. Only to the extent that
supply matches demand will a transaction occur and a leader/follower relation-
ship be forged. 7 Moreover, the consumers of leadership services may be ap-
proached by more than one supplier, perhaps offering different services. Facing
two or more suppliers, a follower will presumably align with the one providing
the most attractive product. And in making that choice followers can be expected
to consider their "policy distance" to, as well as the negotiating effectiveness of,
each of the candidates. At the macro level this line of reasoning suggests that the
impact of leadership on negotiation outcomes depends not only on the amount
and quality supplied but also on the "unidirectionality" of demand as well as
supply.
Modes o( Leadership
In order to examine the leader/follower relationship more closely, it may be
useful to focus the analysis on different modes of leadership. Following the lead
of Young (l989c, 1991), this is the path I propose to take. More specifically, I
examine three basic modes of leadership: leadership through unilateral action,
leadership by means of coercion, and instrumental leadership (including intel-
lectual as well as political aspects). These modes can be distinguished, inter alia,
by the mechanism(s) through which they work as well as by the kind of capa-
bilities required to succeed. They also differ in their locus: leadership through
unilateral action is exercised outside the negotiation framework, instrumental
leadership within, while coercion can take place within as well as outside the
negotiation game. In real life, however, different modes of leadership are often
found in some kind of combination. For example, U.S. leadership in getting the
Uruguay Round negotiations underway clearly rested on coercive as well as in-
tellectual power. One relevant implication is that the empirical illustrations of-
fered may well be "impure" cases, where more than one of the basic mechanisms
are simultaneously at work. Nonetheless, the differences are so profound that
different modes may be difficult to combine for any single leader; thus, open
coercion does not go well with brokering or attempts at persuasion by means of
a "good example."
Leadership Through Unilateral Action
This mode of leadership is exercised whenever one moves to solve a collective
problem by one's own efforts, thereby setting the pace for others to follow. 8 As
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indicated above, the actions in question are not moves in the negotiation game
itself. Leadership by unilateral action is exercised through moves undertaken in
the system of activities that constitutes the subject of negotiations (that is, in the
basic game). However, leader/follower relations within the negotiation setting
can sometimes be understood only in the context of leadership exercised outside
that setting. For this reason I consider this mode of leadership relevant.
Unilateral action may provide leadership through at least two different
mechanisms: one is the substantive impact it has on the options available to other
actors; the other is social persuasion. Substantive impact occurs whenever actions
undertaken by one party alter significantly the set of options available to others
or the costs or benefits flowing from one or more of these options. This mech-
anism is operating when a "benevolent hegemon" provides collective goods to
a "privileged group" at his or her own expense (see Olson, 1968; Kindleberger,
1981). The role played by the United States in providing military security for the
North Atlantic area after World War 11 is, to a large extent, a case in point (Olson
and Zeckhauser, 1966). So is also the unilateral supply control scheme previously
implemented by the world's leading exporter of petroleum in support of oil
prices. Note, though, that unilateral action to provide collective goods need not
qualify as leadership as defined above. The hegemon certainly initiates and un-
dertakes problem-solving efforts but does not thereby necessarily guide or control
the behavior of others. 9 In fact, to the extent that prospective partners are allowed
to be free riders, unilateral action by one actor may weaken rather than strengthen
their incentives to contribute.
Unilateral action may change the set of options available to others or the
consequences of one or more of these options in many other situations as well.
Thus, the industries and governments of the small countries in the European Free
Trade Association are likely to find that although formally free to choose which-
ever solutions they prefer, they have in fact little choice but to adopt many of the
standards established by the EC for products and services within their own in-
ternal markets. The sheer size of the EC market and production of goods and
services is such that its internal policy changes tend to alter the structure of
opportunities facing other societies, whether this result is intended by EC deci-
sion makers or not. lO Similarly, in the computer industry IBM has to a large
extent, through the development, production, and marketing of its own products,
set standards that smaller producers find it in their own best interest to adopt.
As indicated by the examples given above, leadership through unilateral
action undertaken on its own substantive merits can be provided only by actors
occupying a dominant or preponderant position within the basic game in ques-
tion. Leaders need not be at the apex of the overall power structure of world
politics but must have sufficient capabilities to accomplish alone significant
results in a given system of activities and a position enabling them to secure (for
themselves) a sufficient amount of the benefits produced to make unilateral ef-
forts worthwhile. Put differently, the unilateral mode of leadership requires a
considerable amount of control over events important to oneself (otherwise an
actor would not go it alone) and-if it is to work through its impact on the set
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of options available to others-also that prospective followers be highly sensitive
to moves made by the leader (otherwise they will not follow).
Unilateral action may, however, provide leadership not only through its
substantive impact on the set of opportunities facing others but also through
social mechanisms, notably as a means of persuasion. Particularly in situations
characterized by high problem similarity, unilateral action may be used for dem-
onstrating that a certain cure is indeed feasible or does work, or to set a good
example for others to follow. The power of demonstrating a cure can be found
in some discussions about the feasibility of phasing out certain pollutants, such
as chlorofluorcarbons (Benedick, 1991). The mechanism of setting an example is
advocated by some groups of environmentalists who claim that by unilaterally
imposing on one's own society strict standards of pollution control a government
may help strengthen public demand in other countries for equally strict mea-
sures. ll In fact, by imposing or threatening to impose unilateral environmental-
protection measures, a government can strengthen demand within its own society
for international regulations. Thus, in the case of stratospheric ozone depletion,
the prospect of stringent national regulations seems to have been a major reason
why several U.S. firms joined forces with environmental groups in calling for an
international regime (Benedick, 1991; French, 1992). Moreover, in certain kinds
of situations-for example, those corresponding to what is known as the "assur-
ance game" -unilateral action by one party may help dispel doubts about its real
commitment. 12 It can do so by providing what Jervis (1970) refers to as "indices"
rather than mere "signals." Thus, a verified unilateral cutback in armaments by
one state may help demonstrate that its bid for a peace treaty or an arms control
agreement is indeed sincere. Osgood's (1962) well-known procedure for graduated
reciprocation in tension reduction (GRIT) relies on a similar assumption about
the reassuring effect of unilateral accommodative moves.
The persuasive impact of unilateral action depends primarily not on its
actual impact but rather on the amount of uncertainty removed or on its moral
force and symbolic significance. Even actions that by themselves make no sub-
stantial contribution toward solving the basic problem itself can indirectly make
a significant difference by helping to persuade others to follow. Accordingly,
although leadership through the substantive impact of unilateral action is a
privilege of the strong, exercising influence through the persuasive impact of
unilateral action is a role to which small and weak countries can also aspire.
"Cheap" acts may not do, though: the moral significance of a move will often
depend, inter alia, on the amount of sacrifice incurred by the actor-and so may
the credibility of "indices" (Jervis, 1970, p. 28).
In the case studies reported in the book, leadership through unilateral
action seems to be less salient than either of the other basic modes examined here.
The traces of leadership through unilateral action in these accounts are largely
confined to intracoalition relationships. Possibilities of multilateral action by a
subgroup were considered at least in SEA negotiations. Thus, Lodge observes,
"The United Kingdom was effectively seen as irrelevant because there was general
acceptance that if the United Kingdom chose not to go along, the other members
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would proceed anyway." According to Moravcsik (1991, p. 49), the threat of
exclusion was a major reason why the United Kingdom accepted majority voting
on internal market matters.
The less conspicuous role of the unilateral mode might, to some extent,
be due to a methodological bias; as explained above, the kind of unilateral action
at the core of this mode of leadership takes place within the basic game and may
therefore attract less attention in studies focusing on the negotiation games them-
selves. Substantive explanations seem more plausible however. Recall that the
official purpose of the SEA negotiations was to upgrade the EC constitution.
This is a project that simply cannot be accomplished through unilateral action
by any single actor. Nor does this particular project leave much scope for using
unilateral action for purposes of moral suasion. In the Uruguay Round negoti-
ations one major constraint was that unilateral adjustments by the United States
(or, for that matter, any other major actor) would create significant competitive
advantages for others. In world trade the United States was simply not a suffi-
ciently predominant position to ignore free riders. Nor was this particular issue
one where the United States could place much faith in the moral force of a good
example. In such a situation a prospective leader must rely heavily on coercive
or instrumental power (or both).
Coercive Leadership
Coercive leadership is a "sticks-and-carrots" approach to affect the incentives of
others to accept one's own terms or at least make a concession. It is based on one
actor's control over events important to others. One actor's (A) bilateral coercive
potential vis-a-vis another (B) with regard to a specific set of issues (i) can be
conceived of as a function of B's relative interest in i (UiB) and A's share of control
over i (KiA) (formally, UiBKiA). Control over important events can be deliberately
used as a device to reward those who join or comply or to punish anyone who
refuses to go along or defects. 13 In the coercive mode of leadership such control
is deliberately used to gain bargaining leverage. 14 Coercive leadership is thus
exercised through tactical diplomacy, involving at least the communication of a
promise or a threat and possibly also the fulfillment of that promise (if it suc-
ceeds) or the execution of the threat (if it fails). In tactical diplomacy an actor
may promise or threaten to do things it would not contemplate except for the
purpose of influencing the behavior of others. Such promises and threats often
involve some kind of links to other issues, involving actors in an exchange of
concessions across issues. If each actor pursues self-interest in a narrow sense, the
exchange rate will be determined by the degree of asymmetry in their interdepen-
dence relationship. As defined above, coercive leadership is basically a relation-
ship of distributive bargaining. This definition implies that, for this particular
mode, bargaining theory may be as relevant to the study of leadership as lead-
ership theory is to the study of multilateral negotiations.
In the era of complex interdependence, virtually every state is capable of
exerting some coercion over some other state(s). But as coercion requires control
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over events important to others, the prime candidate for this mode of leadership
in any particular setting will be a state combining a predominant position within
the system of activities in question with a high score on the overall power index.
In the post-World War II period the United States has probably more often than
any other state found itself in a position enabling it to exercise coercive leader-
ship. Examples of the actual use of coercive techniques are not hard to find. In
the period of reconstruction after World War II the U.S. government forged
economic cooperation in Western Europe by making grants under the Marshall
aid program contingent on a commitment to join the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation and to accept a modest level of coordination of economic
policies. In their efforts to work out a peace settlement between Israel and its Arab
neighbors, the Nixon and the Carter administrations to some extent relied on
arm-twisting as well as "bribery," promising economic assistance as a reward for
cooperation and also hinting to Israeli leaders that future economic and military
assistance might be jeopardized by further recalcitrance.
Also, in the GATT negotiations the United States is still, in the words of
Winham and Kizer (1990, p. 6), "the driving force whose threat of unilateral
action, an implicit reference to increased protection, is a formidable bargaining
chip." In a similar vein, Sj6stedt concludes that "the wave of neoprotectionism"
in the industrialized countries provided strong incentives to the reluctant
members of GATT to agree to hold a ministerial meeting in 1982 to consider,
inter alia, the new trade issues. Coercive elements of leadership seem to have been
less prominent in the SEA negotiations, and the kinds of threats and promises
mentioned by Lodge are all, it seems, internal to the negotiation game. 15
As these examples indicate, exercising coercive leadership usually entails
at least the risk of incurring costs. 16 Not only must a leader provide prospective
partners with sufficient incentives to cooperate on the leader's terms or with
disincentives to refuse to go along, but the more coercion that goes into forging
acceptance of a certain solution, the more coercion is likely to be required to
secure its implementation and maintenance. This relationship points to one of
the basic assumptions behind the hegemonic stability hypothesis: the weaker the
relative position of the hegemon, the higher the costs incurred in providing
coercive leadership. 17 Consequently, a significant decline in the relative power of
the leader may undermine the stability of an international regime or agreement
established by means of coercion.
Instrumental Leadership
While coercion basically comes down to imposing one actor's preferences on
some other(s) or preventing others from doing so to other actors, instrumental
leadership is essentially a matter of finding means to achieve common ends. With
instrumental leadership one actor's guidance is accepted by others either because
they become convinced of the (substantive) merits of the specific diagnosis that
actor offers or the cure he or she prescribes or because of a more or less diffuse
faith in the actor's ability to "find the way."
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Instrumental leadership pervades everyday life: when I heed the advice of
my physician to subject myself to a certain cure, I do so not because I expect to
be rewarded (for example, by a substantial discount in the bill) or because of fear
that she will punish me if I refuse; I do so out of faith in her professional
competence and personal integrity. Similarly, as a teacher I expect my students
to heed my advice only if they consider it valid on its substantive merits or-when
they find its substantive merits hard to determine-only to the extent that they
have confidence in my competence and integrity. But the instrumental mode of
leadership also seems to be more important in international negotiations than
formal bargaining theory would lead us to expect. Actors quite often enter in-
ternational negotiations with incomplete and imperfect information and also
with tentative or vague preferences (lkle, 1964, pp. 166). Whenever they do-and
negotiations on some the new problems of environmental degradation, including
that of global climate change, are evident cases in point-diagnosing the problem
and discovering, inventing, and exploring possible solutions are likely to be
important elements of the process (see, for example, Winham, 1977a; Haas, 1990).
To the extent that negotiations involve searching, learning, and innovation, there
is also scope for instrumental leadership.
This relationship is clearly demonstrated in both case studies reported in
this book. In the Uruguay Round the United States, the OECD secretariat, and
to some extent others (the EC, Canada) performed important functions of lead-
ership in providing a more or less consensual base of knowledge on which the
negotiations could build. Sjostedt emphasizes that the GATT negotiations in-
volved not only strict bargaining over the exchange of commitments but also a
substantial amount of analytical groundwork. Similarly, in the SEA negotia-
tions, key persons, informal groups, and actors in systemic roles (the Commis-
sion, Council presidents) played major roles in developing and "marketing"
formulas that gave direction and impetus to the process. Sandholtz and Zysman
(1989, p. 107) emphasize the role of "vision and leadership, an image of relation-
ships that will respond to new tasks, and the skill to mobilize diverse groups to
construct that future." In brief, the case accounts leave no doubt that instrumen-
tal leadership can indeed be considered an important factor in shaping the out-
come of these negotiations.
In general, instrumental leadership seems to be based on three capabilities:
skill, energy, and status. At least skill and energy may for all practical purposes
be considered necessary conditions for success; Snidal (1990, p. 345), for example,
talks about the need for a "conjunction of resources and initiative." The aggre-
gate impact of the two seems to be largely "multiplicative" rather than "additive"
(Sorrentino and Boutillier, 1975).
The skills relevant to instrumental leadership may be subsumed under two
general headings: substantive and political. To qualify as good, a solution to a
collective problem has to meet several substantive criteria. Consider, for example,
a problem of environmental degradation. In evaluating policy measures actors
would presumably ask, first, whether and to what extent each option can help
achieve a certain state of environmental quality (for example, a sustainable pat-
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tern of resource use). This question will often imply a concern also with tech-
nological feasibility. Second, they would probably prefer a solution prescribing
or inducing behavior that yields an economically efficient allocation of resources.
Third, it seems a safe assumption that actors would somehow be concerned with
the distribution of costs and benefits, which would lead them to face the question
of fairness. But they would also realize that if a joint solution is to be imple-
mented, it has to meet an opportunistic criterion as well, that of political feasi-
bility (see, for example, Underdal, 1992). Meeting each of these criteria calls for
certain kinds of skills. But the skills required are different. This difference sug-
gests that leadership roles may be differentiated within the instrumental mode
itself; most likely one actor leads the way in developing substantive solutions
(providing what O. R. Young, 1991, calls "intellectual leadership"), and another
leads in the political engineering of consensus ("entrepreneurialleadership").IB
This pattern is evident in both case studies. In the Uruguay Round the
United States, the OECD secretariat, and some other actors (notably the EC and
Canada) provided substantive, intellectual guidance. The role of brokering po-
litically feasible compromises and packages was taken by delegates of other,
smaller nations-including Colombia and Switzerland. Similarly, Lodge clearly
draws a distinction between the proactive "champions" of European union and
the "managers" or "brokers" in the SEA negotiations. The champion role was
fulfilled by France ("the realist champion") and Italy (the "idealist") and by the
Commission of the European Communities and the European Parliament-two
Community institutions-while the mediative functions were to a large extent
left in the hands of the Council presidents, even when the incumbent happened
to be the representative of the smallest state (Lodge, Chapter One).
Skill may be a necessary condition for effective (instrumental) leadership,
but it certainly is not sufficient. 19 Only if activated and brought to bear on the
problem in question can skill make a difference. At this point energy or effort
enters the equation. The more human energy geared to the task of solving a
particular problem, the greater the achievement one can expect. In fact, exper-
imental studies indicate that effort itself can to some extent serve as a basis for
leadership, even in the absence of (superior) skills (Sorrentino and Boutillier,
1975).
The amount of energy an actor brings to bear on a problem can be con-
ceived of as a function of available capacity, subjective political competence, and
relative interest in the matter in question. Clearly, some countries-notably those
that are large and rich-usually have a skilled staff available for diagnosing
problems and developing solutions (Cox and Jacobson, 1973, pp. 393-396). From
this perspective it is no accident that the United States led the drive for an ex-
tension of the GATT regime and that France assumed the mantle of leader in the
SEA negotiations. Moreover, the more that is at stake for actors, the greater the
efforts they will be prepared to make in order to shape the outcome. Note, though,
that when it comes to the mediative aspects of political engineering, having a
strong interest in the outcome is not necessarily an advantage. To the extent that
prospective partners see the entrepreneur's own concerns as biased or in some
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other way nonrepresentative, strong stakes may actually undermine the legiti-
macy of the entrepreneur's leadership and impair confidence in the specific ideas
that the entrepreneur develops or advocates. 2o In this perspective, inviting the
OECD secretariat to produce further studies for the Uruguay Round negotiations
may have been a good idea; although serving "the rich," the OECD secretariat
was probably considered less biased than the U.S. administration. Sj6stedt's ob-
servation that intellectual dominance by the proactive champion at one partic-
ular stage of the GATT negotiations provoked substantial resentment among
Third World countries is a nice illustration that aggressive efforts on behalf of
one particular state may easily be counterproductive. Even a strong leader may
be heavily dependent on the availability of "nonallies" to perform complemen-
tary functions (compare the notion of a leadership complex introduced earlier).
The term status is used here to refer to an actor's formal role in an orga-
nization as well as to the actor's position in an informal social order. In the
context of international collaboration special authority is conferred on the in-
cumbents of certain formal roles, including those of conference president, com-
mittee chair, and secretary general. Informal status is partly a matter of personal
reputation, seniority, and so on, but it also depends on the political orientation
of and the prestige ascribed to the nation or government the person represents.
The relative weight of these two components seems to vary depending on the
institutional and political setting (see Keohane, 1966). Whatever its basis, status
generally serves as a key to access (to decision makers, arenas, and issues) and as
a source of legitimacy and respect: the higher the formal or informal status of
actors, the more inclined others are to pay attention to those actors' contributions
and to defer to their guidance. The relationship between formal authority and
informal status is likely to be synergetic, in the sense that the combined effect will
be larger than the sum of the parts.
As instrumental leadership is based partly on individual skills, status, and
effort, it is a role to which representatives of small countries and international
secretariats with constrained mandates can also aspire. In certain respects, notably
when it comes to mediation, representatives of some small countries, particularly
those in the middle position on an issue may even find themselves in an advan-
tageous position compared with their great power colleagues. This proposition
is supported by the fact that a Swiss-Colombian proposal and the brokering
efforts of a group of middle powers built a bridge between the important camps
in the Uruguay Round negotiations. Lodge makes a similar point in her case
study by referring to "the more traditional honest-broker role of a small state
holding the Council presidency." Lodge's account of the SEA negotiations shows
that nongovernmental actors-in some cases even particularly prominent public
figures, such as Paul Henri Spaak and Altiero Spinelli-can play significant
roles. That being said, however, we should realize that effective instrumental
leadership may require a substantial amount of human resources. The fact that
it took large-scale research programs in Norway and Sweden and years of cam-
paigning to convince other European countries to consider acid rain a serious
problem illustrates the point. Therefore, the smaller and the poorer the country,
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the more rarely it can (afford to) mobilize the amount of expertise and diplomatic
activity needed to playa leading role, even in purely instrumental terms.
For obvious reasons, the case studies cannot provide detailed descriptions
of the kind of strategies and tactics applied by instrumental leaders. Suffice it here
to point out that in both cases procedural as well as substantive means of engi-
neering were used by proactive champions as well as by brokers. In both cases
coalition building-isolating the main opponents and undermining their status
as pivotal actors-seems to have been the main path followed by the proactivists.
Sj6stedt's analysis of the GATT negotiations reveals how the United States care-
fully moved by expanding step-by-step the group of partners from a small core
of "allies." Both cases also illustrate how institutional devices, such as commit-
tees and working groups, can be used deliberately to expand the platform and to
provide a seal of organizational legitimacy to a particular project. For the brokers,
the calculated use of informal networks, as well as of compromise groups, was
clearly an important strategy of consensus building in both cases. Moreover, both
accounts illustrate the importance of timing. A mediator would most often like
to get in on the act before a situation of stalemate is actually reached, but the
premature introduction of compromise formulas and package deals may easily
spoil the chances of having them accepted.
Conclusion
Now that we have examined these three modes of leadership one by one, what
can we say about their relative significance in accounting for the outcomes of the
two processes examined in this book and about their combined impact? Although
the case studies provide no basis for determining explanatory power with great
precision, some observations can be made. First, in both cases it seems abundantly
clear that leadership was indeed exercised and that in its absence there would have
been neither a Uruguay Round nor an SEA. More generally, leadership of one
kind or another is an integral part of multilateral negotiations. A certain min-
imum of leadership-measured in amount, quality, and "unidirectionality"-
also seems to come close to being a necessary, though by no means sufficient,
condition for success (compare O. R. Young, 1991, p. 302).
Second, different modes of leadership are normally at play in the same
conference. Moreover, one actor may be able to provide more than one mode of
leadership in the same process, even though these modes are derived from differ-
ent sources and are exercised through different behavioral strategies. From
Sj6stedt's account we can see that coercive and intellectual leadership modes were
at play in the GATT negotiations and that the United States to some extent was
able to provide both. Arguably, this combination is precisely what gave the
United States its political clout in the Uruguay Round. In the SEA negotiations,
instrumental leadership was backed by the threat of subgroup action, and al-
though leadership roles seem to have been more differentiated in this case than
in the Uruguay Round, France was to some extent able to play both cards.
To see why some combination of leadership modes is so crucial to over-
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coming the problems of multilateral negotiations, recall that each mode has a
distinct function that cannot be fulfilled (equally well) by any of the others. For
example, coercion is a means of altering the incentives of one's prospective
partners, inducing them to accept one's own terms or breaking their will to resist.
Instrumental leadership, by contrast, is basically a matter of inventing and clar-
ifying options, integrating or balancing interests, and persuading others to adopt
one's own views. It is easy to see that coercion can be largely irrelevant or even
counterproductive when it comes to diagnosing problems, inventing effective
cures, developing politically feasible solutions, or inspiring followers to contrib-
ute to a common cause. It is equally clear that instrumental leadership can be
quite ineffective in breaking the informed resistance of others. This difference in
functions has two important consequences.
First, there must be some optimal mix of leadership modes in multilateral
negotiations. This optimal mix must include some version of instrumental lead-
ership and (at least) one of the two power-based modes (coercion or unilateral
action). They need not both (all) be provided by one particular actor or coalition
of actors; in fact, roles must to some extent be differentiated (for example, coercive
promotion and mediating do not go well together). The important thing is that
they are both provided and in such a way that they do not undermine each other.
Moreover, each mode seems to have its prime time-namely, one or more stages
at which it is the critical element of leadership. Thus, Sjostedt's account of the
GATT negotiations suggests that coercion (the more or less implicit threat of
protective measures) was critical in, inter alia, the agenda-setting stage but that
once that stage was completed, the time was ripe for intellectual leadership to
help diagnose the problem and clarify available options. At a later stage, nego-
tiations were driven by a mix of coercion and brokering. The notion of the
optimal mix may therefore be developed to include propositions about optimal
role differentiation and optimal sequencing as well. And the two may be linked
in the sense that the optimal mix requires one kind of leader to defer to another
at a certain stage in the process. For example, overt and strong coercion during
the stage of research is likely to impair it, even if the two modes of leadership
are provided by different actors.
Second, because different modes of leadership to a large extent fulfill dif-
ferent functions, the relative importance of each mode in a particular negotiation
process can be recast as a question of the relative salience of different functions
in that process. I have already indicated that different functions are performed in
different stages of the negotiation process. The salience of different functions is
related also to issue characteristics, such as problem complexity and the config-
uration of interests: thus, the more complex the problem and the less incompat-
ible the actors' interests, the greater the scope for instrumental leadership.
Conversely, the more simple and clear-cut the issue, and the more competing the
interests, the less the scope for intellectual leadership. The effectiveness of differ-
ent kinds of leadership may also depend on the kind of decision to be made. Using
Cox and Jacobson's (1973) terms, I would suggest that the power-based modes of
leadership tend to be more salient with respect to programmatic, rule-creating,
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and operational decisions than they are symbolic issues. And, everything else the
same, they tend to be more critical in the implementation of international
agreements than in the negotiation process itself. All this analysis suggests that
in multilateral negotiations we may find not only a leader but perhaps a lead-
ership complex consisting not only of the leader and its active supporters (recall
Sj6stedt's "U.S.-led coalition") but also of "nonallies" performing complemen-
tary functions of leadership. Such a configuration can be seen most clearly in the
GATT case. The United States was no doubt the principal champion of reform
and the driving force in these negotiations, and the United States could by and
large rely on the support of a number of allies. But other actors played comple-
mentary roles that also seem to have been critical in moving the process ahead.
Among these actors were a set of brokers (including Switzerland and Colombia)
and at least one international secretariat beyond GATT itself, that of the OECD.
To what extent, then, are existing theories of leadership capable of pre-
dicting and explaining who exercises what kind(s) of leadership in different
settings of multilateral negotiation, with what (kinds of) effects on the outcome?
On the basis of this analysis it seems fair to say that existing theories can specify
rather well the capabilities required to provide different modes of leadership (and
thus to identify the potential leaders), can identify the principal behavioral strate-
gies available to these actors, and can provide important clues to how capabilities
and behavior interact to affect outcomes. Determining effects on outcomes is,
though, clearly the hardest part. Also, we do have rather elegant theories pertain-
ing to the coercive mode, but instrumental leadership-particularly elements
such as innovation and persuasion-seems to be less well understood. Arguably,
it is also inherently less amenable to (formal) modeling. This drawback applies
to negotiating theory more generally; our models of distributive bargaining are
more "advanced" and conclusive than our models of the integrative mode.
To what extent can leadership theory, in an overall assessment, explain the
outcomes, and the difference in outcomes, in these two cases? The prolonged
stalemate in the GATT negotiations can be interpreted as a case in support of
the hegemonic-decline hypothesis. The United States no longer commanded the
mix of intellectual leadership and coercive bargaining power needed to add a new
set of rules to the GATT regime, and no other state or coalition of states could
yet aspire to fill that role. Many other countries probably saw themselves as being
less dependent than previously on the United States. The growth in several other
economies provided a material basis for more assertive policies than in the past
on the part of important states, and the end of the Cold War circumscribed the
opportunities of the United States to overcome the demand from major (Euro-
pean) allies for their own tariff protection. The problem was exacerbated by the
fact that the governments of many industrialized countries had a rather weak
(parliamentary) basis that made them highly vulnerable to parochial demands
from domestic interest groups. Thus, the supply of leadership was rather weak
on the domestic scene as well. In the EC negotiations a fortunate combination
of formal and informal leadership, provided by multiple actors, made a decisive
impact. The substantive driving roles were clearly played by a couple of major
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member countries. But these governments were able to capitalize on the support
of the Commission (particularly in ideology) and also to use the office of the
Council presidency at critical points in the process. Instrumental leadership
seems to have been important but so also was the fear on the part of the "lag-
gards" that the majority might simply decide to go it alone. The EC case thus
nicely illustrates the interplay of different modes of leadership and of formal and
informal roles.
If we are to improve our understanding of how leadership works in mul-
tilateral negotiations, we shall have to look beyond conventional international
relations theory for inputs. In the international relations literature, including the
study of international cooperation, the power-based modes of leadership have so
far attracted the most attention. A political realist may argue that this order of
priorities simply reflects the relative significance of different modes of leadership
in the realm of international politics. To drive home the point, the realist might
add that if little attention has been paid to the persuasive impact of unilateral
action, the explanation is simply that there is nothing out there to study; the
category is virtually empty and hence irrelevant for all practical purposes.
As indicated above, this line of argument is based on an overly simplistic
notion of the nature of international politics in general and international nego-
tiations in particular. Admittedly, one can easily find instances where, in the end,
power is paramount. But it is equally obvious that the instrumental mode of
leadership serves purposes that power alone can never achieve. If we are to un-
derstand processes and outcomes of multilateral negotiations, we need to be able
to grasp also the logic of intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership. The student
of international negotiations must not only "rediscover the art of politics" (Sand-
holtz and Zysman, 1989, p. 107) but also be able to understand how politics work.
This is no minor challenge because, arguably, the instrumental mode of leader-
ship-like the integration mode of negotiation-is also the most complex of the
three. In particular, processes of search, learning, innovation, and support build-
ing tend to be harder to grasp and model than the logic of incentive manipulation
and rational choice.
Here the study of leadership seems particularly relevant. At least some
traditions within the study of leadership are concerned primarily with the instru-
mental mode of leadership and more with strategies and tactics than with capa-
bilities and structures. The intriguing challenge to the student of international
negotiations becomes, then, to transpose and integrate findings and propositions
from other settings and different traditions of research into a comprehensive
framework for the analysis of multiparty conferences.
Notes
1. Admittedly, this is a rather crude definition, but it seems to capture the
essence of those provided in, inter alia, The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences
(vol. 9, p. 8), The Handbook of Social Psychology (compare Gibb, 1969, pp. 212-
214), and Burns (1978, p. 18). It also corresponds reasonably well to Webster's
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definition of a leader as, among other things, a "principle or guiding part in
group action."
2. The argument is not that leaders are necessarily motivated by altruism.
Leaders may act "responsibly" simply because they occupy a position (for exam-
ple, as the dominant actor in a particular system) where their own self-interest,
at least in some respects, corresponds well to that of the group as a whole.
3. For a somewhat different interpretation, emphasizing conventional
statecraft and bargaining ("intergovernmental institutionalism"), see Moravcsik
(1991).
4. This is, as O. R. Young himself points out (1991, p. 302), a "strong"
hypothesis in the sense that one single observation of "success" without the
presence of leadership is sufficient to falsify it. On closer examination, however,
it seems that Young's definition of leadership reduces this proposition to a rather
trivial statement: leadership, as conceived by Young (1991, p. 285), "refers to the
actions of individuals who endeavor to solve or circumvent the collective action
problems that plague the efforts of parties to reap joint gains in processes of
institutional bargaining." If we insert this definition into the formulation of the
hypothesis, the definition seems, in essence, to boil down to the statement that,
without some action designed to solve or circumvent problems of collective ac-
tion, agreement will not be reached. This hardly qualifies as a particularly bold
statement. Nor is it as easy to test as it might appear; I strongly suspect that it
would be hard to find instances of multilateral negotiations where no action of
this kind has been undertaken. In conclusion, then, a stricter definition of lead-
ership-and also an indication of some critical minimum-seems required to
rescue Young's hypothesis from appearing as trivial or close to untestable.
5. Interestingly, we find in both case studies observations that indicate a
large gap in levels of participation and influence. For example, Sjostedt observes,
"Approximately 70 percent of the formal participants were passive, or almost
passive, in the negotiations following the Punta del Este meeting." Lodge points
out in Chapter One, "It is axiomatic that no major initiative can proceed in the
EC without the consent of France and Germany."
6. Compare findings in the study of crisis management-for example,
Hermann (1972).
7. Here I am thinking not only of the matching of supply of and demand
for specific services; even the more or less fortuitous matching of more diffuse
moods may be relevant (compare the notion of "mood-matching" developed by
Goodin, 1988).
8. The term unilateral is interpreted liberally to include not only actions
undertaken by one single actor but also actions undertaken by a (small) subgroup
of parties acting as a united coalition.
9. And "leadership without followers" would be a contradiction in terms.
10. In doing so, they may also affect the configuration of interests and the
distribution of political influence within other societies-thereby, perhaps, rein-
forcing the adaptive response (see James and Lake, 1989, pp. 6-9).
11. If unilateral action produces positive externalities, there is, however,
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a real risk that the persuasive impact of a good example will be offset by negative
effects on partner incentives. Thus, if pollution control measures undertaken
unilaterally by one country help protect the environment of its neighbors as well,
the neighbors may very well find that their own optimal levels of abatement are
now lower than they would otherwise have been. The general lesson may be
stated as follows: before relying on the intrinsic persuasiveness of a good example
to carry the day, check whether and to what extent unilateral action produces
positive externalities as well.
12. The basic problem of the "assurance game" is that although both (all)
actors prefer mutual cooperation to any other outcome, cooperation is not a
dominant strategy for any of them. In fact, being the only one to contribute is
the worst of all possible outcomes. In other words, whenever some amount of
uncertainty pertains to the choice of one's prospective partner(s), an actor faces
a dilemma.
13. Notice that the word coercion refers to the use of promises and rewards
as well as threats and punishment. In the context of cooperative problem solving,
positive instruments are, presumably, more frequently used than negative ones.
14. This formulation raises the question of what to make of moves that
are coercive in effect but not in intent. The "wave of neoprotectionism" in in-
dustrialized countries mentioned by Sjostedt may be one case in point; I suspect
that at least some of these protectionist moves were undertaken for genuine rather
than tactical reasons. Such moves may clearly be relevant to the exercise of lead-
ership, but if we conceive of leadership behavior as a deliberate effort at guiding
others, they will not be an integral part of that effort.
15. An internal threat is the threat not to accept a particular deal or to
withdraw from the negotiations altogether and thus bring the other parties to
their respective best alternative to a negotiated agreement. By contrast, an external
threat is one referring to moves in the basic game or to some kind of linkage to
external issues.
16. In this regard there is an important difference between positive and
negative coercion. Promises entail costs if they succeed; threats are costly if they
fail.
17. Another basic assumption is that regime preference is a function of a
nation's relative power. More specifically, a decline in relative economic strength
is assumed to weaken a hegemon's preferences for free trade and other liberal
regimes (see, for example, Kindleberger, 1981; Gilpin, 1987; and Chapter Two in
this book).
18. The concept of political engineering is elaborated in Underdal (1991).
19. In his study of the UN General Assembly, Keohane (1966, p. 37) argues
that skill is more important for the representatives of small states than for those
of large states: "Thus, the quality of a great power's delegation may determine
the extent of its influence within certain limits, whereas the ambassador of a
small state may determine whether or not his delegation's views are considered."
The general proposition can also be found in Cox and Jacobson (1973, pp. 393-
397).
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20. Note that the combination of bias and strong stakes tends to worry
other parties the most. As the role of the Norwegian delegation in the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea illustrates, having a strong stake in
the outcome need not in itself disqualify a government from serving as a media-
tor-as long as its interests are seen by others as being fairly balanced.

PART THREE
EVALUATING
THE ANALYSES

Chapter 9
Lessons Drawn
from Practice
Open Covenants, Openly Arrived At
Winfried Lang (Austria)
Multilateral negotiations are different. They differ from bilateral negotiations,
but they differ also from one another. The case studies in Chapter One and
Chapter Two have to some extent demonstrated the broad variety of regional and
global negotiations. The spectrum would have been even more complex if one
of the negotiation processes in the United Nations context such as the Conference
on the Law of the Sea or the negotiations on ozone depletion or climate change
had been included. Yet another dimension of complexity would have been added
by a description of the lengthy negotiations that have taken place in the frame-
work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
Multilateral negotiations are a tempting subject of analysis and research
because they are much more accessible to the researcher than bilateral negotiations.
This higher degree of transparency results mainly from the fact that multilateral
negotiation material (summary records, documents on various national positions,
and so on) is more easily available for public scrutiny than information on bilat-
eral negotiations. To the extent that multilateral negotiations can be likened to
parliamentary proceedings, they show a relatively high amount of transparency.
Participants in such negotiations may even be tempted to use the media to influ-
ence other participants by building up public pressure or by mobilizing nongov-
ernmental organizations. Thus multilateral negotiations reflect in some way the
lofty goal of Woodrow Wilson: "Open covenants, openly arrived at."
This openness of multilateral negotiations is, however, only a relative one.
Important deals are still struck in back chambers by a limited number of key
players. The results of these nonpublic meetings are then transferred to the public
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arena to be formalized and cast in legal rules. Thus, parties that had no part in
the private proceedings are confronted with a sometimes difficult choice: either
they swallow the result achieved without them or they resist. Their resistance,
however, will work only if they dispose of some veto power. If they possess such
power, either by means of existing rules (consensus) or by means of their sheer
weight (economic, political), they should have been included from the outset in
the nonpublic dealings. The transition from private bargaining to open decision
making is certainly one of the most delicate moments in the multilateral nego-
tiation process. At this juncture of the process it should be realized that in spite
of their apparent transparency multilateral negotiations are not more "demo-
cratic" than bilateral negotiations. Although the impact of power may be some-
what mitigated by more or less stringent rules of procedure, power remains a
dominant feature of multilateral negotiations.
Case Studies
The case study of the Single European Act (SEA) conveys comprehensive insight
into the workings of the European Communities (EC), which by means of this
important and new legal commitment made a major leap forward on the road
toward full union. The most distinctive attribute of intra-EC negotiations is the
plurality of types of actors. Not only do the various governments play their
traditional roles and defend their national interests. They also have to compete
with institutional actors such as the Commission and the European Parliament,
which is closely linked to the parliaments in each member state. Coalition build-
ing is therefore much broader and also much more complex in EC negotiations
than in other multilateral negotiations. Another specific feature of intra-EC ne-
gotiations is the presidency, which is assumed by a different governmental leader
every six months. Each government assuming this function aims not only at
performing as optimally as possible but also at achieving maximum results for
the EC interest. As this interest may be at variance with the perceived national
interest, dilemmas may arise for actors during their turn as president. Further-
more, as the negotiation on the SEA affected the future position of each actor in
the newly organized EC, the intensity of negotiations sometimes went well
beyond the average, when more mundane subjects such as foreign trade and the
environment are on the agenda.
This study highlights also the importance of the power factor in any intra-
EC negotiation; it identifies the big four (France, Germany, Italy, and the United
Kingdom) as the key players and recognizes that the first two had to give their
consent to any major initiative. Equally important is the statement that smaller
states were likely to make the most of an opportunity for a statesmanlike diplo-
matic role such as the EC presidency. Tactics such as posturing, coalition for-
mation, and the use of trade-offs were evident within and outside the EC, as were
time pressure and agenda adjustment, through which issues without wide sup-
port were simply dropped from the agenda.
Contrary to some allegations that decision making in Brussels takes place
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in an ivory tower, this study affirms the view that movement toward European
union was kept alive by a steady media campaign. It also confirms that this
negotiation would not have proceeded successfully if there had not been coalition
makers or honest brokers such as Italy keeping the process on track. As in any
other negotiation, the agenda was adjusted; as in any other negotiation, final
decisions were postponed; as in any other negotiation, countries were persuaded
to swap sides. One of the favorite tactics evidently was isolating the least com-
munitarian actor (the United Kingdom): this isolation was achieved with some
success by a close alliance between Italy and the European Parliament.
The Uruguay Round case study suffers from one drawback for analysis-
namely, that the round has not yet ended and that no final conclusions can be
drawn. But the long process and the difficulty in reaching results allow for certain
lessons out of failure. The simple fact that 50 percent of this study is devoted to
the prenegotiating phase stresses the importance of getting to the table (Stein,
1989). This period of continuous confrontation between the United States and
certain developing countries (mainly Brazil and India), especially on the issue of
including new times on the agenda (services, intellectual property), reflected a
new phase of North-South relations: the more ideological confrontation of the
1970s, devoted to the "new international economic order," was replaced during
the 1980s by a more subject-oriented and national-interest-related dispute. This
new, more differentiated approach of the South to economic issues may have been
a major reason why the so-called coalition of dissidents, opposed to the opening
of the new round, faltered in the end and was unable to impede the start of
substantive negotiations. Leadership and coalition theories are called on to ex-
plain these developments.
In many instances Sj6stedt highlights the role of mediators, this role being
played in some cases by the director general of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and in other cases by the de la Paix group, an assembly of
various medium and smaller powers. This middle-of-the-road group, as well as
the Cairns group (agriculture), was able to cut through the traditional barriers
between North and South and by its very existence contributed to fluidity, if not
flexibility, in the negotiating situation.
Analytical and intellectual capacities are frequently referred to as another
important element in this process. As the GATT secretariat, at least during the
early phases of the process, was not authorized to do research and exploration
because of the opposition of the dissident powers of the South, this work was
done by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
which the dissidents also resented. Here again emerges the issue of scientific
certainty, of reliable and objective data, which may well affect not only respective
national positions but also the overall outcome of a negotiation.
In his conclusion Sj6stedt attributes the difficulty of arriving at the end of
the tunnel to two factors: the waning of leadership and the complexity of the
endeavor as a whole. The first factor is certainly important; there need not be the
proverbial hegemon (the United States), but at the very least a highly committed
group of powerful states is needed to keep the process going and to lead it with
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some adjustments to an outcome (it being understood that no outcome is final
and that each and every negotiation may be reopened whenever circumstances
and interests so demand). Complexity, however-the result of having many issues
negotiated along various tracks (agriculture, services, and so on) and within
different bodies-engenders the difficulty in agreeing on a compromise solution
that cuts across these various processes and interests.
It should be noted, as Sj&tedt correctly mentions, that the final result of
this round very much depends on an understanding being achieved between the
chief players of the North (the United States and the EC) on agriculture and
related subsidies (exports, internal support). Thus the initial North-South con-
frontation has turned into a North-North dispute. It remains to be seen whether
sectoral interests or the survival of the international trading system as a whole
will prevail. Indeed, the stakes are high.
Theories
Decision Theory
In multilateral negotiations, decisions have to be made not only at various points
in time but also at different levels. These levels include the respective delegation,
the interest group it is part of, and the full conference. These decisions are closely
interconnected and depend not only on events at the conference table but also on
developments back home.
Decision theory has been geared mainly to research and to explaining ex
post the changes of preferences or the modification of positions on the way
toward the final compromise (see the application of decision theory to the case
studies in Chapter Three). But decision theory can also be helpful to practitio-
ners. By applying the "what if" mode, they can learn how certain changes in their
positions might facilitate or impede progress toward the conclusion of negotia-
tions. This approach can also help practitioners in the prenegotiation phase to
understand potential moves (alternatives) of counterparts and to react appropri-
ately in due time. Scientific support and knowledge is likely to be available only
to big power delegations. Delegates from smaller nations or developing countries
may be at a disadvantage, unless some independent or impartial body is able to
provide advice to those delegations that cannot afford it.
A problem not to be neglected in this context is the distinction between
decisions on procedure and decisions on substance. Here it would be helpful to
develop criteria that would assist the practitioner in making a meaningful dis-
tinction and in being fully aware of the respective consequences. As a matter of
fact, some decisions on procedure, in spite of the benign neglect with which they
are treated by some leading delegations, may have a major impact on the overall
outcome of a negotiation.
Another area in which practitioners could benefit from theory is by gain-
ing insight into the link between events at the conference table and decision
making in the respective capitals. Most delegates would prefer to be closely as-
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sociated with the domestic decision-making process. Some benefit could also be
drawn from insights into the decisions (motivation, orientation, and so on) of
nonnational actors such as chairpersons or leading representatives of interna-
tional organizations in charge of the respective negotiation. This analysis would
also produce a certain linkup with organization theory. Any lesson learned by
negotiators with regard to improving transparency and with regard to reducing
uncertainty facilitates decision making and is therefore conducive to progress.
Game Theory
Negotiations, bilateral or multilateral, are frequently considered games-note the
term key player-although their outcome may be of the most serious nature.
Game theory has attempted to apply its recipes of mathematical rationality to
interactions, which at the top level (governments) may well be considered rational
choices but which at the level of the individual negotiator could well be blurred
by the so-called personality factor. Another factor that may erode the rationality
of choices is the pressure of public opinion.
Game theory, as presented in Chapter Four, gives some important insights
to the practitioner, especially as regards the real-life impact of certain voting
rules. It may well be that the drafters of these rules (being mostly lawyers) do not
realize that qualified majority voting, which replaces the unanimity rule, in-
creases the power of a decision-making body (such as an assembly or council)
several hundred times or that marginal players may by the same token increase
their voting power several times. Thus drafters of voting rules would be well
advised to consult game theorists on such specific issues. Voting rules playa
significant role not only in the EC context but also in global environmental
treaties, especially as regards the use of force or the amendment of these treaties.
At this juncture one caveat should be added. Most multilateral negotia-
tions follow the so-called consensus rule, which excludes the possibility of vari-
ations of majorities on different issues. As consensus building has become the
main feature of multilateral negotiations, national positions based on rational
choices are exposed to sometimes highly effective social pressures, which emanate
from participants that have already joined a different but mainstream opinion.
A delegation may block such pressures only if it is among the key players or if
it is able to rally a major interest group behind its position. Breaking the con-
sensus is socially acceptable only if the delegation concerned can politically af-
ford it. It would be most interesting if game theory could shed some light on this
intricate web of pressures and counterpressures around the conference table and
eventually predict the outcome of these "games."
Organization Theory
Most multilateral negotiations take place in the framework of an international
organization. Among the few exceptions one may mention negotiations related
to humanitarian law convened by the Swiss Federal Councilor the negotiations
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of the CSCE. Since the end of the Cold War, the CSCE has moved to an ever-
increasing level of institutionalization, from which one may conclude that it now
constitutes at least an international organization in the making.
Organization theories and whatever insights they are able to convey in
respect to issues such as structure, decision making, culture, and conflict resolu-
tion are likely to benefit negotiators provided they are fully aware of the specifics
of the organizational context within which they are acting. It goes without saying
that rules and procedures valid within a certain organization affect negotiations
conducted under the auspices of that organization.
Much can be learned from two case studies: differences in the respective
strengths of secretariats, differences in the goals of participating governments,
and so on, explain to a certain extent the different outcomes of the respective
negotiations. This explanation does not mean that substance, the contest of po-
litical and economic interests, would not remain the dominating factor. The
organizational features of a specific negotiation constitute, however, important
background conditions, which are able to facilitate or to delay progress.
Organizations are not only settings for and players in multilateral nego-
tiations, they may also be their stakes. This is particularly true in negotiations
devoted to constitutional issues such as the SEA negotiations, which aimed at
proceeding farther on the road toward full European union. Even the Uruguay
Round has an organizational subgoal, namely, the establishment of a multilat-
eral trade organization. In negotiations on global climate change and biodiver-
sity, institutions were established to make the legal instruments operational.
Exiting international organizations that convene a treat-making conference are
as a rule interested either in obtaining for themselves new tasks or in creating new
institutions. The existence of organizations and their vested interests in respect
to a specific outcome may also explain some of the differences between negoti-
ations on the depletion of the ozone layer and negotiations on global climate
change. Whereas the ozone layer negotiations were managed largely by a well-
established organization (UNEP) having its own interests in relation to institu-
tional growth, the climate change negotiations were assisted and supported by
an ad hoc secretariat that had not yet developed similar interests.
Organizations have an impact on multilateral negotiations even when
their own future is not at stake. Beyond the technical servicing of a conference,
they have to play important roles as advisers (because of their knowledge about
previous practice, legal precedents, and so on) and as catalysts. The chief exec-
utive officers of these organizations can provide negotiators with compromise
formulas that might not have been readily accepted if they had been submitted
by one or more of the negotiators. Proposals coming from officials of the com-
petent organization are most likely to be followed if they reflect credibility and
impartiality.
It is certainly true that "negotiation is the organization in motion" (Chap-
ter Five), especially if one considers highly formalized negotiating processes such
as the codification conferences of the United Nations, which since 1961 have
produced numerous conventions fixing to some extent the present state of inter-
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national law. The complex interplay between the various organs of such confer-
ences (plenary sessions, committee of the whole, drafting committee, and so on)
assimilate these conferences to parliamentary proceedings well known in most
Western democracies. But these organizational negotiations are in charge of pro-
ducing international regulations as well as adapting them to changing circum-
stances (such as progress in science and technology and changes in economic
feasibility), as has been so ably demonstrated by environmental treaties such as
the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer; because of
a high degree of built-in flexibility this treaty may be considered a "living
organism. "
Multilateral negotiations take place in a certain organizational framework;
they are likely to produce new organizations or to endow existing ones with new
tasks; they are carried on within a more or less new context in order to meet the
evolving requirements of the international community. Thus organization theory
and negotiation theory are likely to enrich one another and to convey appropriate
insights to practitioners.
Small Group Theory
Small group theory, as developed by social psychology, may appear to have some
difficulty in proving its relevance to intergovernmental negotiations. First, there
is the argument based on size; how can we apply this type of theory to global
gatherings like the Rio Summit or even to GATT, which at first sight do not
appear to be small groups? Second, there is the argument that negotiators act not
on their own behalf but on behalf of a government; they are supposed to execute
instructions to the best of their abilities. Both arguments contain the proverbial
grain of truth but are not sufficiently strong for us to dismiss the relevance of
small group theory to multilateral intergovernmental negotiations.
As far as the problem of size is concerned, size has no major role to play
with regard to negotiations of the SEA type, but it has to be recognized that
conferences with a hundred or more participating governments could never
achieve meaningful results if there did not exist small negotiating bodies
("friends of the chair") in which representatives of certain interest groups (coa-
litions) and some key players meet in order to work out the most difficult solu-
tions. Thus, most multilateral negotiations of the global type function as a two-
tier process: the full membership of a conference, divided into several interest
groups, "entrusts" the real bargaining to a smaller group of delegates; the out-
come of these negotiations in smaller circles has to be approved within the re-
spective interest group as well as by the plenary of the conference. Thus, it may
be reasonable to apply mechanisms developed by small group theory to multi-
lateral negotiations, provided this two-step approach is followed.
As regards the problem of negotiators not acting as individuals but as
agents ("puppets on a string"), one should not neglect the personality factor.
Negotiators usually enjoy a certain freedom in carrying out their instructions, in
interpreting these instructions, in reporting back on intermediate results, and in
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seeking new instructions in the light of evolutions at the conference table. Here
negotiators may activate the various facets of their personality, their specific skills
or energy, and so on, especially in smaller settings.
Thus, practitioners should not dismiss the insights conveyed to them by
small group theory. The thesis that a specific sequence (generate fresh and in-
teresting ideas, reach consensus on them) is likely to generate optimal results may
take a different form in each case. However, insights such as those related to
group cohesiveness are likely to have an overall bearing on the actual behavior
of negotiators.
Coalition Theory
Coalitions are a distinctive feature of multilateral negotiations. They are indis-
pensable for decision making because no meaningful bargaining can take place
among some 100 or 150 participating governments. Coalitions of states are often
called interest groups in global forums (GATT, United Nations). However, the
notions of coalition and group are not necessarily identical. Coalition implies the
formation and disbanding of associative relations; some governments cluster
around a specific concern, while others move away and join another political or
economic cluster. Thus coalition is a rather dynamic concept of the interactions
in a multilateral framework. Interest groups reflect a somewhat higher degree of
stability-for example, the Group of 77 in the North-South relationship or the
Eastern (Communist) and Western groups in the Cold War. As regards the Cold
War groups, the old structure of the CSCE had a middle group, called N+N
(neutral and nonaligned states), which, because of its middle-of-the-road posi-
tion, was in many instances instrumental in devising compromise formulas and
building consensus around them.
More recent multilateral negotiations-for example, on global climate
change-have demonstrated that permanent groups may not be a regular feature
of negotiations conducted on a global scale: the group of industrialized states has
been split in two (the United States versus the other GECD countries), especially
as regards the fixing of target dates and concrete emission figures concerning
certain greenhouse gases. The group of developing countries has been split in
three: the oil-producing and oil-exporting countries, which are afraid that any
move away from energy production from fossil fuels will destroy the basis of their
wealth; the low-lying and island states, which are afraid of the possibility of
rising ocean levels as a consequence of global warming; the remaining develop-
ing countries, which expect an increase of capital flows from North to South as
a consequence of the transfer-of-technology obligations of industrialized states.
Thus, at a certain juncture an "objective alliance" existed between the United
States and those developing countries that were most strongly opposed to concrete
measures mitigating the impact of global warming.
Coalition theories may have some bearing on the actual behavior of nego-
tiators to the extent that these theories are able to convey a certain transparency
as regards the behavior of coalitions in the past. Factors that contributed to the
Lessons Drawn from Practice 209
formation of one coalition, its maintenance, and its impact on the outcome may
again play a certain role in a different set of negotiations. Whereas the SEA
negotiations involved a continuing confrontation between two relatively stable
coalitions, the Uruguay Round was and still is characterized by associations of
countries cutting across traditional boundaries (North versus South) and changing
across a wide spectrum of issue areas (agriculture, services, market access). In both
instances power, as a political and economic asset, determines the fate of coali-
tions. Developments (such as elections) within the respective countries may also
influence their external behavior. Links of a nongovernmental nature but repre-
senting important economic or political interests may affect the life of coalitions,
as do independent actors such as international or supranational institutions.
Leadership Theory
Multilateral negotiations are unthinkable without leadership. Any practitioner
knows that leadership is a prerequisite for progress, be it within a delegation,
within an interest group or coalition, or at the level of the conference as a whole.
Modes of leadership (unilateral, coercive, or instrumental) may vary at the dif-
ferent levels or according to different issue areas. And it may well be that an
optimal mix of these modes is likely to bring about a result acceptable to most
participants.
Leadership theories, which originated in the context of smaller social
groups or within a given national context, will have to be adapted to the specifics
of multilateral negotiations in order to have an explanatory function with regard
to this type of international and intergovernmental action. Leadership is not only
a question of the skills, energy, and status of an individual. Leadership depends
also on the respective position of the state or government this individual is rep-
resenting. A person is unlikely to be elected to the presidency of a conference if
the government he or she represents adopts partisan views not shared by the
majority or certain key players. In multilateral negotiations leadership is there-
fore a composite factor. The leadership role rests not only on the qualifications
of individuals but also on the political weight of certain countries, their degree
of involvement, their interest in achieving a specific outcome, their willingness
to contribute to this outcome by specific actions (concessions, trading of advan-
tages against disadvantages, and so on)-in a word, on their chosen role.
Two caveats should be added. As multilateral negotiations usually evolve
over a period of many years, it may well be that the leadership role will change
(see the Uruguay Round) either as a consequence of the evolution of the nego-
tiating situation itself or as a consequence of changes of national positions fol-
lowing domestic events. Furthermore, one should expect that leadership is not
the prerogative of one single delegate or one single country; especially at the
outset it may well be that a competition or even contest occurs for the leadership
role. The outcome of these competing ambitions will be either the clear-cut
victory of one participant or some kind of shared leadership, in which the dis-
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tribution of tasks and roles in the various issue areas will again be subject to
negotiations.
Practitioners could draw lessons from the application of leadership theo-
ries to specific case studies provided that similarities exist between the negotiating
situations described in the case studies and the concrete negotiating situation the
practitioner is involved in. Much of the impact of these lessons will also depend
on the negotiator's inclination-either personal or national-to be a leader or a
follower.
Lessons
Drawing lessons for practice amounts to the difficult task of bridging the gap
between theory and real life. Although theories draw on real-life events, individ-
uals acting in a real-life context are reluctant to use theories unless they contain
lessons that can clearly explain and be applied to the situation.
What are the expectations of negotiators? They are most willing to learn
because they have to accomplish a certain task; they are looking for advice; and
they certainly would be grateful to learn, through the lens of a theory, why one
specific negotiation has failed and why another negotiation has been successful.
Negotiators usually are not able to familiarize themselves with all the intricacies
of each of the above-mentioned theories. They would, however, benefit from a
more general negotiation theory, which integrates the insights of the specific
theories. Insights of theories are accepted by practitioners to the extent that the
theories translate lessons of the past into recommendations valid for the present.
The overall intellectual challenge to negotiators should not be underestimated;
they have to decide whether the lessons of the past are really applicable to the
negotiation situation they are confronted with.
What are the lessons negotiators are most likely to need in order to perform
their task in a satisfactory manner?
• At a time when the actors in multilateral negotiations are not only govern-
ments but also economic-integration organizations and nongovernmental
organizations, the negotiator would certainly appreciate information about
the behavior of these new actors, their internal patterns of decision making,
and their vulnerabilities.
• At a time when science (epistemic communities) and public opinion have a
growing impact on negotiations, the negotiator would certainly welcome ad-
vice on how to handle these new factors in the negotiating situation.
• New issue areas such as the environment also require some specialized
knowledge. Negotiators would certainly benefit from insights into sub-
stance. However, much more important for them is the ability to translate
these insights into concrete negotiating positions.
• It would also be helpful to understand better which negotiating experiences
acquired during the Cold War are useful today.
• As the growing size of many multilateral negotiations and the growing role
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of the consensus rule (in spite of the continuing impact of power) constitute
a serious challenge for everybody representing national interests, any advice
on how to manage these problems would be welcome.
• As diplomats trained in negotiating techniques are gradually replaced by in-
dividuals (experts in other fields) less familiar with these techniques but bet-
ter informed on questions of substance, advice on past negotiating
experience and its applicability to present-day situations should be available.
• As negotiators do not act as "lonely riders" but are part of a larger team, ad-
vice should also be available on the internal behavior of delegations.
What lessons do the various theories offer to the practitioner?
• In the prenegotiation phase decision analysis allows negotiators to assess the
size of the bargaining space and the distance that must be bridged among the
parties (national interests, bargaining positions, and so on). During the neg-
otiating process several adjustments are likely to be made; therefore, this type
of analysis may also assist the negotiator in charting a later course of action.
• Game theory helps the negotiator to evaluate correctly the real-life impact of
changing the rules of procedure (unanimity or consensus versus majority)
and in distinguishing between the formal and informal roles played by dif-
ferent actors (such as veto power and preference for impasse).
• Organization theory is able to explain the context of multilateral negotia-
tions and provide the negotiator with an understanding of the limits and di-
rection offered by the structure, decision-making procedures, and conflict
management approaches of the international organizational setting affected
by the negotiation.
• Even in broad multilateral settings most important decisions are taken in
smaller groups; therefore, negotiators acting in such settings and seeking to
provide cohesiveness around innovation need to understand small group
theory as it explains the effects on conformity and deviance.
• Coalition theory identifies different types of coalitions and the possibilities
of their formation. Coalitions are the necessary stepping stones to consensus
in multilateral negotiations, but they can also lead to blockage and stale-
mate, eventualities that coalition theory can explain and help negotiators at-
tain or avoid.
• Leadership theory shows the need for appropriate mixes of unilateral, coer-
cive, and instrumental leadership at prime times in the process of multilat-
eral negotiation; it shows how drawing on skill, resource, status, and
direction moves the proceedings creatively to a conclusion.
When comparing the list of lessons in demand with the list of lessons
offered, one becomes aware that theory, whose objective is understanding com-
plexity, cannot meet all the expectations of practice but that insights from theory
may well be helpful tools for the practitioner, who is concerned mainly with
managing complexity. It should also be stressed that the relevance of theory may
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vary according to the various phases of the negotiating process. Probably no
theory can provide lessons for all phases of this process. Thus, the above-
mentioned theories should not be seen in isolation but as elements of a conglom-
erate negotiation theory that not only assists the negotiator in action but is also
ready to draw on the negotiator's experience in an exercise of mutual learning
and cross-fertilization.
Chapter 10
The Elephant
and the Holograph
Toward a Theoretical Synthesis
and a Paradigm
I. William Zartman (USA)
T here is no winner to the contest; all approaches are winners. As might be
anticipated, each approach in the preceding series of analyses has shown its merit
in providing a compelling insight into the multilateral negotiation process. Each
brings out a particular aspect of multilateral negotiation that is fundamentally
different from bilateral bargaining and that contains an essential characteristic
of a decision-making process with many parties, many issues, and many roles,
and only the loosest of decision rules (consensus). In the process, each exposition
has made some significant advances in its own field in carrying the approach
further than usual. Together they have also shown a rather thorough coverage
of the field. Additional approaches might be envisaged and might provide addi-
tional details that could be checked against the present analyses, but their absence
has not left any glaring gaps. I Issues, parties, and roles have been analyzed from
a number of overlapping but different angles and approaches to provide a com-
plete picture of the multilateral negotiation process.
Before reviewing and synthesizing the results, I should note that the dis-
tinction between plurilateral and multilateral negotiations turned out to be un-
important, contrary to expectations. The reason for this lack of distinction is
important, however: multilateral negotiations tend to take on a plurilateral struc-
ture by being reduced to a smaller number of leading parties-self-selected for
various reasons-with others playing a lesser, defensive, or single-issue role. Mul-
tilateral encounters are pluralized as part of the process of making their multi-
lateral complexity manageable (a point that foreshadows a crucial element to be
I am grateful for the research assistance of Anna KomIa in preparing this chapter.
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developed below). The two cases chosen had different outcomes and somewhat
different dynamics but the differences are not a consequence of the number of
parties.
Approaches
The decision approach using multiattribute utility analysis constructs preference
tables of issue outcomes for each of the many parties and has already been used
in this form to advise national delegations in negotiations. This static method-
ology can be turned dynamic, however, by using the preference figures to yield
"weighted preference payoffs" and "deficiencies" for various outcomes and then
to show how parties can unite to bring about outcomes that maximize their
preferences and minimize their deficiencies. Multilateral negotiations are seen as
a concession process from the main preferences of the principal parties. They
result in a more or less satisfactory outcome-or an outcome at all-depending
on the amount of ~ach major preference "pile" the parties have to give away to
equalize their payoffs. Decision analysis specifies the dynamics, amounts, and
satisfactions in this multiconcession process.
The strategic approach used in game theory has been applied to n-person
games to identify the coalitions that can occur and those that cannot. But it can
be extended dynamically to define multilateral negotiation as the search for issue
coalitions, trading off breadth of support for height of preference, until the dif-
ferent thresholds of nonagreement are reached and parties drop out one by one.
The new extension of the methodology of noncooperative games is more useful
for analyzing multilateral negotiations than that of cooperative games because
the latter already assumes the existence of an agreement point that ensures all
parties some value. Thus, noncooperative methodology is used to see whether
such an agreement point exists at all, where it might be, and therefore how much
movement is required of the parties for an agreement to be reached. By extension
into the practical realm, noncooperative methodology also guides negotiators in
getting to the agreement point, showing clearly the costs (in preferences) and the
conditions (in partners) that the strategy implies. Practitioners, who seem to be
put off by the very term game theory, would do well to learn from its simple logic
and to make more explicit and precise their efforts to figure out individual party's
preference and issue coalitions.
The organizational approach has been employed to identify formal and
informal constraints operating on interactions between parties seen as organiza-
tional systems. But when parties are seen as dynamic entities seeking to move
their organization through the modification of these constraints or rules, nego-
tiation becomes a process of rectifying rules, limited by the same organizational
rules under which the rectification process takes place, on one hand, and the
nature of the parties themselves, on the other. Both payoffs and preferences are
seen as rules because rules determine the payoffs. This approach not only fits the
reality of most multilateral negotiations as rule-making encounters among or-
ganizational persons-bureaucrats, civil servants, and businesspeople-but also
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identifies the key to the process: the procedural rules governing substantive
outcomes.
The social psychological approach of small group theory has been the
basis of the analysis of various effects channeling social behavior. The group is
assumed to exist (a condition that cannot be assumed in the bilateral process),
and maintaining that existence becomes the purpose or task of the group in order
to accomplish other tasks. By extension, then, negotiation is the building of
group consensus when confronted with innovation. The various effects that con-
strain small group behavior can be used to analyze that consensus-building or
consensus-restoring process when consensus is disrupted by new issues. For prac-
titioners, these effects can also be used directly. Negotiation becomes a system-
maintenance process.
Coalition analysis has long been presented as one of the keys to multilat-
eral negotiation but largely on the basis of issue preferences and therefore as a
given. Combined with power analysis, however, it addresses the question of how
coalitions are achieved and maintained. Because consensus is not unanimity but
the construction of a coalition that agrees surrounded by a group that is willing
to go along, power is the way in which consensual coalitions are created. Prox-
imity of parties on issues and differentiation of coalitions among various types
account for the types of power available and are applicable to building winning
coalitions.
Finally, leadership theory is the other standard contender for the key ex-
planation of multiparty agreement, based on some rules of conduct (0. R. Young,
1991). The analysis is usually conducted on the basis of leadership types. Lead-
ership tied to parties' positions alone can produce nothing but deadlock; what
is needed in multilateral situations is overarching leadership to provide a direc-
tion to the various parties' conflicting efforts. Leadership focuses on the compe-
tition between drivers and conductors to direct the efforts of the brokers,
defenders, and cruisers, and so roles determine the outcome.
These approaches are presented as whole views of the subject and not seen
as aspects or subsystems of it; they identify the essence of the subject in different
terms and carry forward their analysis on that basis. Each approach defines the
same process of multilateral negotiation differently and provides a different key
to unlock that process. That key is not simply a disciplinary artifice; it corre-
sponds to an identifying feature of the process as practiced and in turn yields
important insights for the practitioner. Each chapter provides an improved tool
for taking apart instances of multilateral negotiation and fixing them, and can
profitably be used in the analysis of the many multilateral encounters that have
marked the end of the twentieth century.
Each of these windows on the multilateral negotiating room has been
opened wider by the preceding analyses, but in the process each has also opened
further challenges to and opportunities for the particular approach. Each has
shown some diffidence in claiming to hold the key to an explanation of the
outcome rather than simply providing key insights into the process, however
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penetrating the analysis. How can each approach be pushed further to strengthen
its analysis?
The strategic approach could use a voting-type analysis because of the
voting possibilities in the European Communities (EG), but these are usually not
present in consensus proceedings and so all that is left is a ranking analysis in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks. The strength of the
approach lies in its ability to make outcomes understandable on the basis of
preference structures; its weakness is its limitation to a two- (or at most three-)
dimension matrix (Zagare, 1978). A computer analysis, however, could handle a
larger number of dimensions-even the 150 involved in current international
conferences. The graphic persuasiveness of a two-by-two matrix would be lost,
but a tool of analysis would be gained that could show both the possibilities of
building preference groups and of bargaining among reduced coalitions. But the
approach still needs to be combined with some other methodology to explain
change-in preferences, in N-levels, and in strengths. Similarly, decision analysis
has been used less than it could because of its tedious data-coding requirements,
but it has produced some rare and conclusive case studies (Friedheim, 1993).
Additional studies are necessary to provide optimal or ideal-type portrayals that
can be used as baselines for comparison with actual case behavior and to generate
hypotheses to test whether deviation is the result of ignorance and lost opportu-
nities or of other causes that need to be taken into account in a realistic model.
Although it can show when the parties would move if they were to choose the
best agreement point (as they sometimes do), the approach needs to be combined
with some form of power analysis to show how parties make each other change
values and move to other points.
The cybernetic loops enclosing the organizational analysis provide an un-
usually important dynamic framework for the analysis of institutionalized mul-
tilateral movement. As in other approaches, the most promising development
would be simply to apply this framework systematically to cases. Such applica-
tions are rare (Moravcsik, 1991), and nothing thus far in the analysis of the Single
European Act has prepared the audience for the ups and downs of the Maastricht
intergovernmental conference and its aftermaths. Yet of all the approaches the
organizational approach has the greatest potential value to practitioners as well
as to analysts for such extended explanations; the theory needs developing.
Small group theory has concentrated on tactical interactions and needs
development in the directions both of data and of theory. If gathering preference
data is tedious, generating data on the social and personal dynamics of "who said
what to whom and with what effect"-the essence of negotiation analysis-in a
private group is intimidatingly difficult. Equally imposing is the need to develop
a theory-rather than just insights-to handle such data and their process dynam-
ics. Innovation and consensus are important dimensions, not tension-creating
opposites of the same dimension, and they can overlap (consensus to create in-
novations, innovation to create consensus). The challenge of attaching a theoret-
ical handle to these parameters is tantalizing.
Similarly, the need to sort out the conflicting meanings of power hangs
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over all political (power) science and particularly over the political analysis of
any type of negotiation (Habeeb, 1988). Relating roles (power positions) and
coalitions (power aggregations) to power relations provides crosscutting variables
that can generate typologies and propositions, as shown, but still leaves the basic
concept unexplored. The explanatory variables have still not been identified in
the search for the determinants of different-sized parties' effectiveness in creating
(or destroying) coalitions. Coalition analysis in general is taking a rest after some
decades of activity, awaiting discovery of new variables to carry it further.
Finally, leadership has long been a practitioner's rather than an analyst's
concept. Studies that have gotten beyond the Book of Proverbs stage have focused
on the typologies of the leader (Yuki, 1989) and less on matching those typologies
with typologies of followers. Roles and strategies have been referred to above as
a result of inductive analysis, but the three types of leadership need to be related
to followership, preferences, and process to be complete. The question of how
parties compete to give intended direction to multilateral encounters not only
awaits an answer but stands in need of parameters along which an answer could
besought.
The Elephant
Yet the process is all, not each, of these. Each of these approaches has its own
integrity-and sometimes its own discipline-yet at the same time there are over-
laps and relations among them. Game theory and decision theory focus on pref-
erences and the cost in priorities required to attain a winning consensus. Small
group, coalition, and leadership theories all analyze the ways in which consensus,
cohesion, or coalition is achieved, through behavior, power, or style, respectively.
Small group theory and organization theory operate within an assumed entity
characterized by cohesion or restraints; although, unlike any other approach,
organization theory uses rules as its focus of analysis. Leadership roles are inher-
ent in all but perhaps decision analysis, and power is implicit or at least can be
read into each of them. However, these two concepts are explicit and central to
only two of the approaches. Despite the differences in focus, the sense of a whole
is found in the ways in which separate approaches handle the same concept from
different angles.
These approaches can be joined together to present a whole picture of
multilateral negotiations, each approach illuminating a different side of the ob-
ject. They fit together, both in their overlap and in their complementarity, mak-
ing a plated suit that contains the subject. But to make a composite whole out
of them would destroy the analytical focus of each and, without a single over-
arching paradigm, would make the analysis, like the subject, unmanageably
complex. Nor can it be said that they are sequentially rather than functionally
linked; the effects they analyze are going on at the same time, sometimes even one
within the other, or are the same effect conceived differently. Like the analysis
of the famous elephant by an assortment of wise but blind scholars, each of these
approaches latches onto a salient feature of the subject and presents it as the
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whole. In the case of the elephant, the scholar who confronted the tail analyzed
the elephant as a rope; the one who focused on the leg treated the elephant as
a tree; the one who met the trunk found the elephant to be a type of hose; the
one who found the ear, a tent; and so on. The wiser and sightful king who sent
them out then proclaims that the elephant is all of these in its totality. Similarly,
one can say that each of these approaches presents an important insight into the
nature of multilateral negotiation, and all of these approaches combined present
a whole that is at least the sum of the parts. But is the whole larger than the sum?
The Holograph
Independent of the different angles from which it can be viewed, there is an
elephant, a single activity of multilateral negotiation, and its name is managing
complexity. Each analytical approach is a particular answer to the essential ques-
tion of multilateral analysis and practice alike: How is complexity to be man-
aged? Although each is insightful as an analytical approach, none is exhaustive
or comprehensive, and, as a window into reality, each misses large parts of the
whole room that may be visible-but only partially-to other approaches. Yet
there is a room-a subject, an activity-that has its own nature and integrity and
that is larger and more coherent than the view any of the windows give of it.
Complexity is a subject of much inconclusive attention (Warsh, 1984,
chap. I), and management is only a small and even less developed portion of it
(Casti, 1985; Checkland, 1989; Voge, 1985; von Glinow and Mohrman, 1990).
Complexity is not chaos (which also has its own order, as we are beginning to
discover); it is merely the existence of a large number of interacting variables with
no dominant pattern or dimension (compare Casti, 1985; Klir, 1985). It is more
than simply complicatedness and is a specific-if debated-analytical concept.
The most striking characteristic of the subject is its diverse and inconclusive
meanings-the complexity of "complexity" (Klir, 1985; Morin, 1985; Ploman,
1985)-most of which are relevant to multilateral negotiation only to the extent
that they can serve as a helpful heuristic in thinking about the topic. Only limited
aspects of their precise applications relate to subjects with the characteristics of
multilateral negotiations. These subjects fall within the category of organized
complexity (Weaver, 1948), which is not amenable to statistical analysis. "The
fundamental difficulty with systems of organized complexity is that no general
simplifying assumptions apply to them, that is, they do not possess any hidden
simplicity under what is apparently complex" (Klir, 1985, p. 96). But they are also
outside the areas amenable to soft systems management (Checkland, 1989) be-
cause the managers are many, play many roles, and are trying to manage within
the system, not from outside; they themselves are part of the complexity. "A
complex process is irreducible" (Casti, 1985, p. 150). The multiroled nature of the
situation also puts it outside Simon's (1948) insight, that hierarchy is the key to
a large category of complex systems; the sovereign equality of actors in multi-
national negotiations blurs if not eliminates hierarchy, and the variety of interests
and roles tangles what is left of it. Although multilateral negotiations conferences
Toward a Theoretical Synthesis 219
are systems, only in highly institutionalized instances-EC but not GATT-can
they be analyzed as identity-preserving mechanisms (Gottinger, 1983, pp. 77) in
addition to the dependent products of their participants. The problem of analyz-
ing complexity in general has attracted much attention that has led to better
understanding of the edges but that has left a central area, with characteristics
that include multilateral negotiation, still unclear.
Complexity is the essential nature of multilateral negotiation, at many
different-and hence complex-levels. The multiplicity of issues, actors, and
roles and the variations possible in them over the course of the negotiations,
already noted, determine the essential complexity of the process of reaching con-
sensus. Complexity becomes overwhelming, and because it does not contain any
single "hidden simplicity" on which analysis and practice can be based, the
prime imperative of practitioner and analyst alike is thus to find rough ways of
"decomplexifying" to the point where complexity becomes manageable, either
for making something happen or for explaining what is going on. The only
difference between the concerns of the practitioner and those of the analyst in this
task relates to their position in regard to the outcome of the managed complexity:
the practitioner seeks to produce a future outcome, the analyst seeks to explain
a past one. Both use the same three methods to achieve their goal when con-
fronted with characteristically daunting complexity: simplification, structuring,
and direction. Although these three may relate in some minor way to bilateral
negotiations, only in the complexity of multilateral negotiations do they have a
key and necessary role in producing and analyzing results.
Complexity can be reduced and simplified in many ways. It is here that
coalition, a basic effect in many approaches, comes in properly, not as the essen-
tial element in multilateral games but as one of the ways in which participants
in many-partied encounters handle their own large numbers (Stenelo, 1972,
p. 58). But coalition is not the only way to make large numbers manageable; role
differentiation is another. There are a number of ways in which the large number
of juridically equal parties can effectively be reduced through the assignment of
different activities, functions, and strategies. These ways include among others:
• Mediation, which takes out some players as conductors or neutral go-
betweens and turns multilateral negotiations into centralized bilateral
negotiations
• Assignment of group (coalition) representatives, drafting groups, and execu-
tive committees, which relegate negotiations to a smaller (albeit still multi-
lateral) number of parties, which then in subnegotiations presumably bring
in the parties they represent
• Issue-role differentiation, using strategies such as drivers, defenders, and
cruisers, as already indicated
Similarly, issue coalitions are ways of simplifying complexity. Game theory and
decision theory focus on issue positions and indicate ways of packaging, linking, and
trading; parties become vehicles for positions, a further reduction of complexity.
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But simplification is not enough to deal with complexity in a constructive
way to produce consensus on an agreement. Carried to its logical-if penulti-
mate-conclusion, complexity reduction ends up in bipolarization, potentially
the most obdurate obstacle to the desired conclusion of consensus. The multiple
dimensions of complexity destroy any possibility of conducting or analyzing that
process in simple bilateral terms. Whereas a two-party encounter limits roles and
organizes issues, the presence of many parties imposes different roles and prevents
issues either from being easily organized or from organizing the parties. Multi-
lateral negotiation is not merely complexity reduction; it is the management of
complexity, "a process of achieving organized action" (Checkland, 1989, p.78)
that involves reduction (simplification) to make complexity comprehensible,
structuring to make it manageable, and direction to produce a result.
Creative structuring is managing complexity whether carried out by the
analyst or the practitioner (Bennett, Cropper, and Huxham, 1989, p. 308). Prac-
titioners must find a way through the confusing complexity in order to produce
a result that meets their states' needs and interests. A strategy must be worked out
that will establish priorities for issues and parties and will create roles to fit that
strategy. Strategies and priorities are structuring forms of simplification, an at-
tempt to make some order out of the complex parties and issues. Similarly,
analysts must provide some structure to the subject to turn data into knowledge.
If hierarchy alone is inadequate as an ordering device for this subject, other
simplifying mechanisms are needed.
Many of the mechanisms contained in the approaches mentioned above are
clear steps to structuring. Organizations, coalitions, small groups, preference
schedules and matrices, and typologies simplify and structure the complexities
of the process for creative handling. Issue coalitions not only reduce the number
of issues but combine them to produce interlocking agreements. Highly articu-
lated sets of rules usually worked out among parties for fair and efficient oper-
ations, as identified by the organizational approach, produce a similar result.
Chairs, committees, and secretariats help organize debates and establish decision
procedures. Although these elements are usually treated as consequences or ad-
ministrative details of multilateral negotiations, they are in reality parts of its
essential characteristic-ways of managing party, issue, and role complexity by
simplifying and structuring.
The best approach to understanding the process of simplifying and struc-
turing multilateral complexity is through role analysis, for role complexity is not
only a subject to be managed but also the means for managing the other elements
of complexity as well. Roles have received some limited attention in the analysis
of multilateral negotiations. The conceptual work that has been done focuses
primarily on followers' roles-free riders, cooperators, clients (Olson, 1968,
Krasner, 1983; and Oye, 1986; Ravenhill, 1984, respectively). Insightful case stud-
ies of multilateral negotiations tend to be structural, with some explicit attention
to the roles that produce that structure and so produce the outcome (for example,
Preeg, 1970; Ravenhill, 1984; Winham, 1986). "The structure of a system is gener-
ated by the interaction of its principle parts" (Waltz, 1979, p. 72), and those
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interactions are the result of interrelating roles, directed in various ways at "try-
ing to make something happen." The conduct of these interactions to cut
through complexity by providing structure can best be characterized as direction,
understood to include the many ways that the leader, the manager, and the fol-
lower roles in this relation can be played. These roles-which are cloaks to be
donned and shed, not necessarily fixed labels synonymous with parties-take on
their meaning in relation to the leadership function as it is played, resisted,
followed, exploited, circumvented, ignored, and so on.
Direction and its surrounding roles provide the dynamics to multilateral
negotiations, understood to comprise both issues and parties. In his comprehen-
sive analysis of a complex multilateral negotiation, Winham (1986, p. 386) con-
cludes that "leadership was clearly in evidence during the Tokyo Round, but it
was exercised by two parties" so that the structure "that would best describe the
Tokyo Round was a harmonious bipolar system" (emphasis added). As this anal-
ysis suggests as well, leadership or direction was necessary to move from a mere
recognition of coalitions to an understanding of the mechanism that gave them
dynamics and direction and of the relations of the various roles within and
between the two coalitions.
Other analyses of multilateral negotiation also show how leadership was
used to manage complexity by structuring issue and party relations. Leadership's
uses of deduction (formula/detail) versus induction (concession/convergence) to
construct an agreement (Winham, 1986; Sebenius, 1984, chap. 3; Friedheim, 1993;
Bunn, 1992), of centralizing orchestration (for example, through a single nego-
tiating text) (Raiffa, 1982, pp. 211-217), of multiple bilateralism (trial-and-error
construction of multiparty agreements with dyadic blocks) (Preeg, 1970, pp. 130-
134, 184-188), or of two-tiered problem solving (Malmgren, 1973, p. 228) show
how different strategies of guided interaction are the essence of both the practice
and the analysis of managing complexity in multilateral negotiation.
Similarly, decision theory and game theory are tools or decision support
systems (Flood and Carson, 1988; Spector, 1993c) for leaders to use to manage the
complexity of their issues, although the parties will use the aggregating and
ordering possibilities in different ways according to the particular role chosen.
Thus, this type of analysis for managing issue complexity needs to be combined
with other means of managing party and role complexity. Roles are further
analyzed on the basis of power position as they are used to manage complexity
through coalitions-making them, joining them, playing them off, breaking
them up. On the other side, organization theory and small group theory provide
analyses of the means of reducing party and role complexity and focus largely
on procedural aspects, leaving the complexity of nonprocedural issues to be re-
duced by being subsumed under parties and roles. The advice presented under the
small group approach is in the form of maxims for direction, and the cybernetic
(etymologically, "steering") loops that underlie the organizational analysis dia-
gram the ways in which leadership can direct the consideration of procedural
issues so as to benefit from and reform the contextual institutional constraints.
Managing complexity, as presented, is a paradigm, not a theory (Morin,
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1985, p. 65). It is the context for theorizing but more basically a way of thinking
about multilateral negotiations in order to achieve a better comprehension of the
full process. If the basic analytical question for any negotiation analysis is How
to explain outcomes?, the question is answered for multilateral negotiations in
the form of another question: How did/do the parties manage the characteristic
complexity of their encounter in order to produce outcomes? Analysts and prac-
titioners give a conceptual scan of the complexity, followed by a cognitive model
of interrelated categories of simplification, structuring, and direction (Wolkomer,
1993, p. 58). The model has not been presented with hypotheses (although many
of the approaches presented do not have hypotheses of their own either). It is the
setting for the generation of hypotheses, however, that focus on correlations
between strategies and outcomes. When the overarching "name of the game" is
recognized and used to inform the analysis, then the different analytical ap-
proaches can be seen to explain the important components of the whole.
Note
l. Notably, an attempt at an "economic analysis" was tried but resulted
in a duplication of coalition analysis by a somewhat different methodology (see
Bennett, 1987, and other chapters in Humber, 1987). Negotiation analysis has also
been suggested, but, for all of its usefulness in complementing other approaches
used here, it does not have a single analytical focus of its own (see P. Young,
1991 ).
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